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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTIOU 
Throueho\lt history znep hnv~ d.i~eruncd of a ti't'110 :in 
l-1hich th.ere 'Hould b.e justice for ~1.1~ ~hat povci:.ty t·TO'l1ld not 
be~ a time i.n 1-1hich a :man could live i11. dignity an<l be :froo 
to go as f'a.r in this l-Iorld as his inter-ests and tt'bilitl.e3 
directed him--a ti-me in l-rhich. all men t·tould bo s~~cu1._e to lj. ve 
out their liv.es on this planet. This dream probably is as 
old a:s manl{in<l itsel:t, but until ~ecent times. it l-;t1n!&hi(.;d 
little 11lOre than that--a beauti.ful but remot.e posslbility. 
In the seventeenth century this droam or: a go~d 
soeipty t-Ta.s viewed a.new!f This vas the tirno of the gro\·lth of: 
the modern utopian .idea that accompani.ed the slov-1 .rormat:i.on 
o:f the centralized states of Europe.. Its imagery t-ras raticn-
alis.1;ic, .tar reiTJ.oV'e¢3. from the. ecstatic visions which acconi• 
pazs..ied the r~ligi.c:>us1y inspired rE)bellions agitating feudal 
society in its last moments. Af3 the t~aditional patehHork o:t: 
a~tonomous social institutions in ~Jeste.rn. Eu!"ope V:l.S replaced, 
in the int.ercsts of et£ieieri:cy:jt by an increusir..JlY cen~ral­
ized system or rule, men began to conceive or a society that 
would drive this tendenc-y to its conclusion e..nd be governed 
eomnlet.elv bv rationalitv. But not onlv th~ iT'Icl"(H,qing 
- ~ ~ . . . - ~ 
ra,tionality of political power lri~pired the thin..l<:ing of 
social philosP:Pl:ler-sJ they were ~tirred by th€) grm·Tth of.' a: 
1 
neu bourgeois style of life that emphasized calculntion, 
:foresight~ and efficiency, and made Pegula:rity or uork an 
al:most religious occupation. 
2. 
As soon as men began to look at the state as ua \.JOrk 
or art," as "an arti.ficial man, created :tor the protection 
and salvation or the na.tural. man," (Hobbes, Levlathan}, it 
took but one more step to imagine that this "work of art tt 
could be rendered per:rect through i'oresight and l-rill. Thomc.s 
Campanella, a :rebellious Cale.brian monk of: the seventeenth 
century, conc.eived in his City . .2-t the Sun of such a perfect 
worlt or art. In Campanella's utopia, unquestionably designed 
from the most idealistic of :motives, one sees the traits of 
many pre-Narxist utopias. Sa1vation is imposed, delivered 
f'ro:m above; there is an all .... powertu.1 ruler called. the GI'eat 
}fetaphysieus (surely no more absurd than the Beloved Leader); 
on1y one- book exists in the City of~ Sun, a book t·1hich is 
naturally called 1visdom. Sexual relations are organized by 
.state administrators ••according to philosophic rules, n the 
race being "managed ·for the good o:r the commonwealth and not 
ot p~ivate individuals. n Education is conceived along • • • 
entirely rationalistic 1ines, and :indeed it must be, ror 
Campanel.la .felt that the Great Hetaphysicus, as he f."orces 
perf'ectlon uvon history, has to deal t-ri th recalc:i t~ant :mate-
rials: the people, he ~ites in a sentence that bGt~ays both 
r. • .·h .=~a b · • n1 his bias and his pathos, is ·a beast ~t a muv: 1 ra~n. 
1 Lev-Tis Coser and Irving Hovre, ttlmages ot Socialism, rr 
It is here that one come·s upon a key to utopian 
thought : the g-alli:ng sense of a chasm betueen .the scene and 
the subjects, bct\·:een the plan, ready and perfect)O and the 
people)J muta and indifferent. ( Po.or Charles FouriErr, the 
salczr.tan 1-1ith phalanxes in his belt'ry, c.ornes bor,J.e daily: at 
rioon, to -,..m.it .1'01" the one capitalis't-~he ne-eds no more than 
one--uho lvill finance u~t>pia). Intellectuals ~rho cannot 
shape history try to rape it., through either actual vio-
lence~ like the Russian terrorists, · or imagined violenoo, 
tp:e sudden seizure of history by the utopian c:law. In his 
Cit:l of'- ~ Sun., Campanella decrees--the utopian never cea-
ses to decree--that those sentenced to death for cri1nos 
against the God.hoad, liberty., and the higher magi.strntes are 
to be rationally enlightened, before execution, by special 
:functiona:t'ies, so that in the end they will acquiesce in 
their o"'m condemnation. Let no ono say history is unfora-
seen. 
Thus from the seventeenth century on, utopias have 
been imagined in pro.tusion. All pre-Harxist utopian thinking 
tended to be ahistorical, to see neither possibility nor need 
for relating the image of the good society to the actual 
workings of society as it is. For Fourier it is simply a 
matter of discovering the nplan" of God, the ordained social 
order that in realizing Goa's will ensures man's happiness. 
The imagined construction of utopia occurs outsid-e the order 
The Radical Papers, ed. I ·rving Rowe (Uew Yorlc: Doubleday and 
company, Inc 7;1966), P.P· 14-15. 
.3 
or fJ.ux o£ history: it comes thrct.tsh fiat. Onca 'lttO}'ia. is 
esta.blished, r.;isto:t·y gt .. lnds to a standstill ano the rule of 
ratiouulity :r•oplaces th-3 conflict or cln.ss or-, G.s the uto-
p5..$.US nU.Eht have prefex•red to say, the C0l'flict Of p!I.SSiCn.3. 
Friedrich E'n[;Ols· describes this }n-.:oco3s l'Iith both syr.1pathy 
and s.hr-ew0ne~s: 
Society presented nothing but l-Tron~s;. tc.- rcm0\PQ 
theso 1--.rus the te.sk or. rG::l.son. It wns nccc;,~a:r•y, th:::-n, 
to ~~se thi~ unon society from \·11 ~bout by rr·-~rogand~:. 
and l'llwr..cvel-. possiule, by the· cxronple of model cxpcri• 
:ments. These neu social systems trcro foredoomed o.s uto""' 
piru1; the more completely they uere l·Iorkod ottt :tn 
detail, the .more they could not nvo:td dri.fting of.f into 
pure phantasies • • .. • 
• • * • • ·• • • •. • • • • • .. • • • • • • .. • • • • ;. • 
l1e · cap. le;ave it to tho lit~rar;r small fry to 
oolcmnly quibble over these ph::-.ntasic~, t..Jhlch. today only 
make us sm;iJ.e, and to cr-ou o·\"er the super~ori ty or tho;>-\.t• 
ovm. bald reasoning, as compared ~ri th !ltlCh in.snnity. }.'3 
.:for us, vre delight in th!3 stupeneously groat thOU[~ht:~ 
and germs of thought that everyl·ths;:ro break out tht•0\1e;b. 
their phantastic coverine; •. • • .2 
Given the desire to impose utopia. upon c.n indi1"fer-
ent history, a. des.ire t-tb.:i.ch derive:s, in tho main, .frot:t a 
deep .sense or alienation ..fror.: the f'lovr of history,_ it fol-
lOl-IS logically enough that the ut-opians should i:or the 1110st 
part trrl.nk in tettm.s of' elite politics. August Comte speci-
fies that in the nstate of .Positive Science" society is' to 
b 1 · , .. b "' · +- :f i t 11 t 1 r.··''ho_ uto· p..;a to be e ru eu y an e ..... 1. ... e o n e · ec: ua. s • • "" .... 
inaugurat-ed by- the sudden triumph or reason over the va.ga:o-
ies and tt-ris ts of history--1-rha.t o-t;her recourse could a 
lone ly, isolntod utopi an have· but the eli. te, the snall core 
or intellec 't. that, li1<:e hirflt:relf, control.s and guides? 
2I.bid., P• 16. 
4 
;; 
Claudt;t Hen~ide Rouvray, Compte de Saint-Si1non, living in the 
ai'ter£!:10l·T o-r the French Revolution, begins to perceive tho 
mechn.nics or class relations and the appearance !:or the first 
time in modern histo:ry o:r the .masses a.s a decisive force. 
:OUt in the 1nain., it seellls generally true that rc:formers uho 
lack somo organic re1ationship l-lith major historical raove-
nents iutist almost alvrays be: tempted into a mora or leas 
benevolent theory or the ruling elite.3 
In short, !'toom the seventeenth eentu1 .. y on, this· 
dream of a. more just--a good society-...;began to bo thought 
and talked about as n.ever befot>e.. That it \-:as ~ms p:rimarily 
due to the humanism that at>ose out of the nenais3ance l'lhero 
man once again largely put himself at the center. of: the uni-
verse here on earth. :Han becrune an architect, a conBtructor 
and thus, the utopias. They :fai1ed to materialize becaus-e 
conditions \-:ere not right nor even possible prior to the 
nineteenth century £or such a drastic change to occur. Row 
cou1d a Greece exist without slaves, :for instance, end still 
be Greece? 
What proved to be the great bre-akthrough t-ra.s, of 
course~ the Industrial Revolut1on.. A whole new situation 
was created.. Great eoncentt.-ations o:f people not.r lived in 
cities and \vorked in .factories. Production because of' 
machines was- constant1y going u-p--but this Has not the ideal 
socleLy. There were times 01' prosperi.ty--but therto werte also 
3Ibid., p. 17 .. 
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bad times that particul.arly the HOt'kers "'e1•e ill rible to 
adapt to--o.ften starving uith no one to protect them save 
priva te charity. Throughout the eighteenth,. nj:ne toohtb., and 
early t1·rentieth centuri-es, Western econmnies 1"ollol-1ed the 
boo:a or bust cycle 1-tith th~ majority oi: the population fre-
quently ill-o.fr. Their ch~pions l-rere soon to cor.re. 
Behind it a11 renu:tincd the dream or an ovet .. w-rhelming 
abundance of' goods and services l·Ihich men had dree.mcd of 
throughout the cet).turies ,of \·lestern· civilization. Another 
dre3In 1-ra-s that it \lould be possible to approach nearer to 
the ideal of social justice and individual freedom f'or all 
without distinctions of' class, creed, or color. This dream 
had realistically appeared incapabl.o or realization until the 
beginning of' the indus.trie..l age. Ba.fore the development of 
pot-Iered machinery, the hard physical laoor of the vnst major-
ity of: the po·pulation was :r~quired to produce enough for the 
mere survival or these 1.ndi vi duals and the continuance of ths 
social orde.r. The thinking of the pre-ind\lstrial pE>riod was 
stiJ.J_ apparent in Nalthus.' sttmm.ary QOnclusion that the poten-
tia.l. t:or popula:tion il'lcrease vrou1d inevitably ensu-re that men 
woU:l.d alv1ays be in daneer .or s .tarvation. 
During the second hal.f ot the nine-teenth century it 
became increasingly clear that in the .future productivity and 
tot.al. production would rise so fast that an abundance or 
goods and services l-Ias certain. The dates predicted f'or 
reaching abundance varied;, but .as the decadas :passed a groH-
ing ntUllbe:.r of' econo:mists and social critics emile to agree . 
7 
about its inevitability. It i ·s little knoHn tha-t 
John 11~ynard Komes, the influential tvrentioth-centtu•y econ-
omist, shat~od th:i.s vieHp<;>int: "In tile l<>ng-run • • • ntankind 
i~ solyi,:r;tg its economic J?rpbl.eJ1l. The ~cono:mic problem is 
not.-,..f~ \'iO loolt into the .fUtura,..~tho permo.nent problotn Of' the 
human race."4 
This certainty of' abundance re!lloves a. hi thelYto impas-
sable obstacle in the age-long drive to,-lard social justice 
and individual freedom. Social philosophers and theoloeians 
have argued f'or eentu~iea that the ideal or Justico and 1'ree-
dom could have no. 1'irm basis until each individual enjoyed 
his natural riBht to resources suf'.ficient :ror. his subsistence. 
Thomas Jef'f'erson argued that every man needed to possems 
enough landed property to ensu-re his subsistence if b,e \-Iere 
not to be, in ef'.f'ect, a s1av.e, both physically and :mentally, 
in the s_et•vi~e o£ his employer " 
The emergent potential of abundance and the ideal of 
freedom and justice were brought together, perhaps f'OI" the 
:first time, in Edward Bellamy's lastingly inf'luential novel, 
J.ooldnf?l ~to-mrd., ·published in 1888. The central theme o:r 
Bellamy's book is the concept ot an absolute "guarantee'• to 
"abundant maintenance," or i:n other words, ·a guaranteed 
income concept operating in a w.ell-es tablished society .func-
tioning on abundance economy princi.ples and not according to 
the d.ivi::dvc ocohc~ic theory of scarcity. This prcvod to be 
4Robert Theobald ( ed.), The Guaranteed~ Income (JTe~r 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1967); pp. 27~2CJ. 
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way ahead o:r its t:imo nnd, in :fact, is still considered by-
many beyond plausability to<}ay. But the re·cognition that 
the ~iestern l..ror ld was -v1ell O!l its way: to beinz tm economy of 
abundance as a result of' the Indugtrial Revolution, and tha.t 
this abundance 'Has reaching th€1 top seement of society and 
then .:f'ilte~ing do~m to the grO'I.·ring lilid.dle class l-Tith a fe1>1 
crumbs throi-m to the lolr:-er class, led to -vrl.des pread protest 
throughout the nineteenth century. In Ehgle.nd, .such men o.s 
l'lilliam Lovett., Robert ~ren, Jerem;r Bentham, and John Ruskin 
·became champions of the· \Torking man in hi·s search f'or a :Jnore 
:fair- ntake" out of the syste1n--economic, political, e.hd 
social.. Parliament complied l-rith their ·demands to a very 
~imited extent. 
It is in the latter hal:f of' the nineteenth century 
that the openiJl8Wedge of' the real possibility of' tho ng.ood 
society" began to emerge as a possibility. For example, in 
England the elimate was of a society ldth deep ol.envages. 
The uealthy entrepreneurs held the· reins o:r povrer and were 
beginning to .pass on bene.fi ts to the middle clnss. For exatn-
ple, ta.lte the Second Rei'orm Bill o~ 1867; in t-rhich rnen who 
otmed propet-ty or li Ve<i in unfurnished lodgings uorth £10 
annually were given the .franchi~e. , thus excluding the lr.r.orking 
man. The reform measures in Engl and a,ided the middle class 
but largely left the demands of the 1-rorking man unfulfilled. 
~'his was the case of' wottlcers throughout the l·rorld. These 
conditions led to a. resurgence of a. worldv-ride demand,. felt 
particularly thrvughout the Hesternized \·torld, :for the adop-
9 
tion o:f socialism to roplttce the irieq:uits.ble capii:;aliatic 
system. This, or course, 1-~as nothing neu, as ploa o !"or it 
have been inade throughout history, but prlo1~ to tho 1900's 
sph~mcs .f:or a more equitable dis-tr-ibution: or the woalth h a.d 
seemed doomed from the start,. 
J.t is in th1s :unstable ~nvironiilent that . in the lat-
ter ha1:f or the nineteenth century Harx turned everything 
upside dmm.. l-Tith his Comr.n.mist Uanif'es.to (f8!~8), and 
~. Capital (1867-'1894). He bece:me · the leading: thin1cer or 
his age and .indeed is stili a 'Vital :force today. His theo-
:fii~s o£ the eJ.ass struc;gle, 1abor theory -ot: v:alue .. and :tnovi-
table :rall o£ capitalism are adhered to by half of the civi;... 
lized world today. Th.ough he denoune.ed his predecessors as 
utopian socialists, s .till what he envisaged could woll be 
elassi:ried as iri the stream of utopian thoi.lght.5 
The di.f.f'erenee with I-larx \-rag 1 ·of eou:rs e, due to the 
tremendous impact or his id.eas upon the world. 11ru;•x -.ras able 
to avold tl-iO of' the major dj.f'.ficulties of his predecessors: 
ahistoricis.m and the. elite theory. Pa·st utopias which obvi-
ously ":ere ,ri thout equalitarianism~ l-Thich vrere domil'lai;ed by 
an aristocracy of' .mind, could. never have any wide a ppeal .for 
most sav1 that ultimately they must quickly degenerate i.nto a 
.system of' use.ful slavery. 
1-Iarx t-ras the £irst of the major socialist .figui"es v1ho 
' s~n·r the possibility or linking the utopian desire uith the 
5coser, ~p. ei t .. , pp. 17-19. 
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actual development ot' social life. By studying capitalism 
both as an "ideal" structure (pure capitalism being or course 
an economic syste!ll where the means of' production and, distri-
bution are determined by private decision in a .free market in 
contrast to socialism \.Zhere the state c·ol.loctively owns the 
mean~ or production and distribution) and a "real" dyri.~-nic, 
l-tarx :f'ound the sources ot' r·evolt within the self-expanding 
and selt-destroyitlg rhythms of the economy itself. .The uto .. 
pians had desired ~ r~vol t 11gainst history but they cou:ld 
cond'uct it,_ so to speak, only :rrom the space plat.form o:r the 
imaginary .future; Marx gave netoJ pol-u~r to the rev:olt against 
history by locating it, nscienti.ficallti" l-lithin history. 
;The development oi' technoloBy, he concluded, made 
possible a society in which. roon could *'realize" their human-
ity, it" only because the brutalizing burden of ~atigu~, that 
sheer physical exhaustion from l-rhich the great masses or :men 
had never been .t"ree, cou1d now for the first time be rew.oved. 
This l-tas the historic option offered mankind 'by the Indus-
trial Revolution., as it is notor being o.f.fered again by the 
Atomic Revolution. Conceivably, tholl,gh only conceivably, a 
societymight have been established at any point in histari-
. 
cal time which practiced an equalitarian distribution of 
goods; but there -..rould have been neither goods nor leisure 
enough to dispense with the ne:ed for a struggle over their 
di::~t.1·fbution, which means bureaucracy, police.,. an oppressive 
state; a'rld in sum the destruction of equalitarianism. trow, 
afte r the Indust.rial Revolution, the machine might do ror 
11 
humanity t-rhat the aJ.aves had done f'or the Greok patriciate.6 
Part of Harx' s success 't-Tas that he 1-ras one of the 
:firs·t political thinkers to sea that both industrialisnt and 
''the mass society'' uer·a here to stay~ all soci.al scheme:s 
1-1hich ignored o.r troied to c:o:nvert this .fact \·tere t o b.irn n()t. 
Dlarely irrelev.nnt, they "'TE>l:"e not e.ven interi3stit'!~~ Thus b.e 
foresaH 1-rhat .1-re.s crucial: that the great decisions of his ... 
tory 1-ioulci now be made in a :mass s .ocietyJ that the "stnge 11 
upon which· this struggle -would take place had suddenly, dr~­
atically been l-Tidoned far beyond. its previous dime·nsi()ns. 
BUt mos·t important of all .l1arx sal·T the proletariat as 
being ~be agent to lead the transition to socialism. It 1-ras 
this that l-TE,l.S grasped upon by all his avid .follo.\>Iers ... .oto use 
this. proletariat to achieve· socialism ending the .eapi talisti.e 
system. The question was when and what l-lere to be the tac ... 
tics? l-larx had held history was a science and. that tP.e d~s­
truction o~ capitalisr.t l-ias inevitable but as time t-rent on and 
there 1-<1ere no inevi tabl.e s,uccess£u1. proletarian uprisings 
some began to doubt l.farx's validi.ty. It was a:t this point, 
late in t .he nineteenth c.en.tur_y, tha.,t a division o~curred 
within the !.far.Xis't 1-rorld--they i-rer$ ~ow divided into ·tw:o 
camps--·the Revolutionary Soci-alists or the Orthodox l-!arxists 
and the Evolutionary Socia1i.sts· or the Revisionists· 
Europe was the .first rea;t testing ground for l·larxism• 
Thoso on the Cont.lnent generally "L-rere the ftevolutionary 
6Ibid. 
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Socialists.. They oei'ended. the materialistic interprcto.tlon 
of' history, the doctrinl3 of the class struggle, an<1 the 
desirability and inevitability or the violent destruction of 
capitalisn1. Until Harx'1 s death neither Harx nor l!.n~els "1c>uld 
per.m.i t any trunJ;oring wl th the accepted progrw;j and it was not 
until the J.atter 1s death in 1895 that ne't-r leaclcrs nppeared. 
Fro111 that date until the Russian Bo~shevil{ Revolution o-r 1917 
Kark Kautsky vms tho. leading theorist of revolutionary· 
socialism. The history o:r the movement duri-ng these years is 
:filled uith str·12.ggles over points o.:r dogma and tactics, the 
principle one being the one over the question ot: leadership, 
ending with the rise or Lenin to undisputed povrcr and the 
nexcommunica.tion" of' Kautsky. 
At the same time thei"e 1-1as another group called right 
'tdng socialists by some 1 1-1ho represented another strand of 
J.fuxist thought. Their socialism uas· relativ,ely .free froln 
dogmatism in contrast to the more orthodox socialists. 
Although aeknol'Tledging the inspiration or I1ar.x, they haVe in. 
fact abandoned his most distinctive teachings, and have 
worked with no""ir more and no1..r less enmity with liberal demo-
crats. The kind o.f' socialism. supported by this group is usu-
ally called nevolutiona.ry. u 
vlh:ile its practitioners agree with 1·!arx that social-
ism .inevitab-ly d,evelops out o:r capitalism, they believe that 
about by the ldnds of reform supported by non-socialist par-
ties. Hence they worked !:or the passage of legislation to 
13 
improve the condition or the 1-rorkers and to e:fi'ect a more 
equitable distribution of the wealth--in brief, f:or lrrhat is 
called coraprehens.ively l-1elfara legislation. As leadership ot 
these socialists pas·sed lP.rgely into the hands of conserva-
tive trade union me!!lcbors., socialist party progrruns in \<les:t(;}rn 
. . - - . ' . . . 
Europe ca,me- to be quite re.spectable ib. all but extreme right 
and lett quarters. 
The chief thinker ot the "evolutionary" or "revision-
ist" socialists J-Ic.s Eduard Bernstein, t-rho began his examina-
tion of: Orthodox 11ar.xism Just before the turn of the century. 
Although Bernstein was critical of Uarx•s theory or value and 
o:t the economic interpretation of history., hi.s devastating 
attack l-ias against :t-larx' s prophecy oi' the irresistible pas-
sage o:f.' society .from capitalism to sociallsm. As ~rnstein 
sal-T i t-..... and. he provided an abundance of figures to support 
hi.s point-.-the day or deliverance, instead or being about to 
dawn, was in .fact recedizig. He denied that the poor l>mre 
growing poorer and the rich richer ... -the middle class, he 
asse:rted, rar .from being depressed into the ranks or the pro-
letariat" "tvere growing in numbers and thus becoming capital-
ists of sorts: 
It is not only useless; it is the greatest tolly to 
attempt to conceal this from out*selves. The nUl'ltber of 
me~b~rs of" the possessing classes is toda¥ not smaller 
but larger. The enormous incre-ase of social wealth is 
not accomp?Jlied by a decreas i ng number o.f l-arge canit:al-
ists, but PY an increasi ng number- o:r capitalists of all 
<l~grees. The middle classes change their character but 
they do not disappear from the social scale.7 
7to.ne H. Lancaster, Uasters of Political ThouC?ht .. 
Vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton 11if'flin Company, 1959), p. JOb., 
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Takin~ note of' the steady irn.provement in the condi-
tion o:f the 1-lOrlters, Be.l'nstein denie·d. the need and the desir-
ability o£ sudden and -violent revolution. Rather he s-nl-T the 
princi.pla task ot socialist leaders to be to organize the 
worl::ing c~&sses politically and to deVelop them as a demo-
cracy, and to :right i'or a:ll reforms in the state to raise 
the l'sorking -classes and transform the state in the Clirection 
or democracy. This o£ course 1-m.s quite novel and even bore-
tical f'or most Harxists or the period. 
In spite of the· moderation o~ the viel-IS held by 
Bernstein and other oont·inental 11revisionists," their expre·s ... 
sion l-ras never quite free .from a hair-splitting rep.ellent to 
English an.d American students. 
Finally in the 1880's there em,erged ~ re.rormint 
group lThich was ultimately to be the model of' the viability, 
adaptability, e.ffectiveness, and success o£ evolutionary 
socialism. The gr-oup called itself the Fabian Society and in 
the beginning it seemed to be not unlike othe~ protest or-
refor.L"!.i.st groups which l-Tere s·pringing up all over En~land at 
the time. J_[lhe diff'erenc-e uas that this group, though ahtays 
small in numbers, was to have a tremendous impact throur;hout 
England and the rest of' the democratic world. To be specif'ic, 
the ideas o:r ·the Fabian Socialists can clearly be seen as 
influencing the movement to11rard the -vrelf'are :state in America 
and tbis is tht~ 1uain th~::Jis this paper aims to prove--that 
the ideas and. programs of' the Fabi.an Socialists l'tere first 
implerilEmted in Britain and later in the United States, par-
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ticular1y since the advent o:r Fran~rJ.in I'.elano Rocsevclt wd 
his lie-r1 Deal. It is the author's contention tho.t these ideas 
and programs ·of' the Fabia.ns ar>e comparable to a developing 
movement in the United States touard the 'Vrelf'are state or as 
others 1-rould term it, the good society. ·Phis_. then, is l-:hat 
the t·rriter see1{s to prove. 
First, the Fabian Society l-till be examined in order 
to ascertain its history, its impact, ideas and its progrt:ens. 
l"l'hat v-Tezoe it-s acoomplishlllents and its goals? Its st:lted nin 
was the e:I.imination of' poverty, equality o:f o_pportuni ty ~ that 
it uanted the British public to be convinced of' the· need to 
move to\vards .socialism through the democ~atie process. One 
can see its impact in une:rnploynzent legislation, social secu~ 
rity, medical care, and housine;. All these areas ·will be 
examined. 
Secondly, by the turn o:f' the century there emerged a. 
comparable reformist movement in the United States--though 
not nearly so successf"ul as the Fabians. This group is col-
~ectively called the progressives and the extent of: their 
inf'luence is noted by the tact that the period or time of 
thei;r influence is called the Progressive eraJ 1900·1920. 
They, tooj' sought to ·reform or to reconstitute society, and 
they, too, had their predecessors as the Fabians did. In 
this case it vias the legacy o:f' ~the Populists. The central 
question of· the day t·ras' vihether the United States vras to have 
'Hidcspread social justice or continue vr1th injustices? This 
was the time when the ~:orking man had next to no protections--
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he Has at the mercy of' his employer)' and this and a host of 
other problems the progressives sought to alleviate as dit'l. 
the Fabians. They, too, sought to better the social and 
working conaitions of' society. 1-!ost important initially 
l-lel"e the muckralcers '\·Tho exposed the problem3 ~ as Upton 
Sinclair did in his boo!~, ~ Jungle_ (1906). Tec1tly 
Roosevelt, William Hot·lard ·Tart and Uoodro:t·7 \·Tilson are out-
standins examples or prog!'essive presidents and the aoco'lll-
plis.hments or their a.din~ni.strations ·i.n furthering the cause 
of the good society wfJ.l be noted. 
Thirdly, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Ue:t.z Deal \odll be 
ex·runineci. .Du·ring Roosevelt's time~ there t-1-as a marked cccel-
eration ot: the poHers or !'unctions of' the national government. 
The United. States, like Britain, vias 1-1ell on its way to becom-
ing a. l-1Clfare state·, end the Nct-1 Dea1 program shon-ed the 
e:t'i'ect o:r the Fabian and progressive impact;. More particu-
larly, on:e sees the impact o:f the ·Fabians in unemployment; 
social security and housing legislation, and also in !'arming 
and labor legislation. All these areas l-lill be examined,. 
both as to specific programs and the. philosophy behind thetil 
which l-Tere re.flective of evolutionary socialism. 
These, then, are the basic areas that 1-rill be .exam-
ined in this paper. ·B:r exa.TJlinin:g them it trill be shmm that 
Fabian thinking has pervaaed .American progra..I'Jls. 
One .more point· m:ight be mentioned.. \·ihether .ltlabian 
thinking--that of seeking the good society l-rhere all .men can 
develop their full potentialities:, \-there no one need fear 
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starvi ng--is to be achieved through graC.ualisnt#- that i:J, by 
legislation enacted through the democratic process 't-TorldnG" 
1-1lthin the capitalistic system, succeeds in either the Uni~ed 
states or Brital.n depends in l .arge part upon the \olilli-ngneDS 
of the governmen~~s to ·respond to the electorate's dcm~mds. 
The other choice is to byp:;1s.s ~he c1err1ocratic pl'Occss--to 
choose .the path oJ: violence, destruction, and revolution. 
Thet'e is currently a great deal of.' unrest and disenchantment 
within the United States concerning ·-working \o1ithin the demo .. 
cra:tic proces·s·-all or l-1hich was made mani:festly clear in tho 
electi()n year o!' 1968; !'or exa.rnp1e, take this statement o!' a 
young radical., Tom Hayden, a co-o.rdinator of de:nortstr~tioris 
in Chicago at the 1968 Democratic Convention: 
\ole•re going to create little Chicagos every-l:Ihere tho 
candidates appear. 
Our. goal is· to under.score the illegitimacy of the . 
government and to shot-J that it doesn't have any hoFe of 
governing l-rithout social change, beginning t-lith ending 
the war. · 
There • s coming a time -when. the .ftnerican movement wi81 
become more violent for defensive and survival reasons... · 
So in the deepest sense of the word, democracy is on 
trial, tor there are two ways to achieve the good society. 
Eitller to 1-10rk td tbin or outside the capitalistic system or a 
modified capi talistie system.. If the latter choice is taken, 
a resort to violence, chaos, and anarchy 1-1ith the probable 
betrayal or the ideals of individual ;freedom and social jus-
tice will al.most surely .follou... To choose tbe path of vio-
8"The Threat of Little Chicagos,,. San Frnncisco 
Chr<;miele,- Sept. · 2., 1968. 
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lence 1~ould be to re jeet the evolutionary bl"~nd ()1' so.ciJ\li:;m., 
to lose con~rol of the sy:stem~ and then '-Iha.t l-104ld. be the 
position of the inaivi·clual in the good soai;ety? \·iould he 
actualiy bene:Cit.? i-lbich path H:i:ll be taken lttill be. tip to 
the majol"'i ty of tho peopl'e--J>ornaps;, :ro~ . there are al\-lllys 
(lemagogues·· 
Ch.apte~ 2 
THE FABIANS 
Though in the 1880• s several sociali~t JJtovcm~nts e;ot 
under way in England, it 1..ras the Fabians Hho Here to prove 
the most endurine; and the most pervasive. The Fabian Soci¢ty 
became the exception to the rule:t :ror o:f the hundreds of 
socialist soci-eties thnt sprung up in the 1880•s in Ensln.nd1 
most had died vrithin the decade. 
The Society began rather inausp-iciously. Tha date 
-·· 
was October 24, 1884; the scene was the drm.,ring room of 
Ed't.rard Pease, a young man of tlventy-six~ then a partnet .. of 
sorts in a stoelc· exchange .fir..(ll, an occupation which he con-
sid'ered. immoral. as he had become a devotee ot Uilliam Norris 
and all his l-rork. Seated in his dra: .... ring room were sixteen 
i'ellow i:rite~leetuals, among· them Frank J>odmore, the fUture 
biographer or Robert Ot·ren. This group, most of l-Ihom w-rere in 
their twenties,_ had been meeting together for several years 
roro the study and discussion of' current problems of social 
ethics.. They were highly educated men and "tromcn, vridely read 
in the ,.;orks of classical political. economy and the recent 
li teratu:re of land-taxation and socialism. They w-rere influ-
enced particularly by the doctrines of Henry Ge()rge_,~~ the var-
ious British interpretations of r1arx~ ·and the developing col-
lectivism in John Ste'lfnl.rt Nill 's exposition ot the individual-
19 
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They hacl cor(le . to assemble and talk about n. t:Follo:-.-r-
ship or the l1eH Life, t as pr.ojectad by their cuest spea:lcc·r 
o~ the evenin~, Thomas Davidson. Davidson,. knO\·tn ns 'the 
wandering scholar, t ~las a Scottish schoolmaster 'lvho had· emi-
grated to .Ainerica ~.nd th~re developed a cloudy ide-alistic 
philosophy which demand~d. that its aoherents should plede;e 
themselves to live according to thehl:gh ideals or l.ove a:n(j 
brotherhoOd:. .foundinz 1-T}leriever possil;>le communities in l·thiC}i 
such a l:if'e could be l~d~. It was t .bi.s type of monastic 
socialism w-hich Davidson proposed to the gro.up. The histor-
ian of the Fabian Society • Edt-~ard R. Pease~ deciarod that 
what Davidson really had. in mind ·-v1as usomethine in the nature 
O:f 8. community Of SUperior people withdral>m ..ft-om the ~Torld 
because of its wickedne.ss, and shol-ring by example hol't a 
higher life might be led. rt2 
Davidson -was clearly not o£ the stuf'f of ~rhieh cru-
saders are ll'Ulde , and the Fellol-rsh;ip anould be seen :f'or what 
it was, a precursor or the occasion f'or thef'ounding of' the 
Fabian Society 1 not its. raison d•~·tre. 
At the secohd :meeting of' the Fello~rship a r'9solution 
was adopte-d to the etf'~ct "that an association be .formed '4-rhose 
ultimate aim shall be the .reconstruction or society in accord-
1}i>rane1.s Coker, Recent Poli~!B.al .. Thour;ht {Ne"t-r Yor.k'l: : 
Appleton Century Co. , Inc .. , 1934), · P• 1 01 • 
2Lane ~1. Lancaster, 1-!asters . of "Politi.cttl ThouP.:ht, 
Vol. J, (Boston: Houghton J.fif'fl:in Compri.ny, 19:59), P• 307. 
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a.nce 1-rith the highest moral possib.ili ties. u3 Two 1-reelcs later, 
·this vague objective was given concreteness \rhen it \·Tas unan-
imously resolycd: 
The members or the s·ociety assert thnt the c ompeti-
tive syste111 assures the happiness o£ the fel-t at the 
ex.penso of' tho mu.ny and that society must be ).'•occmsti-
tuteo in such R me.nner an to secure the ~l)ner-~1 welfare 
and happiness .. '-' 
This overarchina goal remains the goal or the Fabian Socie·ty 
today. 
Thus out o£ the cloister, the l-ess contemplative nu~rn­
bers of' ·the Fellouship organized the Fabian Society as an 
independent group .on January 4, 1884, ta..ldn~ its no.me· from 
the tactics or the Roman General Fabius Cuncta.tor, in his war· 
against Hannibal. The distinctive _policy of the Society in 
going ahead. cautiously, in choosing the proper moment to act, 
and in the meentime. winning followers 1,rherever they might be 
.found, is indicated in the Fabian motto: 
For the right moment you must \<Tait, as Fabius did 
most patiently, when warring against Hannibal, though 
many censured his delays; bl1t t-rhen the tixne comes you 
must strike hard, as Fabius didll or your 1--1ai ting 1>rill 
be vain and fruitless .• > 
·The question might nol'l be asked, just l-rhat sort or an 
environment did the Fabian Society emerge in? The tirne was 
that or the late nineteenth century, in the 1880•s... Europe 
was alive with the adherents or Harx.. ·The Revolutionar:r 
Socialis·ts were in full bloom. in Germany, in France, and 
4Ibid. 
5t·Iargaret Cole, Tha s~ri .o .• r Fabian Socialism {Uew 
York: John \·lil3y And Sons, 19 · , P• 13. 
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throughout the rest of Europe. But '~hen one turns to Eng1a."'ldj 
there is a. so:!neHhat di.f.ferent situation. 
Stated sinu>Iy, lmgland had its mm political cultu.re, 
its ovm aondl tions, in l-S:hicb revolutionary socialism had no 
great appeal in the 1880 1 s. Initially, when llarx had w~it­
ten his Connnunist J.Ianif'esto in 1848, it had. seemed ~'ngland 
might come -within the revolutionary l!ar.xist fold. As early 
as the r840 1 s, Engels predicted the collapse or the capital-
ist system within the next decade o1• so as a result of eco.;.. 
nomic crisis and tho spi:t"it or revolt in the l-JOrldnz clas.s 
as :rnani:feated in the Ch,artist movement: 
I thinlt the people will ·not endure more than a.nothexo 
.crisis. The next one in 1846 o:t" t847 wi.ll probably brins 
'With it the repeal of the Corn Lav:s and the enactment of 
the Charter. \-that r>evolutionacy movements the Charter 
may give rise to remains to be seen.. But by the time oi.' 
the next .following cri·sis which, accordinB to the nnalogy 
o.r its predecessors, rnust break out in 18.52 or 1853, the 
English people will have had -enough of' being plundered by 
the capitalists and left to starve l'Then the capitalists 
no longer r .equire their services. If' up to that tirne the 
English bourgeoisie docs not paus·e to reflect--and to all 
appearanc-es it certainly ·will not do ao--a revolution 6 
will i'o1lo\-T \.rhich none hitherto kn.olm can be cor.tpared. 
Friedrich Engels • revolt, hOli'eVer, did not occur. 
British industr:r, £ar ~ronf collapsing, ~xpan<led by leaps and 
bounds. Trade revived, thei""e tttas a great increase in exports 
and imports, an astounding incr-eas·e in ·productivity through 
the use of' machines which, while chiefly benef"iting the capi• 
talist class, did reflect itself' in improved conditions a.~ong 
6Harry lv. Laidler, Social Economic Novements (Ne'•1 
York: Cro·~rell, 194.6), pp. 173-74 ... 
certain sections o~ the 1r1orkers. For exa111ple, Parliament 
.fixed the hours or the working day or factory hands lrlithin 
rat-ional limits. In -ad.di tion, in certain trades,. labor 
lL"lions rose and beca.'ile a lJOlrTer in their mm 'right, though 
those uho ~1ere in labor unions consti tutod a mino1 .. portion 
o:r the 'Horkinc class .. 
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Engels is much more perceptive hero. Surveyinc the 
situation, he said: 
The truth is this, during the period or En~landts 
industrial monopoly the English wor1dng class have,. to 
a c.ertain extent, shared in the bene:fits of' the mono-
poly. These ben~fi ts vrere very unequally parcelled out 
a.111ong them; the privileged mino:r:-ity pocketed most, but 
even the groat mass had at least a temporary share nm.,r 
and then., P..nd that is the reason uhy, sinc·e the dyinG 
out of Ouenism, there has been no socialism in England. 
l'Tith the breakdotm ot that monopoly~ the En~lish work-
ing c:ta:ss 1r1ill loso that privilege-d position; it will 
find itself generally--the privilege-d and leading mi.n.or-
i ty not excepted ... -on a level 1-1ith its fellow l-IOrkers 
abroad. And that is the reason why there will be 
socialism again in .England. 7 
His l-Tords 1r1ere prophetic: England's :fortunes 
declined. Therefore, by the early 188o•s- various events 
and circumstances had prepared the way in England £or a 
greater interest in socialism. .Am<>ng these events were the 
extension of the elective 1'ranehise to industrial Horkers by 
the Act of 1867, followed by popular disappointment over its 
ef.fects on the government's policy in dealing with urgent 
problems of taxation and industrial regulation; the· f'inancial 
depression o:r the 1870's, and the agitation over the land 
question. (The contention here being that unearned ineomo 
.from land and prod\lce thereof' ought to be used fo~ the beno-
fit of society as a l-Jhole rather than solely goinc; to the 
. ' ) rJ.cn •. In addition~ in 1880; Henr-y H:incl'"llan published 
England For All, in 1>1hich 1·1arx 1 s main dqctrines ~rere pro-
pounded. Hyndm~n-' .s importance lies ·in the f'o.ct that he rondo 
available to Englishmen the :first English translation of 
Narx's the:ories, !'or prior to 1880, l1ar:>:ts doctrines had 
been accessible only to those Englishmen Hho re2.d Ge·rman and 
French. Thus, r-Iarx' a read.ing public expanded. Also, roost 
important as motivat:Ors for soc.ialisrn l-!ere tl-TO inf'luential 
thinkers or the day, Henry George and John Stew-mrt Hill. 
The extent o'£ the influence of' Henry Geot"go, tbe 
American, upon the burgeoning movement toHards sociali·sm in 
England is indicat.ed by George Bernard Shaw_, a leadin-g Fnbian. 
Sha'ttr stated that he i-ra:s greatly in'£1uenced by the economic 
writings of' Henry George t-rhose Pro5ress and PovertY. (1819), 
'
1beyond s,ll question had. more to do vd th the soc.ialis·t 
:revival o£ that period in Engiand than any other book.n8 
Henry George's views l-Iere set :forth in .Pror;ross and 
l_overt;y: and became at onoe a best seller on both sides o'£ the 
Atla.ntio. Two yea~s later., he vras vigorously lecturing in 
England. It must be seen that George 1 s political thought 
arose out of" his observations o:r conditions he sa.u as he gret-1 
to maturity on thl') P~=t~tf.ie (!o~st in the pe:-icd follmdng tha 
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American Civil liar. As he gret-r 1.1.p, he had been impressed 
with the existence, side by side on the Calif'ornia .frontier, 
o:f abject poverty and i'abulous riches. He reached the con-
elusion~ in what runounted to a "conVel"sion," that poverty 
accompanied progr·asr. because the basic natural resource, 
land, had fallen into the hands of the fev1 ~rho could extrnot 
.from othe-rs 1'ihat price they vTished for its use. It t-1as obvi-
ous to him that the greater value of one piece, of land over 
ano·ther v.1as attributable to its greater fertility or its moro 
advantagem . ts location,. and that the landlord had no right to 
profit .from qualities he had not created. His solution f'o~ 
th5.s anomaly ·vra.s the proposal that society should con:f'iscatc 
this differential by a tax amounting to its entire value. 
Since it uas his view that this tax alone 1>tould be su.f.ficient 
tomeet tho needs or society, his .followers in the United 
States l<rere called nsingle-taxers." 
The Fabians ware later to incorporate his ideas in 
their thought,, though rrom. the beginning they recognized that 
George' s ·vi·el-Ts o.r a single tax on land ~Tould not be applica-
ble to English conditions. As they said: 
Land may be the source of' all wealth to the mind of a 
settler in a. new country·. To those t-:hose l-:orking day 'tr.as 
passed in Threadneedle Street and Lombard Street, on the 
:rloor of the Stock Exchange, and in the Bank or England, 
land appea~s to bear no t"elation at all to tTealth,. and 
the allegation that the \-Thole surplus o.f production goes 
automatically t.o the landmmers is obviously untrue. 
George r s political economy ~ms old-..fashioned. or abs1.1rd; 
~J.d his solutior1 of the problem ot· poverty could not 
withstand the simplest criticism. Taxation to extinction 
or the rent or E.ngli.sh land would only affect a. small 
fraction o:f' bngland•s 1.realth.9 
Though the Fa.binns rejected the land tax panacen., Georco's 
:mention of it did lead them to .find differential values-
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otner than e.conomic rent in profits, salaries, and dividends, 
so George can.'t'lot be J:>ogarde<i as a negligible in.fluenc.c here. 
Also, Henry George strongly inf'luenc.~a ttnd rnotivatoo 
the Fabians in the social political area. 11embers of the 
Fabian Society .frequently spoke o.f their debt to him. 
Edt-Tard R. Pease, historian or the Fabian Society, had this to 
say of' George and his work: 
,Progross and Pover.t:;r gave an extraordinary impetus to 
the political thought of' the tira.e. It proponcd to red~ess 
the l-Tron~s sui'fet-ed by the rrorking ola.s se s e:s a. l!shole: 
the poverty it considered was the poverty· o·:r the t-rae;e 
workers as a class, not the destitution of the unfortunate 
downtrodden individuals.. It dic:l not merely propose,. like 
philanthropy and the Poor La:w, to relieve the acute suf-
fering or tho outcasts or civi'li.zation, those conpenmed to 
l>rretchednoss by the incapacity,. the vice, the folly, or 
the sheer mis.fot-tune of .themselves or their relations. It 
suggested a method by r1hich loiealth wou1d correspond 
approximately with worth, by which the re\1ard ot labour 
would go to those loTho laboured; the idleness alike or rich 
and poor rrould cease; the abundant l-realth created by mod-
ern industry 1-roU:ld be· distributed with something like 
~airness and even equality, a.'"nongst those \-tho contributed 
to its production.. Above all, this tremendous revolution 
was to be accomplished by a political method, app.licable 
by a :majority o:f the voters, and eapable of bcin~ drafted 
.as an Act of Parliament by a:rry competent la'llrye.r. •0 
Thus George's glot-ting picture of a society Hithout 
want, 'Where poverty would be erradicated, fired the imag~na­
tions of the Fabian Socialists. Although they found George's 
9Ed't·1al .. d R •. ?~a:;a, Filstor;i of the Fabian Bocie.;t 
(London: George Allen and Unl-rin, 1924 J, p. · 21 . 
1 Oibid., p. 20. 
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means £or getting· rid of: unearned 1.real th by a land tax inap-
plicable to England, they \·tore inspired to think of other 
solutions. In short, George gttve them the ideal--that pov-· 
erty could be .erra.dicatcd,. that justice and ltell-beine or 9. 
society could be realized by \-Iorking ~rithin the existinz 
political system. Thero \-JOUld be no need :ror revolution. 
A sccono major in-fluence on .future Fabians l-Ias John 
Steuart J.tilJ., who is o;ften characterized as a ·transitional 
figure .from individualism to socialism. It is tho :mature 
John Stet-rar·t l1ill \-Iho was o.f interest to the Fabians. First, 
f.-fill is· important because he made socialism rospectabl() by 
his syz11pathotic consideration of tlhat he called conrnunism in 
the later editions of his .Principles ~ POlitical F.cono_J'E[ .. 
There he went so f'ar as to say that,. if' private property and 
enterprise were shovm necessarily to entail the distribution 
of wealth i-n invers·e proportion to the labor expended in 
creating wealth: 
• • • the remuneration dwindling as the wor!c gl'"Ot-ts hnrder 
and more disagreeable, ilntil the most .t'atiguil1S and 
exhausting bodily labor can.."'lot count 'lrrith certainty on 
being abl~ to earn even the ne?essi ties of l~f'e! if_ this 
or cortm1un~s:m 'Here the alternat:Lve, all the dl..f'.f:tcultie-s, 
great or fraall, o.f communism -would be but as cust in the 
balance .. 1 
In his .Autobiograph_x (1873), Mill ··Hent on to expound 
on the belief's of hirnsel.f and his l-rit"e: 
\fuile t-Te repudiated l-Iith the great~st enore:r t~at·. tyr-
anny of' society over the individual t-1h1c~ r.t!:mt soc1.a.l1st 
0 systems are supposed to involve_, we yet loo:-::ed .fort-.ard t 
11Laidler, op .. cit., p .. 180. 
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a time t-rhen soc.iety l-till no longer be divided. into the 
i~dle and the industrious; '\l'hcin the rul-e thut they lrho do 
not work shall not eat uill l)e &pplied not to paupet-s 
only~ but in1partially to aTl; vThen the division of the 
product of" labor~ instead or ·depending as in so great a 
d.egree it no't-T does, on the accident or birth, uill 'be 
mad.e by concert on an a:cJmoHleclged principle o:r Justice; 
and t-the.n it \-lill no longer be, or be thoueht to bo, 
i!ilpossible !'or huitlau beings to exert them.sclves ·strenu-
ously in procurinr; benefit.s '!·fhi ch 2.re not to be exclu;-
sively their- Ot·m,. but to be shared with the socie.ty they 
belong to... The social problem or the f11ture \..re consid-
ered to be hOlv to unite the greatest individual liberty 
o£ action with a com.inon Ol-mership of the rat-i :material Of' 
t'?-e globe, and an e~ual partnership or all ·in the 'bene-
f1ts of combined labor.12 
This was his good society~ 1~here :men t-rould act :from 'linscl.f-
ish rather tha.l'l sel.:Cish motives. 
J.fi11 l-rent on in the S2,r.le Vein in the last year O.f 
his 1i£e 't·Then he planned a book on socialism" though he orily 
completed the f'irst tour chapters, 't-thich 1-1ere published in 
the EortnightlY: P.evievr in 1879. In these chapters he main-
tained that the arrival. o:r manhood su.f:frage \·Iould sooner or 
late.r lead to a thorough discussion of' the i'oundati.on:s ot the 
system o.f private property, and that in .fact, this discussion 
vas already taking place. Here he admits that: 
The intellEH;tua.l and moral grouncs o.f socialism 
deserve the most attentive study, as a.f':t"ording in many 
cases th~ guiding principles o:f improvements necessary . 
to give the present economic .system oi' society :its best 
chance.13 
Uill concluded vtitl:l a statement that there must be a 
change in the attitude of the state to property, it a nel-l 
socia1 oi"der Here to be brought about: 
12lbid., pp. 190~81 . 13Ibid. 
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A propos-ed reform in la>·rs and custot:1s is not neces-
saril;r objecti9ne.ble becP.use its· e.dOJ:-tion ':ould iinply 
nqt the adaptnti.on of all hurrs.an a.f.fai:i."'s to th~ existin3 
idea of p1~opcrty, but the adaptation of' existinc idl3n.3 
of property to the gr.o\·ith and improvement of hu.rnnn 
aff'airs. • . • Society is fully entitled to abroeatc or 
alter particular- rigll.f;s of property \·rhich, on suff'iciont 
consi<Jera.tioli, it judges to st.e..nd in the 1-:ay of }")Ublic 
~ood. _.And assuredlt the terrible case which thQ socinl-
l.sts are able to :ma!te out ag!linst .tho ec..,no'rlic order or 
societ:r; cetnand::t a full cons.id.eration of all means by 
1o1hi~h the institution may have a chance of being nac:te to 
wor)c in a mf'..nner more bene:ricia1 to that portion ot 
society v.ih;tch at present enjoys the least share or its 
bene:Cits .. 11~· 
And so the temper of the tuQes in the 183o•s were 
ripe .fot'· the rise of' sociali.stic societies. Since the 184o•s 
• 
the English woroking man had seen some of: their HOrst evils 
ameliorated through social legislation. Thei~ demand 1'o~ 
immediate and violent change as in the days of' the Chartists 
had given way to a struggle over improv-ement through the b3.l-
lot, tnrough legislation, and through the strengthening of 
co-operatives. So the- trend 1-1as to worlt t-ti thin the system; 
chango would be gradually brought ~bout. It is ih this imo--
diate setting. that the Fabian Soci.ety t-Ias born. 
By the end of the 1870 1 s security suddenly crone to an 
end. A aepr>ession was . .L a., hand. The triple bubble of pros-
perit1, progress, and well-being had been ·broken.. A g:reat 
number o:r the working -class .round themselves out of' t-rork, 
without -vrages and once their small savings and union benefits 
were gone, dependent on charity and the cold l"i~idities of 
the P9cr Law-;. :Jkilled t1.·au~smen road.e connnon caus~ t·Ti.tll the 
-----·--
1l~Ibld. 
nri.f.f-ra.f.f'u who demonstrated in T~e.f'aJ.gar Square and broko 
shop and club t:ind<:H·Is in Pall 1-!a!l. 15 
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At the sn.me tim~, the stream o:r .social legislation 
sho"t-red signs or dryin3 up, and it appeared that tho irrtpctus 
01" tho p~u·ties • J:-O.rticu1arly the L:i.be:r>e:al Party, toHar.ds 
social ref'o=-m.uas eo:ming to an end. Into this situation 
then, s·ocialist societies suddenly sprung up.. Tlle ruo~t 
important of these 'We!"e: the Social Democratic Fedc:n•ation 
(1-rhich 1-ras or>ganizecl by Hyndman and· his friends.), the Social-
ist l-eague, the Independent Labour Pnrty, and the Fabian 
Society. 
As was stated earlier, initially, there t-ras no justi-
f'ication for assUllling that the Fabian Society would be any-..; 
thing ·lnsting nor neces sarily influential. But the Society 
did have several th:ings in its :favor. It attracted a very 
high caliber of' membership and since membership ~ras generally 
small, those 13elected. liJere industr-ious, hard l'TO;r>kers l-tho 
o.fton already had distinguished themselves in other areas and 
so were a definite contribution to the .Society. Secondly, 
the Soc·ioty l-tas deeply involved in research end produced 
exhaustive studies l-Thich were carefully docu.lJlented and put 
into the right hands :in Fnrlia.ment :in order to influence some 
particular piece o~ legislation. At ti:me·s they even manned 
Royal Commissions. There was a def'inite difference here of a 
st..udy pr•.oduced by the Fabians f'rom that o.r one by a typical 
15cole, op~ eft., P• 13~ · 
31 
interest group. The Fabians had the reputation of: rz•ovidin~ 
objective, solid, reliable research a:nd so their :findinGs 
uere c are.fully looked at, of'ten buttressing an H. y .. t s nrcu-
ment. In f'act, some Fab.i.ans have h ad ~nd do actun1.ly nm-r 
hold o!'i'ic.e in l'arli~-nent, as .for ins tancc the .cuz•ront 
Foreign 1•!inl~tcrt }~chael Stot-rart. .The }labians frora the 
beginning hn:\.Te been a vi.t ·al f'orce in British politico. 
It is not-.r time to look at tho Fabian Society and at· 
Fabianism itself. If one t-Iere to very broadly ~nu rr,.pidly 
ask "'hat the Socialists in Britain and the Fabian Socialist:-; 
in particul~r stood .for, then this. brie.f su-mnary .from one o.r 
their Tracts \-Iould seem to state it 1.rell: 
The very notion o·r Socialism impli~es the meo.n.s of 
production applied. to f'irst things i'irst. It involves 
that tho f'irst claim upon the social dividc11d shall bo 
the pt~ovi.sion i'or all oi' a basic stand1.1.rd of livin~, s .u.b-
jeet only to their \-Tilline;ness to serve the necd.s or 
society according to their pm.rers. It involves tho.t, 
\-rithin the limits set by our com..'lHl.nd ovet• the pot,rer!l of 
p.rod.uction, none shall go hungry~ or ill ... clacl or ill-
housed, s.a.ve by his 01-m t'ault, and that, as .far .as· is 
humanly possible, no child. shall be prejUdiced in his 
chance or a good lire by being brought up in a me-an or 
sordid environment, or under conditions of ill-
nourisbm~ht or mind or body. It irivolve3, -accor-dingly. 
that the who~e fund o£ natural ~bility which exists in 
a people shall be given the chance of: provinG its cal>t:t-
city, and that t-re shall no longer stifle a laree part of' 
this ability by denying to it the op~ortunity of' know-
ledge and of training £or leadership. It means that the 
whole society shall be organized ror rlonty, and th~t no 
Usable resources of' mannot·rer or of' capital shall be 
allo"toted to run to -.raste: Le-aders yes--m'3n end ,.,.onen cho-
sen .for special ability in social acministration a..~d con-
-t·rol., but to come .from. the l·rhole peorle on tho l;>asls. o~ 
the Widest possible· d.if'f'usion of: onportuni ty .from Chllo-
h')Od yeo.ro right into adult li:ft1. 1 b 
16Fabian Society, A Hord oE_ the FUtu~~ ~ B~~tish 
Socialists Tract Series Uo. 2§G 1 London: Fabie.n SocJ.:ety' 
-- , Nay 19, 1942}, P• J. 
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In exe.roining Fabiani SPl itself':. the ir1i t.ial difi'i culty 
is the fact of actul,lly d.e.fining ~ Fabian doctroine. This 
if3 s ,o because Fabinnisro has bee.ri a constantly evolving, 
expandine typo or phi_h1spphy, and so no definite statement as 
to nhat Fabianism is can be mad<h In fact, thero never has 
been any Fabian dozma and dogmatically prescribo.d principles 
of act.ion a.rnong Fabians. This the members of the Society 
insisted upon. In addition; no Fabian vras eve:r compelled to 
obey any Fabitn resol'tltion or to act on any Fabian ,pronounce-
ment. o.r recommendation. If a Fabian \lel'e t .o rej-ect a Fnbian 
policy, he .faced nothing ·\otOPse than the 11b1ack looks" wh:i.ch 
Pericles round to be the suprerr1e poril in fifth-c.nntury 
Athens--or at most a p~ined letter t'rolll the General Seche-
tary.17 In adcit·ion_, rare);y \·Jas conce~ted political action, 
as a pres$ure grO'UP like the: Anti-'Corn r~au ~agtte, open to 
the Society. Here one .falls bac.k Qn Sidney \'l¢bb' s "tbl;) 'H.ork. 
. . 
of individual Fabians", .rot 1rrho is to decide ""rhen an individ-
ual Fabian was acting poll, tiq.ally as a Fabian, as a member or 
~ Lal)o'U:r Party Committee:. .as a county Councillor,- or ju:st as 
a private citizen? Some would ev·en contend that th_e Fabians 
wei"e s·o eager to compr-o~ise, and their pi"e>gre..ms so practi-
cally oriented, that in !'act there vras no discermible philos-
ophy at all. 
This vie\-t can be ~ejecteO, .for, ind:eed.1 there is a 
17cole, op. cit., p"' 326. 
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cN~ated .in an idcalogical \T~cU.Ulll, ·nor 1-1as its aim specu1a-
tion. Its a.im Has eveP practical; the Fabi~ns 't>rer>c out to 
reform ·society so that the (;ood life could b.e enjoyed. by 
all. Under thcne practical aims the philosophy, the goals, 
and the ideals lie. 
Frot.1 the original Fabian Basis, one ctn discqVei"J 
much of uhat the Fabians sought then and novr:. 
The Society consists o£ Socialists. It therefore 
aims at the establishment of a society in which equal-
ity or opportunity \.Jill be . assure'4 and the ~·conomic 
pm·Ier and pri vii~ges of i:pdiiridual~ ~nd c~asses abo}~ 
ished through the collectJ..Ye 01·mershl.P ana democrat:~.e 
cont·rol o:f' the economic resources of the community. 
I~ seeks to secuf~ these ~nds by the :rnothods of pol.i• 
t~cal democracy. · 
This is not .a full statement of' Fab'ianism. but it is a good 
starting point, for !'rot11 it can be discerned several of the 
ideaJ~s or Fabianism~. 
The overarching goal of the Fabians was to achieve 
the good society t:or all thpough the establishment or Social-
ism, to reconstruct the whole society in England so that all 
c.ould liv~ a more full, jl.lst, and equitable li.fe. ~t this 
is not tangible. The Fabians were ~not interested in being 
thco:reticians. J.Tovr there must be a tU:·rning away i'rom a 
mac:ttosco}:;);:c to a Inicros~opic Viel-T of Fabianism. l-lhat Were 
its ideals? 
First t-rould be the ideal or the COII1Il1Uni ty theory or 
v~lue l-T}li¢h is an outgro1rrth of the extent.ion ·of the Ricardian 
theory of rent and Henry George's single-tax doctrine. In 
this theory of value the Fabians in Fabian Ess~iffi ( 1 ()89), 
round. their rational or ethical explanation !'or t;h:Ls devel-
oping sociuliz~t1on in thought and prp.otice. Thus they had 
rejected the labor-value doctrine or classical economists 0.3 
Harx, !'or tho Fabians regarded value as the creation of 
society rather thro1 o.f leJ:;orcrs. 19 
Under the Ricardian theo~y: .. the rent of any given 
piece of land is in general the equivalent of its superior 
a.dvanta~es, its site, .f-ertility, or re3ources--over the worst 
available land at the time. The landmmer._ under· a systorri of 
unres·trained ;private 0-t-:nershipjl retains the revenuo under 
l-Thich these advantages produce, even though they nre not due 
to his ef'.forts or talents.. The Fabians here parted compo.ny 
with Da.vid Ricardo and Henry George, extending this inter-
pretation to other dif.ferential values--to values in tho 
form~ o.r incomes :fro!Jl movable capital--to profits, salaries, 
and dividends. They shol-red that under the unregulated, com-
petitive system a capitalist, in a manufaeturer•s trade as 
well as in land, retains a su.rerior level of' his ca}:-ital, 
which is not due to his superior ahility or service but to 
the locetion of his business, the general incrensc in po·pula-
tion, or the BrOvting prosperity or the people. 
It is here that the heart of' the· matter lie3 • vlhar-
e:ver t.he-re is a gain in excess or the ordinary, the Fabians 
would contend, it may, T;-Ti th little effort, be described as a 
19coker, op. cit., pp. 102-05 
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rent or so'!.!o ltind, and as rel1ts nre something that just hap-
pen_, the~w gains should_, i!' possible, be appropriated tor the 
COilllllUrii ty. Thus, all the co:m:nuni ty \rould share in the valuo:J 
it cr•eat.ed. Value 1-ras hot the creation or th.e laborer but of 
the con:mm.nity as f:l. whole_, and the excess rent should be shax•cd 
by the s t r.tte or> co!l'l.muni t-y as a 1-rhole • 
. As an outgro1-rth or this theory of co~uni ty vnlue 
mention must be made or the Fabian vie-vr of' rents of ability,. 
wP.i.ch reflect their vie't·t of' the nature of.' man:. Rent or a:bil~ 
ity to them l·tas ma.nif'ested in profit; it representod the 
benef"its beyond the usual one derived. £rom labor. George 
Bernard Sha1rr-, in his airy rray in tho Fabiah Essays, det-ined 
rent or ability as "·the excess or its produce over that or 
ordinary stupidity.u20 
This quite naturally \-rould lead to the assumption 
that most men t'lore of ordinary stupidity and, there.fore, or 
very ordinary hone$ty and ~ri th e. more than ordine..ry ave~sion 
to labor. It is this negative vieu of man that is o.f some 
concern, for thop.gh the Fabians always declared that one of 
their first principles· was or the good lif'e for all--that the 
aim a£ society should be to achieve the greatest happiness 
f"·or the greatest nuro.ber--they really seem.e d to have no trust 
nor faith in the great mass of hum~ity. The aim of the 
Fabians \-Tas to educate English society to advocate socialism. 
20o. Bernard Snavr (ed.), and others, _Ft'.bi~ Es~~zs_ in 
Soch'l.lism (London: ~·!alter Scott·, 1889 ), p. 9. 
----~..:..-
society'--it seems to have been a rather closed r;roup--the 
um·rashed 1-wro not part of it but caught up in the :movement 
towards socialism .• 21 
A second ideal of" the Fabians~-a goal around \·thich 
'their uhole philosophy centers--is that or the elimination 
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of poverty. It is here that the Fabians and Fabianism have 
made their greatest contribution to the:;, '1.-rorld, f'or it ·Has the 
Fabians who changed the climate of opinion in England to tho 
belief" that poverty could indeed be-eliminated, that it was 
.feasible, and the means to its elimination \-rould be through 
specific action--through a system of social security above 
ail but also through such le-sser measures as unemployment 
legislation, hous"ing legislation, provisions for health care, 
reduction or hours, and :mi11imUl1l wages. A very in1portant 
pavt o:f this argument for the eradication of poverty, which 
was to be brought about by the concerted action or society as 
a whole, the means in e.:f'Tect being socialism, "L<Tas tho Fabian 
p~ovision fo~ "A national Y.dnimum of' Ci viJ.ized. Lifo .. •r22 It 
is in understanding the rationale behind this that one rinds 
a key to the Fabian attitude tot-rards poverty which was dras-
tically dif.fe~e.nt from that of' the rest o.r English society. 
To see this, one must look a.t the setti:ng of Enzland in the 
21 Alexander GL·ey, "Fabianism," The S_oci?:lLst Tradi-
tion, (London: Longman's, Green And Company,. 1946), p. 392, 
and I,ane W. Lancaster·, "The Fabians,". J.1a.sters of Poli .. tical 
ThouGht, Vol. II (Boston:. Houghton Hif:flin Gompo.n.y, 1959 h 
pp. 319, 327. 
220· 1 · · t . o e 1 op • Cl. • , p. 331 •. 
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188b•s. 
In the 1880's, niid-Victoria..ll thou5ht no longer viewad 
''the poorrr a,s a group to be truren f.'or granted by tho rest· of 
society. Victorian prosperit.y, vrith its ste3.npo"t.:-er and i'ac .. 
tories and ne'\·1 .rortunos and widening ril.ar1{ets, l-Tas rnarrod by 
the f'act that :it railed to provid!i! so much as a decent live• 
lihood .for th.e hundreds o.f peopie livin.gi:n the streets 
b~ca.use theyhad no other place to go--victim~ of' the Inc:tus• 
trial Revolution. "The as~ocia.tlon. of po·1~1~ty l ·rith progress 
is the great cnignaa qt e>'ll.Z. t .ime;" s~id the .&norican 
HertPy Georg~, l-thQ ad:vocated a l~.nd-t.ax and made a socialist 
tit: Be~ nard Sha1r1. 23. 
Tho. contraa·t hung over the comfortably l-tell-oi".f all 
the time. liriters such as Engels would not let them forget 
the .fac:t o.f poverty in the midst of.' riches. In the 1870 1.s 
and, 1880•s, . it was difficult to pick :UP a periodical l-lithout 
:finding some·thing in it about the problem: o£ poverty. It \'las 
called various things--"the Illid-Victorian conselousne.ss o~ 
sin" c>r "the starting-point o.f progress~" as said the Chris-
tian Socialist's Canon Barnett., and then went on to indica.to 
that this was coup1ed. l-rl. th uneasy .fe~r about l-that the undcr-
pri vileged migl1.t do if the privileged did not .fj,il<:l the ahsl-rer 
first. 2l~ This, too:, might inspire future Fabia_'i')a • 
In the t880' s, the traditional remedy tor mahy against 
23Ruth Adam and Kitty Nuggerid.ge, Beatrice Hebb (l!e~r 
Yorl{: Alfrecl. A. Knopf':, 1967), P• 101. 
24Ibid.-:. p. 102. 
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a bad con science about the poor 'i·ias to bliy the~n orr· by etvh1£j 
them money~ and charitable societies gr~eH up liko .mushroo:->1~ .• 
B-:}tHeen 1880 a.1 .. 1cl 1890 alone. one hundred. a.nd th.;rt'\T • · 
, • .._ . . <~ -SJ.X D'JH 
o_nes 1~ere f'<:nmdod in EnGland. 25 
It is hero that; an important personn.2;e ot: tho Fubio.n 
S(.)ciety entors tho sceno. Beatrice Hebb, one of' tho lltont 
influential tnembers o-r the Fabian Society, o:rt en cl"l.llod uith 
her husband, Sidney:, one o:f .the .founders ot the t-rol:raro 
state, in 1 08J joined the Charity Organization Society, s~ek­
ing to invas ticate the causes of' poverty. She f'ound thnt 
social worke.r.s were unable to ansl1er this question. Her-
appror.ch to the problem ha:d been .set "rhen she' reac1 
Herbe.rt Spe·ncer • s Social Statistics ( 1876). His conc~pt o!.' 
the "social organismu convinced her that social evils could 
not only be diagnosed by s·ci·en1;if'ic examination, but also 
eradicated, ancl th:Us society made pe:r-.fect: 
The .ract that this imulied the sacri.fice of' the indi-
vidual to the social good:-when there was any conflict o.f 
interest--greatly a p pealed to Beatr.ic:e, though it l-:as 
ignored by that gre~t philosopher of' individualtsm, 
H~rbert Spencer. Her own purita.T1.ica1 inclinatiohs were 
ilways prompting h~r to extinguish her individuality .S.:'d 
she longed to discover .an object .for this 1 high~r sacr~­
tice. ' trow she deciQ.ed that. the scienti:f"ie investiga-
tion of' :;,;ocifl institutions was to be her· 'worth-l·;hile 
purpose J.n lJ.fe. r26 . 
So Beatrice went about. her pJork as n social investi-
gator se.ekina the causes or poverty. She joined the Charity 
Organization Society because she thought it: 
25Ibid. 
39 
• • • an b.onest thol.lgh short .. circuitetl attc1r1pt to n.ppl:r 
the scien.ti.tic method or observation andexper>iment, rea-
soning and vc~"ifi?ati?n to the task of: delivering the 
PQQr from thel.r m~ s er~es. 2 7 
T'ae resuJ.t.s \vero not quite Hhat she Hanted. .Bcntt•ice found 
that a basic stuntbling block vras the .f'aet that the Society 
had no stand.~rCis by which to measure the lhr~s of those dm·m 
and out. 
In sum, the Charity Organization Society did not f'ul-
.fill her expectations. Her talents and those or· many others 
~rere to be more .fully util.ized by the Fabian Society. The 
importance of the Charity Society lies in. the .fact that in 
·working ror it, Beatrice learned that vJho.tever the cause o.f 
poverty--it it could be explained by the populax- theory or 
11delirtquency~ drunkenness, Ul'll~illingness to work or a lack or 
practicable thri.f't~" or what.ever the cause might be, lt was 
., 
not to be found in urging the poor to· pull themselves up by 
their o-vm bootstraps. And from her job as a rent-collector-, 
Beatrice learned that it lras not enough to cle~ slu.'ns and 
relocate the poor in sanitary surroundings in the hope of 
transforming them into God-i'earing and thrifty workers, 
because i.n order to be that you needed a job which would bring 
in a living t-rage,. and most of her tenants :failed to qualify 
:tor this condition.28 
This last point is at the heart and soul of Fabian-
ism, tho idea behind the proposal O'f a national minimum income. 
27tbid., p. 10). 28Ibid., p. 1-08. 
I 
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This sl.oga!l., 11Tha National Niniii1um.," 1-:hich tho Fnbtn.ns used 
from the 1890 • s on, Ha.s used to desc~ibe the political. nnd 
social po.lic:y they ware putting fort-lard, a policy th¢y con-
tddercd to be merely a.n extension of a lons aer-ies or str,te 
interventions which had regulated f'actory condi ti.ons nn'd pub-
lic health. It lTD.~ gradually being recognized, they claimed, 
that the State had a duty to preserve certain standar-ds belou 
which no citizen: ~hould be alloHed to :fall .. 29 The ct\d to be 
sought ~·ra.s n. national ndninn:un i'ncome so tho t eVC';l~y M?.n "l-Jould 
be in a ponition to lcn;re that slu:.n and be able to \Tork o.nd 
en:joy the i':::·uits ot a r.;ood lif'c• 
In other Hords, the Fabians uo-re ar;·;uir,r; o.~~in::;t the 
fact that a. lil?..n could t-Iork and lvork and ~till remain nt the 
point o£ starvatio~. No, they said this societ.r cnn. do batt~r 
than that. The resources are av.ailablo nnt1 they r~ast be 
redist.rlb1lted r.:o1•e equitably througho\.tt the populr!.tion. ThHs, 
the state 1.1ust tax and guarantee to all u decent H<:-Y of life, 
! a.>1d an ~llo ~·.runce i'or maintains.."'lce must be ~ottlccl ~ccorci1:r:; 
) to thG need~ of the occupa-tion and the MC'?.tns ~t the nation' a 
I co~c:nand.JO Such w:.u:; the t enox- of the nrgt.:.."''1ont. 3-.:tt let no I \:>ne say thu-!:; the F~"lbia:n5 had really r;one racicnJ., !'or they 
1.-:ere not ncvocatinc the uboli tion o:r t·iagcs nor e<1u.nli ty of 
incoqe--:it least the majority t·Ht s not.. ~\s the F'nbio.n3 them-
. . h 1) 1 .• 
291' ... H. r·1cBricr, F E'.biart Sociall~:!l f~~d "~·F:~.:o.. s • :o . l.-
tics I 1 eeL.•1018 ( G~mbrid~e' S.'1Gle.nd: Ca'n.:>ritii~ C l.:lU VC!'Sl.l;Y 
Fresa, 19o2T:-i)'. H)7. · 
J0La1lca~tcr, op. cit .• , p. 322. 
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selves stated: 
In .fact, so .far- as 1r1e a~e :rrom. seekin8 to abolish the 
wage-system, so understood, that ·t-:e 'Hish to bring under 
i.t all those Hho n01-1 escape :f'rom it--the e:mployer•s and 
those uho live on rent and interest, and so :mal~o it Uni-
versal. If' a man 1-mnts f'reedo:m to Hork or not to vrork, just as he likes, he had better emigrate to nol>inson 
Crusoe's lsl?.nd, or else become a millionaire. To sup-
pose that the industrial a:ff'airs of a co:u}::lica~.;cd influs-
trial state can be run \·Jithout strict suborc1inntio.n and 
discipline, ui thout obedience to others, e.nd -; .. :i thout 
def.ir:lite allo1~·ances for maintenance' is to dreant, not or 
socialism, but of' Anarchis~.31 · 
The Fabians l-rere rtot advocating any he&ven on eurth; 
they ttere not advocating equal t·mg:es f'or all. As thoy state·d, 
the Fabiah Society·: 
••• resolutely opposes all pretensions to har;1por the 
socialization or industry with equal vmees, equal hours 
of: labor, equal .of'ficial status, or equal authority fo'l!' 
everyone.32 
This rejection or equality of incomes t-ras the general vicu of 
the Society save \1-Tith a smal"l ·minority led by the voci.ferous 
George Bernard Shaw .. 
It was Sha1rr' s view that one man's income should be no 
more th-an another's. That the prof'it should go back to the 
community.. He recognized no rent of ability, saying that a 
larger income--that is, one larger then, to use his unflat-
terin8 description, that of' a man of' "ordinary stupidity," 
Just happens and that the receiver xnaY not properly claim 
that his superior ability or ind.ustry enti tleo him to any 
unusual recompense. Hence., Shal-l ""tould lump all rnen together, 
recognizin~ no difference in ability or anything else bet1o~een 
32Gray, op. cit.# p. 399. 
men. That lo-Uts his viel-T of ma.n--no one should. be especially 
rounrdod because be vras more able and took the initiative. 
All should be paid equally. ShaH dio not shrink from saying: 
that nsocialimn means e.qua.lity of income e.nd nothing else. u33 
This vievt of equality certainly did not sit \-Tell with 
the majority of' the Society. Even Shal·T in later years 
appeared to have agreed that equality or incomes viaS more of! 
an ideal to be worked for than an essential condition of a 
Soqia.list State .. 34 
The Fabian view of equality i.s rather broadly st~,ted 
in the Society's RulesJ the only document to uhich a Fabian 
must pledge his allegiance in order to become' a member of' the 
Fabian Society. ParaBraph one states the Society's goals: 
The society consists of' Socialists. It therefore 
aiJns at the establishment of a society in which equality 
or opportunity will be assured and the economic po1·1er 
and privileees or individuals and classes abolished 
through the collective ownership and democ.~atic control 
of the economic resources or the cor.ll!i.unity. It seeks to secu~e these ends by the methods of political democracy.3.5 
The Society de.finitely stood !'or equality o:r -oppor-
tunity. It :fought to equalize opportunities so that every-
one could ris-e to as high a place in the educational or 
economic ladder as his talents and interest directed him: 
It {Socialism) involves, accordingly, that the 1-Jhole 
fund o£ na.tural ability Hhieh exists in a people shall 
be given the chance or proving its capacity, and that 
we shall no longer stifle a large part of this ability 
by d.eny-ing to it the opportunity or knouledge and of 
3.3I-1cBriar, op. cit., p. 57-58. 
35c<>leJ op. cit ... p. 339. 
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training ~.or leadership. 36 
Ho~-teVol .. ~ the Fabians did not ::;top th~re. Bcslc1es 
calling t:or equality of opportunity for all to rise educa-
tionally and economical:J.y, most Fabians also ca.lled for 
social equality, or as one Fabian put it, "parity of esteem. 
'f'or all. '137 They ·Here calling :for: 
• • • a htunan fellot·Jship \-rhich . denies anc1 e.xocls dis-
tinctions o:t class and a social system in irhi ch no one is 
so much richer or po.orer than his neighbors a:s to be 
unable to mix. with them on equal ternis. As Professor 
.At-thur Lo:uis has put it succinctly, 'Socialism is about 
equality. 1 .And by e<;ruality is m~ru1t not simply cqunJity 
.oi' opportunity on the American model; but equality of 
st.atug in the lTidest sens:e--subjective as t-roll as objcct-
ive.3 
This more i'ully developed conception or equnlity took 
into ac·count that not everyone could rise to the top. Rather, 
each man must i'ollovr his ot-m tastes and so a bricklayer who 
feels suited. to his job must not b& judged inferio~ or 
unequal to a rloctor. A man must be· judged on his character, 
not on his \-rea1th. By narrowing the gap :bet-vteen the rich and 
the :poor, all t·roU:ld have a decent standard of living; all men 
~muld be in a position to enjoy the fruits of the good life. 
It was this 1-1lder view of equality, beyond mere equality or 
opportunity, that tlas envisa.ge:d since the beginning ot the 
.36ae.ter to page 31 in this thesis f''>r the .full quote. 
37Hargaret Cole, "Education and S.oci.a.l Democracy,'' 
Ne1-r Fablan Essays, ed. Richard Crossman tNet-r York: Frederic-k 
A.PraCGCr, 19t;2. ), P· 99. 
38c R c 1 d "T ition From Cap.; tnlism, u 
· · · .•. A. • ros an , rans ~ 
Ne1-r F!'.binn Essays, op. cit., P• 61. · 
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Fabian Society. Each ma.n 'Has to be j:udeod the equal of ano-
ther, though Sha\·1 1s vie1v that all 1-1ere equal in ability or 
should have equal incomes '"'as never the accept·ed vieu. 39 
Finally, anothel" ideal o.'f the Fabians l·Ias that or 
gradualis111. They advocated a piecemeal tramd. tion of the 
society .from en pi ta1ism to soc·ialism through eradual chanGes 
within the existing democratic political sy-stem. They uould 
be the last to condone a revolutionary approach to socialism.: 
The younc; socinlist ·is apt to be catastrophic .. ;r,n· h.·ts 
views--to plan the revolutionary program as an af.fnir o.f 
twenty-four hours_, with Individual ism in .full S"t·lin~ on 
Monday mornins, a tidal t·rav.e o:r the insur~ent prolet9.riat 
on Nonday afternoon, and Sooia.lisr11 in comploto working 
order on Tuesday. A roan t-rho believed that such a hn.ppy 
dispatch is possible, will naturally thinl:: it absurd and 
even inhuman. to stick at bloodshed in bringing it about-
He c·an prove that the continuance o£ the present system 
~or a year costs more suf.fering than could be crammed. 
into any 1-fonday afternoon, boHever sanguinat•y.. • • • The 
experienced Social Democ.rat converts his too ard.ent fol-
lower by :first admitting that if a change can be made 
catast}.'"ophically it 1-Iould. be 1-1ell 1...rorth making, and then 
proceedi-ng to point out that it vrould involve a readjust-
ment of' _productive industry to meet the demand created by 
an entirely neu distribution of purchasing pot.;er, it 
would also involve, in the application o:r labor nnd 
industrial machinery, al tera.tions r1hich no a-rternoon' s 
work could ertect ..... Demolishing a Bastille tr.dth seven 
prisoners in it is one thing; demolishing one l-llth four-
teen million persons is quite another. I need not enlarge 
on tho point; tbe necessity :for c·au tious and. gradual . 
change must be obvious to everyone here., and could be· made 
obvious to everyone elseHh~re it' only ~he ?ata~troph~stsb.O 
~rere courageously and sensl.bly dealt 1-tl:th J.n d~scus·sl.on. · 
39see Fabian Essays, '!-Tel-l Fabian Essays, and espe-
cially Richard 1Jm·meyt s discussion or equali.ty in his books,. 
F.r:p.tality (Net-t York: Hn.rccurt, Brace a.r,Q. Company, 1931) and 
The Radical Tr-adition, ed. Rita Ifinden (Ne\-t York: Random 
House, · l96Ij."), p. 178; 
4°George Bernard Sha-v.r, uThe Transition to Social Democ-
racy, n Fabian E!ssays in Socialisill, pp. 225 ... 26. 
In sum, the Fabians Here gradualists. Thoy saH no 
sudden ca,pitalisin one day and .full socialism the next. It 
t·tas to be grac'h.to.lly a.chiev~d--pieee by piece. Their middle 
class origin::: and their conviction that the Zei tp;e}.U favored 
.SUCcessiVe installments o£ practical socialism CO!:ibined to 
make the Fabians the mildes.t of revolutionaries. Repudiating 
violence, and sternly re-solved ·to be constitutional, they 
thought of ther;lselves as the agents through 't-thom the public 
w-rere to be prepared t ·o accept collective 01mership and man-
agamont of the ·nation's land and capital. They considered 
this to b~ a perfectly respectable policy. Once every level 
. 
of society had been permeated with socialist vievrs, the 
Fnhian program could be enacted with little or no disloca-
tion through established political institutions. Or, as 
Ed~rard R. Pease, the hi.storian of the Society, so aptly 
expressed this ideal of gradualism: 
Socialism in England remained the fantastic creed or 
a group of fanatics tintil Fabian ~ssays taught the work-
ing class()s or England, or at · any rate their leao.ers, 
that So¢inlism '"as- a 1iving principle that cou10. 'be 
aj:tplied to existing society and political condi tiona 
without a cataclysm, either insurrectory or even poli-
tical. Revolutionary phraseology, the lan5Uage of vio-
lence, survived, a.nd still survives, just as in ordinary 
poJ.itics ~ie use the metaphors or l-rar:fare and .:pretend 
that our political oppOnents are hostile enep1~-es. But 
we only wave the red i'l.ag In our songs I ana we reco-g-
nize nowadays that the .re.al battles ot s.ocialism are 
teur;ht in com.":li ttee rooms a;t1 Hestminster end the e .oun-el.l chambers of Town Halls.Lf. 
That la~t quote w~lJ P.~pr~~s~s th~ th~ust of th9 
whole Fabian argu.."''lent. Their program l-Tas realizable. Thest> 
41Peasej op. cit.~ p. 237. 
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wore no·t speculative, a.bstra.c·t the()rizers--rathe~, their 
theory represented that of' midci1e clas:s reforr.lo:t>s. l~3.rx ·r;as 
their ma:n C'tl'ld soc,~lism their aim but they wore not e;oine to 
get themselves tied up lvith jargon or theorizing. They \..fet~c 
:<>ut to efi'ect cbDnge-s--to reconstruct fiOciety, e;radua.lly i~ 
n.eed be. In England, they sa~1 the policy of gradunlism must 
be adopted :i.n orde.r to e:r.f.ect the type of society they envi-
sioned. Their ·theory represented what they stood !'or, but 
implicit in it 1-ras a sense of' compromise. That is, if' they 
could not get a national mi.nimum or if' absolute equality of' 
opportunity loras impossible to achieve at that. time, the 
Fabians were willing to take less than the optirunm beoa.us e 
they f'elt a small gain was a step tol-l'ards another. This "ms 
in contrast to the Continental Socialists lorho lta:rit()d. all o~ 
nothing. 
The record ot the Fabian Socialists· was .so:metrib.ere 
b~tween all or nothing. The .first thine; they did of any 
importance t-ras to write Fabian Essays in 1889. 'l'his book, a 
collection of essays on socialism1 was wtri tten by seven lead-
.ing members o£ the Society: George Bernard Shat-r, Sidney t·lebb, 
liilliarn Cla1--k.e, Sidney Oliver, Annie Besant, Graham t·lallas, 
and Htl.bert Bland, and had an impact :rar beyond their- expecta-
ti.ons. As a society, their· primary go.al was to present the 
ease :ror socialism.. In Fao.ian Essays, they sought in clea.r, 
pl.ainlanguage to create a lozical, .factual are'Ument for 
socialisr:t. The essays poin-ted out ~bat the movement t¢1-nlrds 
socialisn1 uas not to come about cataclysmically, but rather 
j 
would be :roe.rcly an evolutionary outg1~01.·rth of' exi3tinG social 
and political in3titutions.. Thoy sought to shov! that s.ocial-
ism could be eradually achieved uithin a democ1 .. atic fr£Une-
t·rork. A good indication that their program and case wc1•e 
.Popular t·.ra.s the :rc..ct that Fabilm Essa~ beca"lle a best so-ller. 
The success oif Fabian Essazs shoHed hou grco.t a 
demand the·ro was i'or a clear statement of a socialist pro-
gran1. But convincing the public of: the neod for socialism.. 
was not their primary goal. Right :t"rom the beginning or the 
Society in the 1B80 1 s, they had called f'or enactment o:r their 
progra:m 1-rhich included an eight-hour-day and nationalization, 
as well as a national minimum "income. In a.cldition, the 
Fabians had called fox- social security, unemployment insur-
ance, education for all, and tax reform. From its inception, 
the Fabian Society had a weil..;vTorked-out program. 
Their means to all this they called "permeation." By 
permeation they meant that Fabians should join all organiza-
tions where. use.ful socialist t-Tork could be done, and influ-
ence them. In this manner they would spread their intiuence 
in the \oridest po·ssible way. despite their relatively small 
membership. This, the majority of the Society .felt,. Hould be 
the best \-lay to enact their program, rather then .forming a 
third party or being a pressure group. As Beatrice Hebb said 
ot this policy, "tole want things done and t-Ie don't tnuch care 
which persons or party gets the credit. 1142 The Fabians con-
42Adam .and. Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 133. 
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eontrated their e:f.forts :first t-rithin the Li b.eral Party, then 
the Independent Labour Party, and f'ina.lly t-rithin the Labour 
Party. 
The .first real ef'.fort at p~r:rneation on the naticmal 
level Has at the Liberal Party 1 s NeHcastle Conference in 1891. 
The Fabians f'olt the ,moment 1-1as r 'ipe :ror· permeation and so 
1-1ent to t-101•k to get their progra.'ll adopted. Thoy- "\·7eilt so .far 
.as to elair•l tha.t the resultant Uencastle Progr~ of' the Lib-
eral Party l·!as Fabian in Origin end inspiration. The c-laim 
seems to be rn:urih exaggerated~ The program was definitely 
radical; including provisions :for Home Rule in Ireland, "full 
• 
pol-.rers" ·'£or the London County Council and all other mwtici-
palities, includinB ta;xation o.f ground values, ·and OOitlpulsory 
pm..rers to local autho:rities to acquire land for allotments. 
small holdinBS, village halls; and laborers' cottages; also 
shorter Parliaments, rreo school,ing :for all, the abolition o£ 
plural votin~, the recognition of the need. to pe.y 1'1. P. 's, 
and "mending or endingn the House o'£ Lords. 
·The :tact: remains, however, that it is questionable 
l-thether this was due mainly to the Fabian impact. A recent 
dock str!Jce and worker unrest vras an impetus tor· radical 
rel'orm, and there was nothing in the program th!'.t 1-:ent beyond 
the radicalism ,of the Liberals present. :nevertheless, part 
of the Fabian proBrain l-ras included in the lTevrcastle .Prozra;n. 
Hen-rever, this victory ot the Fabians turned' out to be a hol-
lott one. As one author put it, the . problem 1-ras "that it was 
no more than a paper victory and :meant nothing to the leaders 
l 
vras appar-ent aJ.Jnost immediately after the election. it43 
Proo.f of" this lay in the .fact that. th~ Liberal gQv-
erlnnent, durinr; i t .s period of o:f:fice f'rom 18.92 to 1895, did 
not press for t;ocial lecislation. Not until 189h were n.ny 
lileasures introciuced~ nnd these 1-rent down to dei'eat. This 
inactivity or the Liberal. governm~nt must be set ac;alnst tho 
ero'\·Tinr; pOloJ'e:i• o:r the laft-\·dng groups in the Trades Union 
Cong:J;>ess, an¢1. 'the increasing propaganda .for es tabli.shfng an 
Independent Labour l>ar-ty during those years. Both the trade 
unions and the Fabians had become disenchanted with the Lib-
erals~ l'Tho were oblivious to their demands, ~"ld so the 
Fabians sa1-1 their policy o:r permeation o.f the Liberals was a 
.failure.. Theref'oreJ an alliance of' a great variety of 
"Socialint"· and. "Labour" groups, including the Fabians, 
:formed the Independent Labour Party in 1893• Thour;h ini-
tiaJ.ly a weak body, fron1 its membership vrould come the domi-
nant part or the Labour Party, w-rhich vTas created in 1900. l.J-4 
From 1895 to 1905 the Conservatives Here in powe·r. 
Fet-t re:!'orr.1s ensued. Ho-vtever, in 1897, a l'lork:Jnan•s com:;pen3a-
tion Act l-Ias passed ~:hich .made the employer liable to t.IOrkmen 
ror accidental injuries suf~ered in the course or employment. 
In 1902J .an Education Act was passed, t·rhich the Fabie.ns sup-
ported. Then the reforms stopped• The governi!tent concen-
tP.ated. its energies on the unpopular Boer v.rar. The Fabians 
were divided within. Man:y o:f the younger members of the 
43c 1 · ·t o e, op. c~ • , p. 45-47· 4l~Ibid .. , p. 43· 
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Society co-opel:"at:ed Hi th the Independent La.bou1~ Party or le£t 
the Fabians to .stay in the In.Oepend.ent Labour Par·ty. At 
issu.o 1-rere free trade, opposition to the Boer ~·lD.r and inde-
pendence. The Independent Labour Party stood ror all three, 
l-rnercas the Fabians did not. 
Then in 1905, just be.fore the· Liberals returned to 
pow~:n .. , the Bal.four Government established a Royal Conn::ission 
on the Poor La'I.·T, 1905-1909, to inquire into tpe problem of 
administering poor relief. Beatrice \vebb was asked to sit on 
this C"o!nmission by Prirue J.finister Balf'our. Beatrice We-bb 
.felt the Poor LaH of 1834 ought to be abolished and ·super-
ceded by a proper evaluation .o.f all. the various causes of 
destitution--old age, accident, sickness, f'eeble-mindcdness, 
un.employment--and the estaplist>...ment ot: specific provision by 
the State to deal with each or them. This is implied in the 
later phrase, social security. She said that this is the 
COmt'l.uriity's responsibility. Poverty has social causes. She 
.felt the ans1-1er was not to treat the poor as one class and to 
give them all the same tx-eatment, by thrO't·ring them into the 
·workhouse until they .found a job. She :felt strongly that the 
aged and the unemployed must be dealt l ·rith differently·. In 
e.ddi t ·ion, she objected to the stigma placed upon the poor, 
for once in the 1-ro:rkhouse, the .franchise 'frras taken a-vmy. She 
argued that the poor, too, could be productive c·i tizens.. In 
fact, by acting. -vrisely, poverty could be prev-ented. Abolish-
ing the Poor La1·T vrould be a flOOd be~in."ling ."45 
4S1-1cBriar, op. cit., pp. 263-70, and Cole., op. cit., 
p. 1.39. 
Though Beatrice Hebb brought v1itnesses be!'ore the 
Commission to ba.cl{ up her vi..cn-ws, the Comraission 1 s fir.dings 
l-rere not in accord with hers, although they spOHed her influ-
ence. The Hajori ty Report did not recon-n~nd ~boli'tion of the 
Foor La1-s. The change they ca.ll~d t:or \·Ius tho trans.fer of the 
·administerinc; of it .f.ro:ri the Board of." Gua.:':"'clian~ ·to special 
COmr:li ttees ntminate<:l by County Councils ana County Borour;h 
Councils, in pa:rt :fro:m amongst their r.:tembcrs and in pax-t fror.1 
outside. ·The llajority Report, ho\-1Gver, did shoH Beatrice's 
ini"li.tence l·Then, though it dealt :fi:rst lo-1ith the moral c.auses 
or unemployment like drun...lt:enness and. gambling, it than devoto.d 
II!Ore :space to the social causes or unemployment: casual 
employment, dead-end employment, Unhealthy trades, low wages, 
and unemployment due to cycl$-cal .fluctuations. Also, though 
elements o'£ the deter.rence and e.li&ibili ty principles ~TQU:ld 
remai.n, the Commission did reoow.mend that State public \-TOrks 
as labol" exchanees and unemployme-nt insurance should be pro-
vided. in times or exceptional distress. 
It t-ras a .f~r cry .from the testimony o~ Hr.. J. s. Davy 
bet'ore the Poor t au Commissi_on concerning the deterrence 
principle: 
\tlork should be both ~rksor:1e and unskilled. You haV.e 
got to give him sor.lething like corn grinding or flint 
crushi!lg, t-rhich is laborious and 1-1holly unskilled. • • • 
He (the unemployed :man) mu3t. stand by his accide~t~, Jig 
must su:f'!'er ror the g.eneral good of' the body pol~t~c. · 
This was his reply when asked i.f the deter!'enc:e principle, 
46J1cBriar, op ... cit., p. 267. 
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(designed so men HOttld not be on the public payroll), bore 
harshly upon me.n thl"Ovm ·out of' 1'-rork by a trade depression. 
The Fabians 1-re ro a defini te influence on the Con::1:i:s-
sion~ although they :f:ailed to have the Poor Lau abolished. 
They t·tel~e the spokes1aen or a. risine movement of discontent. 
Labor was increasingly expr•e ssing its discontent by strikes. 
Things ·yrere changing. In 1905, an Unemployed !1orkmnn • s Act 
had. beep passed.. The public and po).i ticlans uere relilit.int 
the old ways or dea1in8 1-Tith the poor needecl. changine. 
Beatrice •s vie1-1s· l-Tere embodied in :3. U}nority Report 
she t-n•ote vrhich was si8ned only by the Labour members. of tho 
Commiss.ion and one convert~ a church.n1an, Rev. · .Russell \·lalce:fi <.)ld. 
She then beean a vigorous campaign to have the f1inority Report 
adopted. To achieve a ;.ride·r base,. a broad all-party: orgc.niza-
·tion was cre~t;eCl: The Nationnl. Committee for the Broa.l.::up o£ 
the Poor La:t.r. In 1910, it became The National Co:romi ·ttee for 
the .Prevention of Destitution. The Independent Labour Party, 
and later the Labo\lr Party, were champions· or this, as well 
as the Fabians. llo longer l-Tere the Fabians trying to permeate 
the Liberals;- they sa1:v ef.forts in that direction to no avail. 
In the end, the Liberals, in particular Lloyd Geor~e, 
outmaneuvered them. Recognizing that many irl England sup-
porte.d re.form but l-rere not rea,dt ror something li.ke the "iJebbs' 
vision of an entirely new social system_, in t-Thich the coll'L'li.U-
ni t_y' \-las responsible f .or keeping its socially inadequate rnem-
bors vti th their heads abo.ve water, as one of the regular 
duties of the State, Lloyd. George had gone to Gor:nany and 
J 
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returned enthusia;!ltic about the l~orJdng of' the schcw3 of 
health insurance established by Bismarck in 1899. l!:t thQ 
san1~ time, Lloyd Geor.ee and Hinston Churcf\..ill ~-;ore beginning 
to be interested in the p~ans for unemployment insurance 
which h~~ been 1-16rkf)d out by a protcee or the \'lebbs_. 
Willlam Hen1 .. y Bcvet'".i:.dge, in 1907., afte~ a study of municipal 
schemos in a nUJ.--nher of cities on the Continent. 
The result l-TaS the UatiQnal Insurance Act of 1911 
l'rhich provided compulsory unemployment and he.al th insu~ance 
:fo1, a lal.~ge segment of the population. The i nsurance '\oiaS to 
be .financed jointly by the employer, the er:tploy.ee, and tho 
government. 
The 1vebbs thought they had .been defeated. An alter-
native schez11e had passed.. They objected. to the employee 
having to pay, cla:inling it should be financed out of' public 
·.funds. \·fuat they :t;"ai :J.e:d to see ~1as that pari; o:f their pro-
gram was 9elng enacteQ.. could they really ha.v~ exp~cted, at 
that point, to get a State l1edical Service? They seemed to 
have been too idealistic inhavfng it ail their- way or not 
at all. 
The passage o£. the lfat:i.onal Insurance Act, ~.rhich '·ras 
a major p.iece of' re.fo.rm legislation i ·rt this perio·d, points up 
the diffe-re~ce bet"1een the Liberals and the Socialists. 
Prior to this,. the Fabi~ns had tended to identi fy advances 
tv~"ia:t•ds th.t: w~lfa:re state with advances- toward so.cialis1n. 
Tb.e col'ttributc:>ry principl~, together l·rith the suhsidi~s to 
private enter:pri.se provided. fqr in the Ins:urance Ac·t, ~bot-red 
this identification vms no necessary one, and that thera l10t~e 
\rays o.r ~stablishing a 1-itHi'are state 1·Ihich . did not involvo 
g:t>eater equality· or complete social contr-o1.1~7 
~err;1eatiori or the Consorvat.ives and Liberals died 
:!'rom. that dute. Increasingly, the Indevendent L3.bour Party 
~.nd the Fab1a.'Tls uere involved in the afi'airs o:r the Labour 
Party. lforld vlar I .and support of the war brought th.em 
together as never be:fore.. Frpm 1911~ on, only :pacii"ists 
remained in the Indeperidel'lt Labour Party beca~se the rest who 
supported tho rTar> had joi.ned the ranks o:f Labour.. P;y the 
end of i'Jorld. liar I, one can see the def'in:i.te in.f'luenoe of the 
F'abians in the La bout- ·Pa.rty. Pri:or to this, they had had a 
contradictory- on again,. off again relationship with Labour. 
Some Fabians had argued that tbe Labour Party \<las irrational 
and not socialistic enough f'or them, uhereas other Fabians 
stporigly supported Labour. But lrTOrking together .for the 
adoption or the J.rinori ty Report and other campaigns had 
brought them closer. 
In 1915, Sidney 1·iebb became the Fabian representative 
pn the Labour Party E:recutive,: the direc~ting group of' that 
party, and became a close associate and !'riend or 
Arthur Hende.r,son, v1bo had replaced R~"r.lsay H~cDOI1a.ld as Labour 
Party Chairman. During the 1-rar yeat>s, \·lcbb became a close 
advisor or Henderson (in both domestic and international 
:l~~ues. In i 9] 1, Ga.rnil:t.e Huysmans, Henderson, Uebb and 
47Nc8±-iar, op. cit., p. 278. 
NacDonald collaborated in 1.-1ritin5 Internati onal Govcrn."T!cnt, 
one of tho eD.rlic.st blueprints of the League or Nations • 1~8 
The ne1-r Labour Party's constitution. of 1918 nnd its 
a.ccorop~ying manifesto, Labour and the }!el·r Social Order, must 
~--
be considered amon3 Sidney \·iebb 1 s mos·t skillful piece a of 
permeation. It 1-ms so comprehensive· a program that succes-
sive progra"ns lrlere only to modi.fy it according to circum-
stances. As G. D. H. Cole 1-1rote: 
Labou:r- and the Ne-vr Social Ot"deP is seen to c6.ntain 
in subst;tm~e by i'ar the greater part of' vthnt has been · 
put forward in respect o£ home policy in S\lbse qucnt 
Labour progra..~es. , and oi' the actual policy 1·1hich the 
Labour Goverwent of 1945 hegall. vigorously to carry 
into ei'f'ect. · · 
.  
Similarly, Henry l?elling has gone on to say:: 
Labour and the l-Te\v Social Order • • • l-UlS or great 
importance b~ca~ it .formed the basis of Labour Party 
policy .for over thbrty years--in :fact until tho general 
election of 19$0.5 · · 
What the. new constitution did was to commit the party 
to socialisn1 for the first time. This ·vzas an acknm·rle~ement 
or the !'act that in the years be:f'ore \·Jorld Har I, the T .... abour 
Party had been steadily moving in the direction of socialism. 
In I,a_bour and the Ne:-r Social Order, the co!l'I:Ilitment to 
socialism :t,;as spe.lle.d out. It l·Tas to coMe gradually and con-
stitutionally. Then the program comes--the "four pillarsu of' 
48CQ1e., op. cit., P• 170. 
. 49Samuel H. Beer, British Politics . In -~ Collectivist 
Age (lfe"t-r York: Alfre:d A. Knopf, 1965), _p .. 1~. 
50ibid.. 
the ·ne1., Socialist civili.zation: (1) rr'a.c Universal EnfO.l•Ce-
,mcnt of. the National l·1inimUl':l, (2) The Democratic Control of 
Industry, ( 3) The RevoJ.ution in liation~;tl Finan co, and (4) 
The. Surplus Health of' tho Conimon Go()d,. 
Subsequent paragraphs set .out these fov.r rrinciples 
in groater dcttil~ The first nas to inc~ude all the propo-
sals ror wagGs, hours, health, sa:f~ty, hol.l.sing., education., · 
public vTorks_, and the prevention ()f unemployment, -t.fhich thE) 
Fabian Society had :frora tim~ to ti:rne advocated. The second 
meant- control of inc;l,usi;ry by a democratic State, includine 
nationalizati;on o:r coal distribution, and a call f'or common 
Ol-mcl:"ship of the land. These t ·Ho dem.and:s for· state Ol·me.rs}lip 
were to be e:ccom,ranied with e.xteneions in political democracy 
by adult su.ffrage and. abo1i tion ot the House o:r r..ords. The 
thi-rd .Principle called :for a steep increase in taxation and 
death. dui;ies so that "equality o:f sacrificen nlight be. The 
fourth envisaged Democratic Co-ope.rntion and a co:m.--:ton plan~ 
scientifically evo.lved., for solving the problems o:r .m:in,.l.ti·nd • 51 
No vast, sl.ldden enactment or t .l'l.is pro grata t·Tas possi-
ble., tor .Britain, as the rest of the v1orld. ~ra:s· in the throes 
O:f l-That began ~S a recession Or economic sltUllp .and baca..--nc by 
the 1930's a.. <treat Depres· . sion. Under these c.ircu.rnstances, 
obv-iously, there were no :runds for such a grand de sign. 
With the economic boom brought on by \-iorld t·hr II, 
l'llanY o:f Britai.n•·s problems appeared to have been solved .. 
~1 ·1 •t · 
·. · Co e, op. c~ • , PP • 
Unc1.er the le:::.dersb.ip- ot the l!a:tionnl or Coalition Govorn-
ment--a coalition of' Labour, !Jibel"als$ and Cons·ervatitres 
l-rhich governed Britain until 1945--:rull employment hilc'l been 
achieved, the standard ot: living '\oias up, social servj;ces hc.d 
been exp£>nded r-1idely so that Britain, despite n \'rar that mnde 
greo.ter and greatqr demands on her n1aterial renources, t-ras 
also able to better the lives of many o£ the English people .. 
As the 1-rar dre'" to a close~ there was a gro\·rine; realization 
that a return to nass unemployment, human squ~lor, human 
misery., and gross inequality lll\lst never be alloued again. As 
early as 19l~1, Britain's l·rartime government had directed 
~it> Uillio.m Be.veridge to recolllr.lend cha.nee.s in the ·existing 
progra.l'Jls for social insurance and allied s ervi cos. 
The l:'esult l-1as the Beveridge Report, issued in 1942 .. 
The Coalition Govern.."llent, having ordered r-rhat it. thol}ght was 
an innocuous,. teclmica.l survey- ._or social insurance, suddenly 
:f'ound. itselr saddled with v:hat was, in e:ff'ect, a declaration 
of Human Rights, a manifesto, a..l'ld a pror;r3Ill. Uot only were 
the :five Gia-"lt Evils-....:t-1nnt, Disease, Ighora,nc·e, Squalor, and 
Idleness-....:indicted, but the ;means to remove. them l'Tere boldly 
.proc1aimed.. ·There 1-1as to be a truly co::tprehensi ve system of 
sc:>cl.al insurance, enjoyed not merely by industrial \-IOrkers 
bu.t by all citizens, as or right. The principle of' a N~tional 
Hinir.ltun 1-1as put .fort·rard. Assumrtion A of ·this report postu-
lated a eo~nprehensive hen.lth service :freely avt'..ilable to al1. • 
Assumption B looJ~ed to the .fa."'lily and called for children• s 
allotrrtmces. Ass.umption C ms.d.e fU:ll employment the essential 
~; . v) 
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basis o:f the l.rhole system. The drea.lils o£ the Fabians Here 
about - to become rGality. 
In 19!t$, r,abour erunc to pouer with a stronr; mo.nd·ate 
to carry out the Beveridge Report, l-rhich they had ca.mpaic;ned 
on... Several acts or Parliament soon extenO.od and r.eorean-
ized the v;hole system of social ~relf'are. For examPl-e, the 
National Insttr·anc.e Ac:t of 1946 provided almost ever-yone in 
Great Britain 1-Ii th a lnrge measure of' personal protection 
1'ro1n childhood to old age. l{a:jor clauses of' the Act included 
provisions !'o1~ sielmess eng une~ploy:ritent insuronce, 't·ridoH' s 
benei'its, maternlty bene.fits, gua:I"dian's allo\<Iances, death 
gra.nts -, and t-e.tirement pensions. A Family Allovrances Act of' 
1945 provided f'ive shillings ror all children after the 
.first, under .fif'teen years oi age . The Industri a1 Injurio·s 
Ac.t of 19h6 extended l'10rkmen' s cornpensation so thn.t all per-r 
sons employed under contract are protected.52 
Early in 1946, Parliament pas~ed the Natio-nal Health 
Services Act; t-thieh went into ef't'ect in July, 1948. This 
Act, because o£ its w-Tide range and comprehensive st.ructure, 
has been called: 
• • • perhaps the greatest Si!lgle ac~ieven~rit Of the 
post-1-rar soc{al revolution. _It wa-s a social invent_ion 
which Britain pioneered in and. other nations acmited, 
even envied.>3 
52Goldwin Smith, A History of' En~lRnd (3d ed.; l~Aw 
Yor.k: Charles Scribnet.ts soris, 19e6T," p. 790. 
S3Harry Hopkins, The Nev-r Loo1~, A Social His to:r:~ 2£.. 
the Fonties and Fif'ties in En~l:m'd'TBoston: Hou~hton 1-D.;.ff'll.n 
Company; f964}; p. 12. 
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Undel~ th~ National Health Service Act, evc:t·yonc in 
the population, ~ec;ardless o~ incone, insurance statuo o~~ 
occu.p.a.tional class uas to have access, ui thout ch:n•r;c; t ·o any 
needad maintenance Ol'- care, in a hospital, to lllc<.lical ser-
vices, and to svccial or natiorml Rssistance, as in tho case 
o£ the blind. 
These- :fou:r acts, the lrational Insurance Act. tho Fnm-
ily Allowance Act, the Industrial Injuries Jl.ct, cnc; the 
National .Health Servic.es Act comprised BeVerio.e;o' s Social 
Security Program. .Its impact t-ras described th~sly by a 
W't>itor from the Daily f.Iail to his re~ders July 1; 19l~8, o. tcH 
days bei'ora the National Healtl:l Services Act \oras t.o co into 
ef.fect: 
On J1onday morning, you 'Hill l-ral~e in a no1·r Britn.in, i.n 
a .state t-Thich 'takes over' its citizens six iilorith~ bc:foro 
thoy are born, providing care and schooling, sickness, 
worlc]_ess days, tvidouhood an.d. retirement. Fina.lly it 
helps d.e.fray the cost o.r their departure. All this, 1-rith 
t:X"oe doctoring, dentistry te:.fld medicine--free bath chairs 
to() • i.f neede9--for 4s . 11 d. out c;t: you ft. l-teekly ·pay 
pac·ket. You beg1n paying next Fr1day. :;> ~ 
Finally, social security t.z-as a reality. \olhat had brought it 
about l-Tas that popul,ar demand had been ovcr\·Ihelningly for it. 
Support came fro:m all politi·cal parties,; The Fabians had at 
last seen their hopes made reality. 
A second area the government rnoved into v:c.s national-
ization, another thing the Fabians ha:d Ion~ ncivacated. The 
govern.--nent nationalized the Bank o:r En,gland, t .he coal mines 
$9 
and the raill·rays, as woll e.s civil aviation.. All telephone 
com~nunications pa~rsod under public otmership in 191~7. They· 
then natiori.a.lized the iron and ste·el indu.<;trie.:J, despite much 
oppQsitiqn, and here they ran into dif.ficulties. The comnon 
ownership o:r the ·means or production had lonz been held out 
by socialis ts as the unique., indispensable cure .!'or allnost 
every socil'.l evil. lts nome had been continually pronounced 
:much as a Hoh.ruttmedan pPonounced the n:rone or Allah. It had 
been ensh1 ... ined in the Labour Party Constitution since 1918 
and the party platform of' that year had called for national"-
ization o£ railroad.s, coal, electricity, and in3u~ance. 
But it was seen that nationalization l-nts not the pa."'l-
acea. Problem industries rentained problem irt¢i9s-tries after 
nationalization. Such was the fat~ of the iron and steel 
industries. Economic crises buf'tet.ed the nationalization 
pr.ogram. The Bl'"i tish government als·o had the ad.di tional prob.-
l.e!ll that it had become the employer Of railway 1-lOrkerS and 
coa1 miners. But there toras. no decline in tho rate ot absent-
eeism. Strikes did not sto.p. And so Labour's problems grew. 
In 19.51, Labour f'aced a new election. The Labour 
Government cou'ld claim it had made ·vast strid.es tot.zards :mak-
ing Bri.tain a welfare state. A comprehensive social insur-
ance system had been established which covered everyone . If 
i l lness struck,. no 1on3er would a .family's life savings go. 
liu~., a poor person could be well cared :for, regavdless or his 
.fi nancial status.. .Another thing the Fabians hac argued f'or 
·Has a more equitable distribution or the lr~ ultq. Here they 
60 
could claim some .n1odest success. l?orld Har II h.~~~ doub.led 
the ~tanda:1;'.cl rate o:r lnc01ne tax. ~'his had been su.ccoedcd by 
peace-time income tax raises 't·lith a zs% tn.~~ on distributive 
profits s inco 19h7. TQ.e res:u:t t of' th.ese higher rates l·ras a 
certain f'J.:at tehing on inco1ne rates and a shi:ft a.ua.y from 
regressive., ina:i.rect taxes 1-rhich h a d been .high before tho 
t-!ar•55 
Othe.r nreaa in :t-Ihieh Fabians had long made recommen-
dations for chanGes "\-Jere agriculture., housin3, and educ.::t""' 
tion.56 The farmer bene:fited by th~ .. Agricultural Act of 1'914.7 
~rith subsidies. Ue noH had his Ol'In secure place in tho 
planned and managed economy. Fabian studies had 16lig advo-
cated more housin~, . and. advances 'Here made here. Finally, n 
vast advance had come in the f'ield of" education \·lith the pas-
sage of' the Education Aot ot 1941~, which provided f'or compre-
hensive ref'o~s in education. .JI..nd then a giant stride lvas 
made \>then, .in Apri1 1947 ~· all ehildre.n were ~eq~ircd to 
attend school until tll<3Y vrere :fifte~n years old. county col·-
leges l-Jere also established. Inroads. were made into makine-
equality o.r opportunity a reality, for rto'lr many more childJ;1en 
lvould be able to clir.tb up the educational ladder. This t~rould 
be no ·:m:9.tter t.rhat their finances. or c;i.rcu.:--nstances. , 
Bot·Tover, there Has another side. opposition to the 
government \-ras grotdng and Labour, by the time of' the 19.5'1 
------------~---
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maintaining POi·Tor. l >art ot tho problem \>TU.c that they had. no 
progralil ·t;o otter the En3lish people. A$ on~ nu thoJ. .. put it: 
By 1952 I.abour had exhausted both the ideo.z and tho 
impetus o£ 19lt-5· The vague a.."'l.d emc..s-culn.tcd pro'7ra!n Hi ttt 
!Thich in 1951 it confronted the elect.ion!J su[ige~t.fHl th~t ~ t · had loDt the c ou~nge ot its convictions al:::;o. 51 
For e:,:ample, they hedged on th~ issue of' f'urthcr nationali-
zation. The left 'fling of' the party was doctrinaire nnd 
insisted on it. The more pragmatic socialists l-T~.re in favor 
of going slm·r, being mo~e flexible. They woulo rather be in 
pouer, eventually achieving their airtls than stand. on princi-
ple .forever, outside of polver... The issue uas not resolved 
and so they .faced the ca."Upaign with a .fUzzy proerw.t in con-
trast to the more positiv-e, dynarrtic progr·run of the Conser·va-
tives. The Conservative.s called t'o.r g:r>ectcr liber·ty nnd a 
more sound econon1y 1 eliminati011.. of' controls, denationali7:a.-
tion, and so on. This was a popular program 1-1i th the vdte1-.s. 
As a result, Conservativ.e rule ensued from 1951 ~o 
1964. Tho Labo-ur Party remained split,. 1-1hich aid.od the Con-
servat;tves. HOi·t.ever, Conservative rule 'Has marJ{Cd by an 
expansion ot the l-Ielta:re state. A planned econon1y, a rnore 
equitable distribution of the tvee.l th, t'ull employment, and a 
just, social insurance system ·Here nov1 considered national 
goals, not just Labour l'arty goals. About the only majo.r 
reversal ot Labour poli-cy \oras denationali.zation ot: the coal 
and steel industries. The di·.ffere·nces t·rere more in degree 
than in kind as even Harold Hilson claimed. t·ihen he ca.'1'lp9.igned 
57Hopkins, op. cit., p. 285. 
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Our Conscrva.-tivc opponents have recently bo::;un to 
stress .nii;d.ln.r objectives~ the dif"i'erenca is not; 3.0 l • •UC~1 
ill Gtuted ends as i.r.l mean~, and ir.t the 1.tin<l of Ho~.i ety 
each lrTould crco.te ... ~o 
By the time Harold t!ilson made that ~tro.ter.wmt thoro 
t-re.s li ttlc doubt l1ho Has in control o.f the r..~_bt.'\U'Y' l:'l4r·;...y. 
Hugh GaitskilJ. had p~~;sideo over a party split C\.)r:n the Hid-
dle. \fuen Hurold Hilson beca.":le lc&der o-"' Labou.r > the dobnte 
t-ras r.esolved. The party t-ras coll"..:nitted to sociallmn on a 
piece-by-piece basis. It 1-10uld be .f':lexible, not doctrinaire. 
The left-uing doc-trinaire sooia.lis·ts t·rho only th<>uzht of all 
or llothinz as nationalization wel"e pOl:l'e!:"less. 
l'1ilson presented a :fresh, bold prog1>rua be:fore tho 
English peopl.e at a time ,.,hen they ~.rer·e beset vii th oeonor:d.o 
c:roises. His campaign echoed John. F. Kennedy 1 s t-ihc11 he sai<: 
he wanted to see Britain moving again. He stressed that he 
wanted to rentore the dynamic o..L the eeonor:~y beco.tlse: 
l-Tithout a. vast -effort· at inc:1--easing our economic 
expansion, t~e cannot solve the problem and assure to 
everyone a. decent and happy· li.f'e, car-3 f'or the &r,ec1., 
the yottng. ~.nd the 1-rea..li:, and cr~ate in the whole country 
a physical envirop,.ment f'i t f'or a cul-t11red peo!')le. Otu:~ 
.Progra.."'ns ror education.. for science, !'or .socinl ser-
vices, al~ nepenO. on the economc rJ~rr..a.'7lic.. On th~ (Jther 
han?, the econo5~c d.yna:m.ic \-rill make no e·ense Hi thout 
socl.al purpose. · 
Then crone the details* H-e called for edV'artces in 
housing, public Ol·mership, ed'Ucatio!l, ~11.d on and on. The 
58 Harold Hilson, "The Relevance of British S-o·cial 
Democracy_," Encyclopa.ediP~ Brittanica Book or th·~ Year {1964}, 
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l!e shall :nnt put t'orth our .full j_ntellectu~.:.l strcn~th 
as n natiori ~ih<:m so nwny of our ch.tldrcn ~·.re v.5.rtlt~lly ._ 
c.ez:led tho ch~nce of' higher educ~ticin, t:h~n th'3 synt€.:1:. 
reJects '-H.~Ui:o.l~ty of opportunity.oO 
F'in~.lly,. in h:is boo.lr, r.rhe Rnlevence o-r Br! ti~h Soci&li rr,;l 
- ---- --·---· ----- ... - ..  -- .. · 
l·!het:h:::r soci ulis::.n df-}stroyed. hunran fraedo1n: 
T.hero u.re those, par~icula.rly in tl".o u.s., 'H1lo 
.beJ.ieve th~it the as.s.:~rtion o:f publlc t•es1:cmsihi li ty for• 
the r:H~an!1 or !'ull employment,. social anvance .i .matc!·.i e.l C.•l" 
spi:ritt,!.::l.l, is a fatal step in the ei:r·ection of C:(;; n:;",.,lnl:{.r.~. 
It is oU.l" bcliei' that a socialist npproo.ch to R:.:·l tn.in' ~ 
problems, SO f~.r f'rOlll being a lurch in the dirccti0:1 Of 
communism.,. r:le~.ns the .f"u1lest .flo:-reri.nG of: d~mocracy. 
For• l-lhilt> \ve yield to .none in our dcter1nin.::1tion tq i'ir:.'ht 
f-or the basic political treedoms--frccdOlJt of speech, of 
relic;i.o:n, of public moeti11g, of the b~llot--Ho bolicnrc 
that no !;·wn is truly f'rea who is .i.n economic thrallciO!:lJ 
-who is u slave to unemployment; or cconc-rrt.ic insecurity s 
Ol" the cripplin~ cost o:r flled.5.cal trea.tr~~lCnt, 1-rho lfJ.c~s 
the opportunities, in both the mate:t•ial vnd the price-
less il~~nnteriaJ~ :3~nse to a :f'...1.ller life n.ng1 the ful1cot realization o:f his talents and abili tios. 
No :more fitting stator.tont couJ.d hfNe been ·.-rritt:en ac 
to the influE:nce of the Fabian Society w~iich began .so lon,g 
a$o, one a.:rternoon in ()sna,burgh Street. The record of 
Harold Viis on r s a~iMinist.ration thus far b:a.s not bceh so full 
of progress s.nd. ad·vancement. The econorny has been plc.c;uerl 
by crises. Thera have been labor problems. .Eq,u~lity of 
opportunity he.s had a severe test with recent e.rriva.ls or 
Negro ilm:tigrants i'rom the Gomr:tom·realth countries. Then thera 
60Ibid., p. 29. 
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level ~11.<:1 the LOndon ~~D.2m.ist st~ted., nOno-l:u.:.lf' R z:,lillion 
·."'1-.-~'lG ... J."':r.··.~.l .are in po~.,c· r ·.ty. u62 H · 11 ·· .... ., ~ .... ~ v OHeVe't~, fl.. ; · :!..$ .l'lO\• {';..J.OOrny. 
n ·•t ·• · ·• · . • · h d • ~ 1 "t .h · ~ ~r:t · ~:n.n ~s roov;J..ng a en :1n soc....,a secur:t y, o·hs? .. t•c;, O<t.l.l(.;.G.·· 
incc.,~cl' Pnd rr1orn equality o.r op;-.ol~tttrti ty~ ,Pov c.rt;:;r is on i.ts 
l'ic:..y to elir.iination:. Further ji.A.c1gment ·Hill have t .o C.O!JI0 \·rh~n 
l•:J ViliJOn ind:1catec1, t-7i th.out a vast eccncnrl.0 l:X:pm1siol1, r..is 
hands. uould be tied. 
P...ltho1.1gh no lll!J.jOr political deve10l·:tiont can h?:v::: ~ai<1. 
to have b~en due .tp 1-"abian influence., still thor·:> is no o(}uht 
thc.t Fabians have influenced British politics. \-!hen they 
bo5an, there lias no social secrurity·. Tho1•e. ~ra.s no t<:tlk' of: 
equaii.ty. Th$ idea that the poor should be le .. ft to starve 
wa$ prevalent. The Fc.!Jians said no, and cha~ity \·t::ts n.~t thG 
~'"lsHer., either. Poverty has s·ociaJ_ ca.usce. It c3.~ bo <:li!'ri.n-
ated. The ~bour Party takes up the bann~r today and cnlls 
tor a na~ionaJ. Dlini:rnu.?fl inQorae, a. Fabian idoa.l of ~o:ng ago 
which h~.s y~t to be nehieved. So., too~ it C.\:~lJ.s· f('r> ~- fuJ.ler 
li:re .f'o~ all. The list goes on and on. 
62'~B~itain Rethinks the lo'eJ.f'are S~1:tte~ n Jlrnerica, 
Vol. 111, no. 2.3 Uie;v York) (De~er:tber· 2, 19t(/ J, p. 67.'"5: 
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It seems undeniably true that the Fa.bj_al!s hrivo in:flu-
enced end do continue to influence British politics. For 
inst~nce~ Hilson's Secretary :tor Social Serv;tcos., 
Richard. Cr-ossntan:; is ·~ F'{tbian, a:s is his i-Io:mo Scc1•et~:ry, 
J9Jr1es Gal.+azhan; an.d Def'ens:e Secretary, Denis Healey. The 
Fabia,n goal ·of socialism has yet to be i'ully a.chiev~d, but 
they have \ ·ton because theit" cause is no~1 3nglanc1r:s. 0~ 
recalls Sidney He.'bb's statem~nt so lQng ago about 11the incvi ... 
tability of' gradualness" in achieving the good :li:fe tor all .. 63 
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Chapter 3 
THE PROGRESSIVES 
Th 1.900 ~ d. th""' be,.innincr o£ a new era. and . ·. o year- . · marl<e ·· ' o .. <:) 
a nel.-r century. It was both a time o:f change and of conti--
nuity. l.merica t·ras C:he.nging from a rural, agricultut~al 
nation to an uroan, industrialized one. Its population l-ras 
changine :from a largely homogenous Northern European one to 
a mor .. e heteroeenous one, 1-rhich t'las particularly due to the 
grea.t in.f~ux or nel.·r immigrants f'rom Southern and Ea.$tern 
Eu.rope.. These net1ly arrived innnigrants, by and large; 
ar.rtived with a dif'ferent political tradition than most Ameri-
cans because Southern and Eastern Europe had more aut.horitar-
ian paternalistic governments than the more· democratic tradl-
tion of' the P.mericans. 
So, too~ the old ideals of individualism and laissez-
.f'aire v-1ere being questioned by many. For exmaple, the Popu-
~ists and Socialists ·had long s:aid that capitalism must be 
eliminated or .modi.fi..ed. The call T;Tas out ·for more equitable 
1-rages and so on. Social justice bec~Jne the cry voiced again 
and again by the disaffected and their leaqers. Perhaps the 
most striking development of the Gilded Age was the errlergence 
o£ corporations and labor unions. They marked the beginninp; 
of c.ollactivist!l in .America, characterizing the tendency toward 
bigness and organization, which are hallmarks of t h is century. 
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Coinci.dent-al ·Hi th ·thcs e changes 1,ras the emergence or 
a social re.!'or:m.movemont, tho proeressivc movement, uhich is 
the subject of' this chapter~ This tnovement f'ot• re1'orn1 was a 
product both of the grievances of the time and a :r.ulfillm~nt 
o:r earlier re.form movmnents \<those inspi-rution can be ~raced 
back to Thomas Jcff'erson e.nd !indrm·.r Jackson. From the days 
ot: Thomas Je:fferson and Andre11 Jackson, re·.formers had sought 
to extend the .fruits of ·democracy to an over larg er· segr.1ent 
o:f the population. It was part o£ the Arnericru1 re.fol"ln tradi-
tion to seoic justice ..for all, to do a1-1ay t-7ith inequities and 
privilege, to v1id.en opportunities so that all might live a 
!'uller, happier li!'e. 
The iiilll'lediate pr.edecessors .of the progressives '\-rcre 
the Populists. The Po_pulist r evolt marked the beginning or 
a nel-r re.form period which began in .the 1890's and was to cul-
mina te ~n the Progressive era. This .revolt, which was agrar-
ian based; was the initial response or discontented rural 
.Americans to the effects o..f massive industrialization. 
Although this movement in t ·he immediate sense must be judged 
a f'ailure, still it did show there was grcn~dng support for its 
demands. The high point o.r tl:Le Populist movement was the 
presidenti al election o£ 1892. The. Populists had campaigned 
long and. har-d 1'or the adoption of their pla tform. 
The :Populist platf'orm or 1892 h ad attempted to state 
t.he objectives or various groups,. -which t hrough it raised 
their voices in protest. To ease the burden of d ebt for the 
farmers and to raise incor.1es for miners, it promised the 
It 
I 
I 
• :;_ 
r . 
! ~ 
' t ! 
:· . 
I 
unli..>n.5. t~d coinag~ of silv~r and gold at the x-ntio of sixteen 
to one. Labol:" t-ras ass:ured some restriction on i;r mic;ration 
and the eight ... hour day on government proJects.. nationaliza-
tion of' the railroads,. the telegraph, ana the telc:rhone, a 
graduated incol.le ta..""t, and postal savines banks Here ·promised 
to of'fset the poHer of' monopolies. A single term .for the 
president, direct elec·tion or senators, and. the initiative, 
referendum and recall vJcre included in orde:t~ to restore to 
the people control ot government. 
In 1892 James lfe·aver, the Populist candidate, ran 
third. Ho'·1ever, the election shO"\·te d vridenint support for 
the Populist program. \veaver g.ail'led mqre than a million 
popular votes ancl.. the Populists bec~U--no the first third party 
since the Civil l'lat> to brea!c into the electoral college 1-ti th 
twenty-.t1--ro votes • 1 
The tt.ro tnajo~ .Parties :recognized the sie;nit'icance of 
this vote. ·In 1 896 the Democratic candidate ! 'or- president, 
William. Jennings Bryan, also ran as the P~pulist candidate 
:!"or the. Presidency, and by 1896 the Derl'locrats had. taken over 
much o!' the Populist program.- In the election o£ 1896 the 
Republicans, 't-rho :m.ada no J:·retense o.f being Populist.s.,. won •. 
William Hc·Kinley became president, and .from then on Populi.sm 
declined. ln the immediate sensa, Populism 1-1as a £ailu.re. 
Horrever, oth~rs ,~rho had PO\-t~r would t .al<:e up many or its 
d~lru:t.ntls ~J, a :future time. 
1 Osc~r Handlin, J.merica, !:. Rislsrt O!ei-I York:: Holt, 
Rinehart and t·Jinston, Inc., 1%8), p. 1 • 
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An as-s assin's bullet ush~red in that .f'U.t\trc time 
soone r thr..h ~yone expe.cted. Theodore Roos evelt ca:r.1c to thG 
presi<l,oncy and ther•o \·Ta.s no"t·T, :ro.r the i'irst time~ a progres-
sive l .e&.der in the tfui to House "rho could do .so: aethi ng- about 
thes e progressive and fopu.list demands .. 
Th·~ pl--ogressives, in both their progrrons and ideals, 
h ad some strik ing sirnilar-i ties to, but alsq glaring differ-
enc-es front the Fabians. First,. the. sir11ilaritios. Both arose 
at relatively the srunc time, the late 1880 1 s and eo.rly t890• s·, 
a time Hhon there was li:idespread. protest against .the inequi-
ties or the clny, both in England and the United States. 
These •·rere both middle-cl.ass :movements, loti th !t;he lead~rship 
coming primarily t'.rblll. t<Qe upper .ran..l.cs of the middle class. 
This meant several things. First, it rei'lected a sense of 
responsibility to"Ta.rds the less fortunate,, this strand of 
humanitarianism and compassion t1hich has been in Anglo•Sa..-:con 
society :from the beginning. Secondly, it meant their social 
and e.conomic re.forms t-rould be achieved gradually, within the 
democratic process. These people had too much at stake t.rithin 
the existing society to torant to change everything radically 
and put their positions in jeopardy. 2 
Other sirnilari.ti-es stand out,. On£) l-Ias their optimism. 
Both the Fabitu""lS and prog~essives f'elt that men. ·could reorder 
their society s~o that all. might live a .fuller, happier lif.e. 
2Richard Ho.fstad.ter, The .Ag~ 2£. Reforr.t U!e~T York: 
Al.fred A. Knop:f, 1955) , p. 20~ 
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They had faith in human, as t-Te ll as natnt. .. inl, proe:z'c,s s . 
.Thin~s vtould get better. All this .,.rould be doi1c l-Ii thi-n tho 
system. Violence uas not to b e re s ort<H1 to. Both the pro-
gressive and Fabian Ittvven1en t s vrere adap ti vc, :prar;nntic, 
undog!r!atic, ever chan~ine, and dcrvelopin3 movc!r.ents. .Just ati 
there 1-ras no Fahi:an "party line ,'' so· tho r e r!D.3 no procrcss.i.Yc 
"party line. tt For example, tho·tlgh at tho beginnil"le trustD 
and a::t1 !'or:.'ns oi' organization t-rere a.natho!:l::\ and the genora.l 
fc¢ling was that they must be destroyed, ns timo vrent on 
Theodore Rooseve lt-'s view that organi~at;ion 1rras not an evil 
in itself', that its worst aspects could bo curbed by public 
regulation and so on., bacruna the majority view. Thue pror:rc ::J-
sivism., lik~ Fabianism, is characterized by its prnsr-1nti~m 
and cunnot be· viewed as Ol"le tvhole, consistent moveme nt. 
Rather-, it must be examined in its various sta~es in orGf)!" to 
f'ully understand the move::nent. 
So llmch f:or the sirni lari ties. 1-!ow the dif:i"'e ::-'3nces 
bet\-reen the tuo movements. First and .foremost was the f act 
that the Fabians t-rer-e outspokenly c6inrnitted to esta:)lis hing 
SociaJ.is111 in Enel.a.nd; wherea_s the vast majority ot; the pro-
gressives remained champions of' Capitalism and lndividualin:.l. 
The idea. \-las to refOrJI\ the existing cnpi t2.listic sys tem, to 
make it Juore workable s·o the.t socialism o.r violent r e·roluticu 
l.rould. not be such a threat.3 J\~so, the progressive id.eal t-r.c..~, 
in the main, a return to a ru~al, co.:npeti tive, free enter:rrise 
3Ibid., p • 237~ 
·11 
. .. : 
1 : 
:! 
I 
• 
·I 
i 
··• 
' ! 
=• I 
: • , 
·, 
.; 
71 
system uhere the individtl.al l·ras self-.su.fficicnt a.!1d reiencd 
supreme in contrast tp the Fabian id~al o:f a co-operntive, 
urbe.n, industrialized ~-ocioty. The prosressives ":·..'c.re really 
~ooldng bacb·!ard to America•s idyllic pust, hOIJln~ to res-
tore it. This was in cont1•ast to tho Fabians who sm·r tha.t 
·the individual could no longer be self-sufficient and so 
advocated state intervention in order to roa1izo the public 
\otelfare. As time -vrent on, these <ll.f'ferenccs Houlcl le.osen, 
but in the bezinning of the movements the di.fi'erence.s bet'i:cen 
the Fabians and progressives -\-1ere glaring. The central iclenl 
of the progressive r11ovement 1rras the seat?ch for tho re~liz ,s.­
tion or social justic.e. A second. i~portant belie!' of: the 
proe;res.si ves uas a belief in posi tivc government.. Finally, 
the progressives lrTOre COmmitted to f:ulfillinr; the dernocratic 
ideal, that gover!L'>llent should be by and £or the people and 
not be run in the inte.rests of the plutocrats. 4 
This .first ideal, that social justice be realized_, 
wtas the keystone to the 1rrhole movement. Hi thout it, the 
movement would not have been. The long hours, the dedica-
tion displayed by many in the race of' small gains, l-rould not 
have been possible \·tare it not for the beliof of' the pror;res-
sives that it would be all 1-rorth it if they co:ulo. bette.r the 
4-otis L. Graham, .!!! Encore. For Ret"orm (1!el·T Yo:J.:: 
Ox.:rord Univet'sity Press, 1967), p. 5;\i'inf~~G A· Ha::b:-son and 
f..l:frcd H. Kelly, ~ /;.Hl~r•luan Constitution: Its Orf.~1.ns. and 
Develon:ment (lrew York: u. ·t·l. Jtrorton .2-nd Company, 194o), PP~ .. 
632:..33; and. Alan Grimes, ll.rneriean Political Thour.:ht Ore\-: York: 
Henry. Holt and Company, 19.5"$L, p. 387. 
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lot or the underprivileged and exploited, i:f th9y could .see 
that each man, as TheOdore Roosevel.t expressed it, got a 
"square deal. 11 As Roosevelt once said! 
vre are no respecter. o:r person$.. If a labor union 
does 't:·rrong, He oppose it as fi:l:':mly as ~~e OfJJ:·Os-e a cor-
poration. 'Hhich does t-irong, and t~~ st.and equally stoutly 
!'or the ·rights or the rnfU} of' t·real th an fo.r tho · "mge 
worker. 'He secl:: to protect the property or every man 
lvho acts horiestJ.y, of every corporation · that ropre~cnts 
-rrealth honestly accu..rnulated and honestly tisod. \'le seck 
to stop l;1l"Ofl8dOing anp. 't-Ie desire t? punisl_l tho 'rlJ!Ongooer 
ottl.y so :far as is necessary to a.ch1.eve thl.s end.!:> 
Rein:f'orcins ·this vieH, ·Roosevelt t-rent on to say: 
Let us strive steadily to secure jus·tice as bett>reen 
man and man 1-rithout regard to the man's position, social 
-or othem·1i.se. Let us remember that justice can never be 
just·ice uniess it is equ.al.. Do justice to the rich ma.n 
a.n:d exact justice :rrom him--justice to the capitalist and 
justice: to the 1-rage-l-ro.rker. • • • I hn.vo a.n equally 
healthy aversion for the reac.tionnry and the denwgozuo; 
but I a:m not going ·t -o be driven out of fealty to riry prin-
ciple~ be-cause Qert_ai? o:r thefll are championed by 6 the react~onary and eertaJ.n _others by the demagogue. 
Roosevelt and h:i..s fellow progres$i·ves stood £or 
social justic.e for all. Since this l·Tas so great a part or 
the progressive movement, a.'Q,d since it i .s the strongest point 
.ror eorn.parison ~tri th thi Fabians, the meaning of and motives 
tor social justice need elaboration .. 
First, the ideal of social justice t·ras not motivated 
solely by hUlllani tarian reasons. Rather, the progressi vas 
.r~ared that to neglect the victims o:r indust·rialism vrould 
invite social disintegration and ultimate catastrophe. In 
5uarold Ho~ ... rland_, Theodore E,oosevel~ and His Tines 
{i1e't-l Haven: Yale University Press, 1921 ), P-• 107 • 
6Ibid., p. 108. 
' 
' • 
. ~ 
: 1: 
I : 
.. , 
t·'' ,.,
, ... . I 
:.1. 
. I · • 
i 
! : 
i' .. 
j · 
ii 
'I 
I 
~ 
I 
i 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
; 
' · 
73 
ord€.-:r to forestaJ.l this poss·ibility, they bocrunc the chroa-
pions or socinl justice- -in a linli ted roa..l'lnc~. This attitude 
l-IaS t·!ell expresned in a letter Theodore Roosevelt \-T.rote in 
1906 to l-Iillirun HoHard Ta:ft, about tho ta.slts o!' 1\lncri.cn.n 
political leadership as he envisae;ed thern. :for the next 
quari;er century:: 
I do not nt all like the soeio.l conditione c.t pre-
sent.. The dull, purbind :folly o:f the very l' ich, their 
gre.e.d and arrogance, 2.nd the vra:y in H[lj,ch ~hey have 
unduly prospered by· the help ot: t .he ablest lm·ryers, and 
··too often through the weakness or shortsiehtedn.;;ss of 
the .judges or by their unfortunate possession of: meticu-
lous minds, ·these :facts and the corruption in business 
and polities, have tended to produce a very unhealthy 
condition o£ oxcitement and irritation in the public 
:mind, 1-rhich shm•s itsel.f in the enor"mous increase in 
socialistic propaganda. Nothing effective., b(.'lcausc noth-
ing at once honest and intelligen~, is bein~ done to coPt-
bat the great amount of evi·l vrhich, mixed t-zi th a ·11 ttle 
good, and a little truth, is contained in tho outpourings 
of the Cosnionolitan, of: MeClure•s, of: Colliers, o~ 
Tom Larson, Do.vid Graham Phillips, of: Upton sTnclnir. 
Some of them are socialists, but they are all building up 
a revolutionary feeling t-Thich will ·probably t:1.ke the .forru 
or a po.litical campaign. Then we may have to d,o, too 
late or almost too late, what had to be done 'in the sil-
ver campaign, uhen in one su..w:ter vre had· to convince a 
great many good people that t·rhat they had ·been labori ... 
ously taught i'or several years p1•evious \•ras untrue. 7 
Thou~h Roosevelt did not speak .for the more radical 
progressives, still his was the gensral viEn-r. The-se- men 
trtm.ted social just·ice but in a sense it vras bein~ forced on 
them. I£ they did not give in and reform the system, the 
radica1s \-10Uld f'orce their hand and destroy them. Thus, they 
took the middle road,. that of' reform l-7i thin reason. 
Another reason ror tne progressives -aclvocatin6 socio.l 
7Hof'st.qdter, op. cit., pp .. 236-38. 
.. 
· ' 
·I 
.I . 
' l ; 
I 
" i \-. 1 
- I ~ : 
. ,l 
'! 
l 
i 
' ! 
I 
c•no.·· uas. t.hot tboy. :felt that the f...:ne.'r:".ic·, .. n.· s"'r ... ~· c't' •- c. ,.._ t ·"' , - ,. , .Y u · l · - • . ~J .• ,·~ ...,'J. 0.1. 
baJ.tttjce nnd tha·t the 1~ropor b').lancc mu::.rt be r(~.atot"od. Th::..t 
w~s no longer· being ~un. /..merica. had be~n co1~:-iit tc.:l to 
"ideals o:r absolutely .f'.t•ee oppOi .. tuni. ty, llhcl:>e rw man i e sup-
posed to be under any limi tntions except the li:ni t&t.ion~ of 
hla mind .• . . 1mere men lirin or lose on thei.J.."' 1n~ri ts." 
various lnea..l"ls, the neu system of orzanizntion had dc~troycd 
this body of ideals.. But ''Amorlca l<~ill insist npon recovor-
ing thes~ ideals vlhich she has al"L-to.ys Pl"Ofe.sscd. ••8 
The motivations behind the id~al o:f soci~.l ju~·ticc:l 
1-1ere many and varied. But mo.z•e importantly, ·t-~hro.;t oi<1 noc5.r,l 
justice mean to the progressives? \'lhe..t concepts l'Hn'e embod-
ied in that catch ... .all phrase:, so~ial j'ustice? One ri..nsl':~r !,n 
to compar·c the progress-ive and tho Fabian ideals of. so~ial 
jus tie e. 
There are a nu.r.tber .of component pt..tr•ts. t.o thi3 cor~­
eept~ socie.1 justice. First would be ·the ideal o£ equality. 
The Fabian position is well knorm 1 for th11y he.ve lone been 
chainpions. o:f equality, and at the very least, equality of 
opportunity. 9 The progressive opinion t·ras .more n.'nbieuous .. 
• 1 h d ·h • "' · ,.,u .. "' is-·y !-!any p.rozress~ves ~-rcro · ong a-"'ld ar C& amp1.ons o.). e~ .... .!. ., • 
Talce this s tat:ement of Theodore 'Roosevelt in 1 '910: 
·e I '7 ., [" 1 On t S :r'tl.e quotations in t.,;his p~re.zra.ph nrG ~-.ooc.rc:r • .l s. . l-ro~ds, in Ho:fstadter·'s book, ~ A1e of fuf_9l:ll, fP· 2.22-23· 
9see page 31, sup-r-D. passirn. 
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At every state, end under all circmns.tanco.ss the 
essence of the struggle is to e.qunliz.e oppo:r-tunity, de.s-
troy privilege, ~.nd ~iva t .o the 15.fe .cmd citizenship o£ 
every individual the highest possible value both to hint-
sol.f a:n(i .to the co:mmom·tealth. I stand for the sonare 
deal. But uhen I ss:y that I ara .f'ox- the squru"c d~al I 
mc!l..n not merely that I sta.n.o t:or .f'air play under the 
pr~sent rules of the gsine, but that I starJ.d for having 
those rules chann;ed so an to '"orl:: :for f'. more substa.'Yttinl 
equality or opportunity ana of' reHn!"d !:or equally good 
servica.10 
Ho\rrevev,t all progressives l'I.OUld not agree wi tl1 this 
vie\-t.. For progressivism, as c. Vann 'trToochmrd has viritt~n, 
"generally l·ras progressivism :for nhite rn.Gh only. rr11 }1ost 
white progressives t•ernained Urie::f.'i'coted by th~ plight o:f the 
Neero and adopted prev~lent ra,cis.t ideas. They also did. not 
ch~,mpion the iimnigrant r s cause. These tt-ro groups $eerned to 
be outside their interests. Equality of' opportunity lTas to 
be sought for some, not f'or all in society. 
Secondly, l:>oth the Fabi.ans e.nd progressives l'lere 
gradualists. They meant to seel{ re·.rorm :pieceine.al and legit-
irnately. A typical statement o.f' this at·titude \-rere these 
remarks b~ }foodrot..r Hilson.: 
r.'hen we have freed our government;; l-Ihen lie h ave res-
tored freedom of ent·e:r-prise, Hhen He have broJ,en up the 
partnerships between :money and p.o\·Ter 1-:hich now block us 
at· every turn, then -vre shall see our vTay to accomplish 
all the handsome things t·rhich plat.formn pror.lise in vain 
if' they do T~t sttlrt at the point \-There star'ld the gates 
of lib~rty. 
1 OHowland, op. cit., p. 197. 
i i Carl Rcsek ( ed.), The . Progressives,. The P.:nerican 
Heritage Series (Het·t York: Bobbs-Herrtll Co., 1967) ,. P• x11 • 
12Graharn, op. cit., p. 166. 
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So the Pl''ogr~ssive.s t~ere corr ;d tted to erncualisr:1. 
}!OlvENe!>, it vrould be e. mistake to sa.y that they l ! el:>e both 
com.rnitted to gra oualisi:l and leave it at the.t. Tho Fabians 
Here co!ll.tn.itted to a thorough reorganization of the social 
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.f~br•ic, to achieving socialism gradually. ·roe proBr·¢ssivcs 
l'lCre never corn:rl.tted as a group to socialism, no:- to e.ny 
radiefil reorganlzation of' the society. They were more for 
social re.fo-rr.t than social reorganization. 
Thirdly, the pr>ogressive.s and Fabians o.ovocated a 
"balance between the public good and the private gain."1) 
This re.f'lected the influence- of a book that bot~ e;roups 
ad'lli tted in:tl.uenced their thinldp,g, He,nry George's P.1 .. og~ 
and .Poyerty, in ~rhich ~ras expounded the community theory of' 
value. 14 The Fa,bians bad ta.l{en this idea up immediately. 
They saw George's single tax on land as too simplistic, not 
recognizing it l'las apt £or the Anierica:n experience, bu'.; yet 
the Fabians did believe in George 1 s com.rnunity theory of value 
and the idea that poverty was preventable ·through redi.s·tribu-
tion. The progressives also believed in the cor.rnunity theory 
ot value and J.rere for redistribution of income in a vague way 
and \orere f'or preventing poverty, though whether they thought 
it p-ossible is debatable. The Fabians 1-rere mor.e definitely 
committed on this point. 15 
13 ..... b.d 4 14~e. e pages 33.-35, supra • 
• . ':J.. ,l. . •I :P• • 
15George J.Iot;rry, . The Era of Th,eodore Roosevelt, The 
.l1e1-1 Ari'Lerican Nation Series ( He-.;.·i York·: Harpor o.nd Brothern, 
1958), p. 98. 
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A se-cond .funde...l'Jlental ideal that both tho F~.bia..Tls n.nd 
progressives believed in was a cor.rrnf tment to positive gov0r:h-
l!lent. The progressives.~ unlike other ref'ori'l groups, .foll<>He d 
the lead o.f the Populist.s in rejecting the Jeffcr.ooni nn ideal 
that that government Has be.st uhi.ch governed leo.st. They 
felt government should step in and be involved in the crucial 
probler11s. o:r the day, _particularly v:hen tho states and local 
govermn:ents wer.e incapable or neglected these needs.. In tak-
ing this stand, they .saw g.overmnent · as a posi tbre good, some-
thing that actively look ed after the 1-relfo.re of the body pol• 
itic rather than the laisse z-:t'a.ire attitude or government 
~tay out. B-.r in.ferertce, this ideal rejE)cted tho old indi-
v.ic:1'Ualis:m and meant that. the government vrould. bo~OI.I'.\e ever 
more important in the lives of the people .. 
The increasing demand f'or positive govo·r:n.,•uent devel-
op~d conc:urr~ntly \·rith a third. major ideal o:r the pro~res-
sives~ a d.em.and for- a more popular goveranment, an ideal the 
Fabians did not concentrate on. This demand that government 
must be govern.."'l.ent in the interests or the people as a l-1hole 
ra7ther then the special interests or plutocrats, -vras one 
that runs throughout .American history. Reform m.oveme~ts 
have consistently argued .f'or greater popular control of the 
·government and the progressives. were no exception. They 
felt that in order to- achieve a positive publ'ic policy, it 
would be n e cessary to make the politica.l process more popular 
and more democratic. If bosse s and busin ess::-.tcn controlled 
cities, the stat e legislatures, and the Uni ted States S~nate, 
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if jl.id[;~S refused to validate as consti tU:tional populc..r and 
f'osi tive legislative prog;rrons, then the nnsl-rer was to cir-
ct,mvent the pm·1er of the bos!les and busincomnen and in m.sk-
in~ all .Public o1'.ficials rnore responsive to the public 1-tilL. 
Tho demand for the direct ele.ction of the S~nate, for the 
diroct primary, the Austrnlinn ballot ano corrupt practices 
l .egislation, :!:or the initiative, re.ferendtun, and rE>ca-11--theoc 
vrerc demands that l'10Uld make government more responsive a..Tld 
public of'"ficials responsible to the majority of' the people. 16 
Or so the prosre.ssives thought. The record has sho\·ln 
that these "radical" experiments in democracy l'Tere destined 
to realize neither the hopes of progressives .nor the fears o.f 
conse-rvatives. l·Iany a. progressive ieader looked upon the 
ini ti ati ve and rc.f()rendum, the recall, and the primary as the 
greatest constitutional reform sinee the days of 1787. 
Through them the ~ascals would be thro-vm out o:r of'f'ice, and 
the intelligent \rill o;f an enlightened people \·rould 1'ind 
expression. Some frightened c·onservative:l; on the other 
hand, believed that direct democracy would mean the end of 
lat-r.f\11 representative government. President T·art said of the 
initiative that "the ultimate issue 11 was "socialism, rr and he 
denounced the recall of judges as .giving "enormous povrer t:or 
evil" into the hands of corrupt 'bosses and rrstirrer.s up of a 
s.¢ci al hate. u 1 7 
16Grimes, op. cit., p. 377• 
17Harbison and Kelley, op. cit., p. 63:8~ 
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Actually, there "las no decisive chEtnBC £or eood Ol" 
evil e.s a result of these democ1~atic re.forms. Becnusc tho 
pc~OJ)le could it1i tlate la~m did no.t mean that :;his nation • s 
la~1s uere the ideal. The cures ior democrt:~,cy' s pr.oblem3 
1-:erc seen to be not merely to have more democracy. 
Th:ts pet•hnps was the greatest 'l..reakness of' thf'J pro.,. 
grcssive movement.. It concentrated too much upon the refor.rfl. 
of' the mechanics ot government, and too little. 'Upon tho deep-
seated social and economic institutions t-xhl.ch gave r.i.se to 
goverrimental corruption. 18 'The party oQsn 'Y!as too o.ften mere 
scum upon the sur:to.ce of: urban poverty, and the corrupt or 
stupid legislator merely the t ·oQ accurate image of spacial 
inte~'est groups, organized minor·ities 1 or even dci'icient pub-
lic intelligence or morality. These v!ere not evils to be 
cured by strip-pine; the spea.~er o£ his poHers or abolishin~ e. 
party convention. 
This last point sho1-rs the basic di.ffer¢nce betHeen 
the Fabians and progressives... The progres:;;iv~s l·Tere ena-
moured o£ means, to b!'eak up a trust, or of havine; the ini-
tiative. They stood :for mild social and political re.forms. 
The Fabians Here mo!'e interested in end$, for they :tw-anted 
to strike at the roots ot .a probl~m. They wanted t .o elim-
inat~ poverty a.'1.d create an ideal society. The Fabians. stood" 
for thoroughgoing social reorganization7 not mere ref'orm of 
the exis U:ng system, l-rhich the progressives advocated. 
18lbid. 
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Tho progressive progran, like the Fnbi:;m1 s~ Hr~s 
pragmatic and evolving continuously.. President Theodore 
Roosevelt's pr-ogram \..Zas called. the "Square Doal. 11 
Rooscvelt•s objec·bive l·Tas a square deal for all. Tho gov-
er.nnlCnt, he thought, 1-r.a.s rund~-:1entally n.. t·e..fereo-... Its :f'irat 
obligation 1..-as to be .fait> so that no corapetitor could vio-
late the rule3 or gain nn unre.ir advantaze ovex• his antago-
nists. Each pe1•son deserved an opport-unity to do his best 
and each \-Tas to be judged on his merits .19 
The i'irst a~ea in t-rhich Roosevelt soue;ht to apply 
thes~ principles :l·ras in his relations ·Hith business and 
labor. Roosevelt, in this are.a., stated his pbsi tion clearly: 
'I am for labor, ' or •·I ani for ca:pi ~al 1 substitutes 
SO!nething elsf,) :f'or the inu11utable lm•fS of righteousnons. 
The one· and the other v1ould let the class man in, and 
letting hit•t in _ is one thine that \-sill quickly eat the 
heart out or the Republic •. 20 
Thus, he sought to :favor neither, rather to take the 
.nrl:ddle course. Because at that time big businos.s 1-1as all .. 
powerfUl and organized lal:>or 1-1as still a fledgling, Roosevelt 
concentrated his ef.f'orts on attacking the abuses. o:f big busi-
ness. His first effort was in the· antit,rust area. He souc:ht 
to revitalize the Sherman Antitrust Act of: 1890 which had 
solenmly l-larned: 
Every contract, combination in the .form cf trust or 
other\od:se, or conspiracy in restraint o£ trace or com-, 
merce arriori.g the several states,. or with :foreign nations .. 
19Handlin, op. cit., p. 726~ 
20Howry, op. cit., P• 1o-1 • 
• ' 
' 
t ' l 
., 
. j 
l 
l 
J 
I 
I \ I ; 
I I 
i l 
i' I 
:,j 
• _I 
i,, 
( 
( 
I 
I 
j 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
81 
i .s hereby dec"l~wed to be iilegal. 21 
The f'il'st lnajor target Has the Uovthern Securities 
Co.zr.pany, a flla.f.l.moth erfort to unito the r a lhrays of the north-
1-1est under Jw:nes J. Hill and J. P. l-1or£;~m. Roosevelt brouc;ht 
suit against the CO)llptUly under the Shel•n•c.n la.lt::. and in 190!J. 
the Supreme Court ordered the company dissolvc<l. The judg.es 
held that although :?.. holdinB company Has not itself' a con-
spiracy, the px•ocess of .forl'ning one l'Tas illegal i:f the intent 
was to restrain tre.de • The decision Has the signal :r·or .fur-
ther prosecutions• In the n ext .four year::J., this admini-stra-
tion secured indic·tments against tvrehty-five tr].l.sts, includ-. 
ing thoso in beef', oil, and tobacco;. Yet Roosevelt did not 
attack indi:scrimina.tcly. He did not believe all trusts l-1ere 
evil and sho:uld be broken up. For example, i.n 1907 ,. when ho 
.fearec1 a dt;~epening of' the .financial crisis, ho acquiesced in 
1-torean:'s acquisition of the Tennessoe c·oal and Iron Company 
£.or United State~ Steal, a move that reduced competition in 
the steel industry. 
This move re.flected Roosevelt •s grot-ring belief that 
it would neither be in the interests o~ the nation nor pos-
sible to break: up all the trusts.. Rath~r, the better ans\-ver 
\oTould be to 1et the corporations rarnain, but curb them from 
abusing their pom~r by public :reglil~tion. J.s George E. Hm-rry 
state-d it: 
21 Harvey Hish, Conte;nr:,ora.ry f.ner~g,.!. {lleH York.: Harpe-r 
& Brothers, 1955), p. 6'8. · 
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It is one of history's small ironif)s th&t Roosevelt 
never once in his public life argued tho.t trus-'c bus tino-
l-rould cure the ind"Ustrial problem.- As a matter of rec~ 
ord, :rrma the time he l-Ias governor or lleH Yor~~ to the 
end · of his li.fe he believed ln eovcrmnent reGulation Rnd 
not dissolution of gi~l'lt corpo.ra.tions.. He st·r~t6d his ·. · · 
pos:i.tion. cl~ar),y in his .first messaee to Congress, rear.-. 
:firliled it at .Fi ttsburgh on July 4, 1902, t>..rid t!.3,D.in all 
a~ross the country in the campaign of: that f'n1l. At 
Pittsburgh he ddclared that the growth nr l~rr;f:" industry 
was natural, inevitable, and benef'icial, and that the 
nation could no more turn b.a ck by legislation than it 
c.ould turn back. the l'-lississippi sprlnB .floods. But, the 
Pres.it1e!.1~2aodcd 'w-ro can regulate and ¢ontrol them by · levees. 1 
P\i[:)lic regulation, then, uas hiR ans1.-ret- to the tr\lst 
problem. .Hm·rever-, throu~hout his terril i~ office, he simulta-
neously pursue-d his trust busting activities. l·lhy? Tho a.ns-
rter lies in the tact that l-Thile the path to ei'fective reeula-
1 tion 1-ras blocked by a stub'!:>orn, conservative Congress, the I only ~!a.y tor Roosevelt to bring the arroe;tint capitalists to 
I 
I heel '\·tas through the judiCiOUS use of anti.trust lal·TS • 
In the .field of public regulation Roosevelt l-tas most 
successful uith tho railroads, perhaps because l-tith them it 
was a clear case of inters·tate comn1erce and the country Hils 
sobndl.y against the abuse.s or the railroa ds rlhi ch had be.cn 
graphic~lly pointed out by both the Populi.sts and muc1c:rakers • 
A major achieve::1ent in this area uas the Hepburn Act, 1-rhose 
main provision grant~d the Inte:rstate Comnu~roe Cornrttission the 
p0\·1er to set reasonable rates on complaint of a shipper. 
This bill rras a bre~l!through. Prior to this~ government had 
noi; been abl.e to intervene in t>usiness but t·rith the :passage 
221-!o.t-Iry, op. cit., p.. 1 32. 
! j · 
I 
: i . 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
of tP,is bill one co:u;ld sc.e there ue.s dc1'initely gvi:r..g to be 
.e. more ac.tive inv-olvement oi' the .t'ed,eral eoverrir'lont in thfl 
control of the econo1ny. 23 
Roosevelt also concent:r-ated h'ls e.f.:rorts on social 
we1fa1~e legislation~ Tne Presiclent, shortly- af'ter ndo!)tio11 
of the Hepbu:r>n Act, signed. t\·m other si5ni.ficant measures--
the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Heat Inspe9tio11 Ame.ndmcnt 
to the ./'.gricultural. Appropriations Act. Each t·ras necessi;.. 
tated by the callous ~.isregard of th~ public's health by tho 
indl.lstiries conc.erneQ.... Each also re:flec.ted a sharpened h'H'nre-
ness by responsible men that i'ederal reguJ:~tj,on 't·ras tho only 
means of safeguarding the people's hoalth against i:rrcspons:f ... 
ble bttsinessruen .. 
Roosevelt also fought in the interests o.f' the public 
1-rel:t'are in other areas, as in his .fight :ror national corttttol 
and development o.r the nation''-s natural resources. 
By the year 1907, the· eonserva:tive Republican major-
ity in Congress had had their . fill of' Roosevelt and approved 
no major domestic legislation duri ng his last tvro years in 
o.ftice and repudiated him on several occasions• lleverthcle-sr~, 
Roosevelt and his :fellOl-1 progressi ves re.fused to gi.v e up,. 
The President appointed a nmnber of' ·neH investigatory co!:' .. ''llis'!'" 
sicms.. He made fUrther st~ps in conservation. Mu ho r~pe at.o. 
edly lectured Congress and the people on the need tp r•litlga{e 
.the harsh :inequities Of capitaliS!n by 1-iel:fare nl':'}2.SUres • .He 
2.3Handlin, op. ci.t. , p. 729 ~ 
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u~.s out.rc:q3ed by tho Supremo Court's ruling in Locknc·~ ~· 
ne:t·r York t1905), 1-1hich held that a rnexir!lu..-·-,.-hours lal-1 .rot' 
baJcero Has linconsti tl..t.tional on the grounds that it vras e.n 
unreasonable inter.f"erence with the right of f'ree contract 
and an l.Ulreasonable use o:f the state's p_olic-e pot·:0r. . J\nd 
a.fter a l!eu York tenement lau t·Ias invalidated and a liorJnnon' s 
compensation lal-r declared unconst.i tutionnl, he l-Jr<;)te Jus-ti.ce 
William R. Day that unless the judiciary'::; S!Jil•it ch~trme<l, 
11We should not only have a revolutlon, l;>ut it would.be abso-
1ute~y necessary to hav.e a revQ1ution, because the condition 
o!' the tro"r"ker 1..rou1d be:comc intolerable. 1124 
In a message Roosevelt sent to Conr;l"ess on 
January 31, 1908, the most ·radica1 Presidential message up to 
th,at t .ime, Roosevelt charged that bus.inessrnen hacl revised tho 
doctrine o£ states t rights for their 01·m sel:fish interests 
and to avoid all meaningful regulation. He said there 1-ras 
"no lllOral d:i.fi'erence betueen gambling at cards • • • and 
gambling at the stock market. n He called .for str;iuzent regu-
lation of securities, irnprisorunent o.f businessmen t-rho flouted 
the lat-r~ and a comprehensive program of business regulation. 
He ca:ne out f'or -.rorJcrnan• s compensation, coMpUlsory arhi.ti-E\-
tion of labor disput~s, and acceptance ot: big unionism as a 
countervailing pouer to big business. 25 
24LOuis B. \fright, and_ ot:hers., The ~emo~ratic ExT.Ior-
ience (Chicago: Scott, ForesiTlan P.nd Company,. 19o3), P• 303. 
25- ~ -d .L.O~ • 
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Roosevelt left office in f909 \·!ith none or this 
adopted. Hol·rever,. ori.e cannot call the record of t ·he Squaro 
Deal a failure. It is true. that r.mch of it l-Ias not enacted 
into law during Roosevelt's term in o.f£ice, but there was a 
reason .for tnat. His refor1n.:-; \·rere not pas nod largely because 
alt!lough the people \-ranted ch~nge, mnny politicians did not. 
DurinE Roosevelt's t·erms, control of both tho House and Sen-
ate lny in conservative Republica."! hands o.nd, a.s a result, 
major p:r>ogressive re·:forms \-Jere not pasljco. \·flutt Roosevelt 
got through "ras a result of' his compro:r.ri. sing lti th the con~or­
vative coalition o£ Republicans and Democrats, :ror he Jll'ilst 
got their support or risk de.feat. 
By t-ror~d.ng tozether v7ith the conservatives, some 
pl"'ogress r-ms made ori his progrem.. No longer l.Jould. business 
be all-powerf'ul and unchecked in relation to. labor, for exam-
ple, because of his antitrust activities. But the record of 
Roosevelt must primarily be s-een not by listing bis re.fot,ms, 
but ns a preparer or the 1-1ay for others to move tOl·Tards a 
welfare state. Uhen Roosevelt le:ft o:f:fice it l-ta s realized 
that a return to a complet'3 laissez-fnire system. 1·rould no 
longer- be possible. People 1-rere demanding the .right of' the 
governmemt to intervene in the intet•ests of the public vrel.-
.fare. Finally, .Roosevelt's Squar-e Deal vias i:mporta.'lt bec.e.1).se 
no longer t-tere the social proplems o.f t;he nation th~ concern 
of a re-r; I"efor-m.~r~. Roo~evelt had brought the social prob-
lems of the nation into the full light of pUblic scrutiny to 
be dealt with. Th.ere rsas no going bac!.:. The .Square Deal 
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had loft its mark. 
The years 1908-1912 \orere yea:r>s of erm·Iin~ progressive 
strength. In 1910 Congressional and State elections, p~o­
gressi:vcs, l'lhcthcr running a s Republicans or Democrats, had 
made impressi vo ~alns. But also in this :p e.riod the Republi-
can party b egan to split down the r.:tiddle. \·1i1liar--I Jlot-tard Taf't 
was no11 President and uithin the :first year o:f his term 
Teddy Ro.oseve.lt and his .rellOl-t progressiv~s .found they .had 
made a roista..l<e in believing. that Taft nould carry ou.t their 
progr$li1. Taft increasingly allied himself' with the. conser ... 
vatives., As a result, tot·rard the end o:f Taft's term, 
Roosevelt and Taft both battled £or leadership o-£ tho pa:t:•ty 
in the 1912 election. 
Despite this turn to the right by Taft, the record 
shows some progressive actions during his administration. 
Ttoiice as many anti trust eases were brought dul. .. ing his ad."llin-
istration than duri·ns Roosevelt's. Both the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Amendmcnt.s v-re.re rati"Cied by Congress in the 
ear1y months of 1913. The Sixteenth .Amendment, "rhi ch pro-
vided f'·or a .federal income t·a.x.., coul~ f'uiffll the ideal of a 
more eqllitable distrib1.ltion o-£ the vTealth. fhe Seventeenth 
.Amendment provided :for the direct. election of the Senate, 
fulfilling the ideal o-£ a more popular government. Finally, 
the Ha..l'ln-Elkins Act o.f 1910 was passed, t·rhich established the 
jurisdiction o:f the Interstate Commerce Co::r.mission ·over all 
coil".r.runications and strengthened it by allm·ring it to susr-end 
rates. 
l: 
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In short, during Ta.~t;•s administration, SC"!~!'e- i'cJ!'~hl·d 
si;cps t-:ere taken in the proBressive progrnrn.. The que~tJ.o~l 
mU.$t then be asked, t-Ihy? Taft had merely ploac;od. h5,!~::l()lf ll.~J 
\~antinr; to consolidate the Square Deal but .thenc ~te1:-!l •.-:cnt 
.fut"ther. ,_.he ans~·:e.r is that most or these \-19l~o drio not to 
tho efforts of Taft, \·Tho gave half-nenrted sut..i~ort, but 
rather to an alliance of insurgent Republicans and progrc:;-
si v·o Democrats 1,rho n0\·1 had the strength ot: -rttm'lbcr·s in Coh-
26 grass,. · • 
The 1912 election t·ras a tightly .contcste.d ono. Hl:dch 
revealed a deepening s~hism in the RepUblican party. 
Roosevelt t:ried to take the nomination airay !'rom Taft 1 nnd 
w:hen h~ £ailed. :forme·d the Progressi'"'e or Bull Hoose party. 
Opposing Roosevelt and Taft 1-tas r/oodroH Hilson, a neucomor 
to politics \-.rho ran as the Democratic candidate. The unpop-
ular, bUIJ:lbling, conservative Taft wa~ .foredoomed to de:!'E)!tt,; 
and so the race beca"'lle a choi~e betl·teen tHo progre.ssi ves • 
Roosevelt or ~Tilson. 
Roos~velt' s program vras knot-m as the lJew Untional-
ism.,. It l·Tas a well thought-out p1 .. ogr-az~ a.hd re£le ct ed tho 
evolution or his political thought .from mild to radical pro-
gressivi;sm. In the last years ot his presid0ncy, Roo·sevclt 
had set .forth his idea that the re'deral eovern.'1lertt should bo 
a oynaznic :force in the social and economic a.r.fairs of n~n. 
J3:1 1909 he had aciopteda program demanding broad f"edcral and 
' 
,. 
, . 
. 
economic regulation but had not yet forn:ulntetl a coheren t 
political philosophy to justi.fy such a proer~. This l-J~.s 
supplied by Herbert Croly in his -vrorlr, Promise o.f t...mc·ric R-:"1. 
88 
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Lire (1909) • 
Croly1 s theDis not only summarized the most pr·O~rcn;.. 
siv9 thought of the tir.1e but also becrune the ratio-nale o£ 
the Uol.J Nationalism, and even of l·lilsonian prQ~ressi vism 
a.fter 1915. In P.merican thought, Croly snid, there v:e:re t\·TO 
opposing v.ie1.-Js on t-1hat role gove1•nment should play.,. The 
f'irst uas the H~ltonian viet·r, identi:fied Hi th the aristoc-
racy and special priv·ileged, t-1hich ~aid govern.r.:rent shQuld 
intervene directly to alter ~xisting ~conomic relationships 
or to establish P,evT Qnes. The seccnd was the Jef'.fersonian 
view that government should pursue a policy of strict laisscz-
faire t-li th rega~d to economic activity. ri'his \·Teak eovc:r·runcnt 
concept \-ras identil'ied with democracy and a proeram. of equal 
righ ts and opportunities. Croly said this -v1c::..s \o1ron3 and 
called boldly for a new orientation in progres-s·ive thinking. 
1-lhat he demanded was nothing less than that the progresslves 
abandon their Je.ff'ersonian pre judices against stron~ govern-
ment and adopt Ha.--niltonia.n means to achi6Ve .Tei'ter!Jonian, or 
democratic ertds.,27 
After reading this bool< , Roosevelt began at once to 
translate Croly 1 s scholarly treatise into living political 
pr-incipl0~ all could. understand. .ln a .famous s -peech at 
27 Ar.thur s. Lin."!{, Hoodrot-r !·:ilson a nd the rrorn•essi ve 
~ (Nevr Yor~\:: · Haroper a.nd Brothers, 1954):--ii".- 19. 
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Oso.n?-tomie, Kansas, on .August 31, 1910, Rooseve.lt sounded the 
~eynote of h;is two years 1 crunpaign. The old nationalism, ho 
said, had been used 1'.by the sini.sto1 .. • • • special inter--
ests. u What he propose.cl. ltro:s a nel-r nationalis1n, a dy1:aamic 
d(.)!nocr·acy, thnt l'tould recognize the inevitability or. concen-
tration in industry, and bring the great COl .. POl .. a.tion3 undi:n .. 
compiote federal c.ontro1, that l'rould protect o.nd encourage 
the laboring man, that, in brief, \.:ou1d do many o.r the things 
associated l-Ti th the :r:lOdern concept of the t-re1i'n.re· sto.te • "\·Te 
are .race to .race lttith :heltJ conceptions or the :relations or 
property to hu.>'ll.an l·relf'a.re ., " be decla.t"e.d. 11 • • • Property 
(is) subj&ct to the general right or the community to regu-
lat·e its use to whatever degree the public welfare may 
. · t u2.8 requ~re J. . • 
This~ in genera1,. was also the program and th3nte that 
Roosevelt propo.sed during the campaign of 1912. Tho Progres~ 
siva Platrornl o:r 1912 on t-rhi·ch he campaigned included mea~­
ures 1ike a minimuzn wage. ror 1-romen, prohibition of child 
labor, 1-10rkman' s compensation~ a.""ld social insurance. On the 
political level the Progressives -called f'or adoption or the 
initiati·,re,. ref"erendum, and recall~ as well as the ihstit"tA-
tion or a nat·ion•-v:ide presidential priiriary ·in order to insure 
popular cohtro1 o;f government. In the economic :rield, the 
major demands were :tott a .:fed.eral trade co:rr.r.rlssion to exercise 
sweeping, regulatory .authority over, bu.siness and industrial 
·:· ;" 
1· 
a.ctlvity and a t a rir:r co::".r.:li.ssion thnt ·Hould sot .r:!.t ~:; 0 ~, n 
SCienti.fiO basifl !t.nq i;Ua.rantc~ that b~nc.fits etf }:'•rOt ':) Ct.iPh 
9.0 
accrued to uorke·r-s as ,,f¢11 a:s em."". lover·~. 29 rrt • tl · 
:1.·· o~ - 1U. S .t • 1C·n, \-:{l3 
the Net-! Nationalism. Th · · j 
· . .. ~ e.overn.rnon~ \·.'Ot11d no~'l be n yi tnl 
i.'orce that could eff'ect cho.nc;e so thnt it c:ould l"C '-\l:lY s e!'vc 
the l?eJ..faPe o:r the people. Tho F'abi~ns Hou1<1 hn·.ro .n odded 
their heads in agreement. 
Tho other major contender ror the prccidcncy, 
l.:oodrO't-1 \iilso~,. he.d rio SUch l-toll-d.e!'ine d prCIG!'{l..Yll ()r rhilN!O-
ph:r l-Theri the campaign beaan. Li.ke Rooscvt'lt, ho h~~d n gon-
eral co.rnmitment to the. goals of socin1 justica, but "Urtlilto 
Ro:o~evelt, \iilscm :t:elt they should be ~ceonpl~nhoci only by 
.c 
the .states and localities. This stnnd rcflee:t~d tho rnct 
that Hilson vias a progressive or tho J'9:f!'er.sonian J'C: r~uo:d.Nt, 
U.lldi.sturbed by Cro.ly' s cha.1leneo. Punda:nent;all~r n ~tnto'::~ 
rights Democra·t; vlilson believed that the "fede ral p~1'7C!" 
should be used on1y to s?feep tt¥-ray sp3cia1 privilege~ and 
artif'icial barriers to the develo}':'ment oi' individual .ener-
gies 1 and to prest)rve .and restore coinpeti tion in bus!.noss. 
Thus he tias :ror a rela.ti.vely l-teak :federal go,vernmcnt. 
~Ulaon, throughout the co..":lpa:ign, sce!'lod to bo senrch-
ing :ror an issue. He .found it ·t-rhen he met Louis D. B~:lnd~is, 
• lr.~',·•"'"'Ye·rs in tho countr···, ~ho on~ Of the lea(iint; prog roe.SS1Ve - "' 
also l-l'as the ch.ie.f spokesman of' the philosophy of re:;ulnted 
29rbid., p. 16. 
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th~ small business..-n,g_n. J!..nd it Has B:::>andels ';rho clarified 
l·lilson' s thought and let:. hh1 to believe ·th~.t the most sign:t.r-
icant question :racing the Amel,ican people t-ras the preservn ... 
t1.on of econorr.ic i'reedon1 ;.n the Uni.ted State!l. 3° 
Brandeis taught, and \·Til.son ac;r·e~d E:.nd reitel"atcd in 
his speeches~ that the rnn.in tesk ahead l-Ias to provide the 
means by lll'hlch business could be set fx-ee .from the shack1os 
o:r Iilonopoly and special privilege. Roosevelt claimed thr,t 
tho groat co:t>po;ration~ vTOl'"e often the most e.fticient uuits of 
industrial. organization, and that all tha.t was necessar~r lrza.s 
to bring them under· st.rict public control, by close regula-
tion or their activities by a po1.-rer.ful troade commission. 
" \1ilson rep1ied: 
As to the monopolies, I lrnol~· that they are so vw.ny 
caros in a juggernaut·, and I d.o not look forward with 
pleasUt"e to the time when the juge;et"l'lauts are licensed 
and driven by commissioners or the 'United States. 
Monopoly, he added, developed amid conditions or unregulated 
cornpe'titton. "rle can prevent these processes through reme• 
-dial legisJ_ation, and so :restrict the -wrong use ot: COlyU)eti tion 
that the :right use of cor;1petition will destroy monopoly. rr31 
·zn sllort, l1i1son t-ras· calling tor an end- to big busi-
ness and monopoly so that :free competition could be rest.ored. 
Another basic di.f.f·eronoe bet1-teen the 'Nc:-.r nationalism .and NE)l>T 
:Freedom, \-Tilson's program, was illustrat-ed by l•Tilson's savage 
attack on Roosevelt t s labor progr•am. l~he idea of' tho federal 
govorr ... ment • s ·mo-ving directly into thf) economic i'ield, by giv-
30Ibid., p. 20. 31 Ibid., p. 21. 
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ing special protection to 'L-rorkers, or farmoJ;>s, o. s Roos evelt 
1-;as beginning to see ~-a right and just, vJas as abhorrent to 
\-lilson in 1912 a.s- the idea or class le~islation in the inter-
est of manu:factiu~ers or .shipmmers. As Uilson said , the phi-
losophy o£ America \-las equal rights !'or all and special priv-
ileges for none-- "a :f'ree .field an.d !lO f avor." 
I do not unnt to live under a philanthropy. I do 
not }7a...~t to be taken care of by the govePrlm.cnt. • • • 
t-Tc do not vrant a b~n~volont government. \>le 11a:rit a free 
and just govern..-nent. :>2 
So, -under l'!ilson,. the executive po1-1er \·rould not be 
widely e.xpanded. It would rnaihly. be directed at breaking up 
the monopolies so that free competition could. be restored. 
In this 1-ray the rarmer and s1nall p1 .. oprietor could once n.~ai-n 
prospe~. flilson' s administration t-Jould thus judge social 
policy fro!ll the vi.evrpoin.t of the small pro1n•ietor and the 
independent :farmer, l'Iho l-Tere his chief support·ers. Jeffe-r-
sonians, not only in ends, but inme ans, they considered 
restraint on bigness the :most e.r.feetive protection !'or indi-
vidual liberties. Tho l1ew Freedom aimed to recti:fy the 
injustices in:Ciustrialism .had caused, by a return to the ear-
.1ier values of economic and political democracy. And so the 
attempt to apply these values in practice \-Io'llld be the task 
o.f the Hilson administration • .3J 
The choice, as \'lilson s a id, t-tas b et·t-reen his Uew Free:-
32Arthur I·f. Schles·inger, · Jr., The Crisi~ o!' lli Old 
Order (Boston: Houghton Hi.ffli n Co., 1957), p. 28 . 
33Handlin, op. cit., p. 7)2. 
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dom, or nlavery and cn~hninm.ont under Roosvvelt t.s UeH Nation-
a.lism: '•This is a second struggle i'or e1itancipation • .. . If 
Arilet~ica is not to have f'ree enterprise, t.hen sho can h~ve 
.f.reedo!ll or no sort 'Hhatevor.34 It vras \·Ills on's belief that 
econoJ:dc democracy \·Tas absolutely essential to political 
demoerne:r that gave ultimate :meaning to the slozan, '"Tl'l.e New: 
Freedom. u 
The election ot 1912 b"J;"ou.gh~ to of"~ioe Woodrolt llilson 
and the lle>t-1 Fre~do!ll, rath~r than the Nevr nationalism. In malt-
ing that choice, the voters had rejected Theodo:rte Roosevolt's 
proposals f.'or centr-alizitlg pol-;rer but at the sS..-ne time rcvenl~d 
tbe:i.r desire to .ext.end the activities of' the gover~ .. mont for 
.t· 
the protec,:tiort of" the individual. t'lhat n0\-1 of' ·the rec·ord of 
his adrainistratl,on? 
At the llew Freedom"s core 't·ras the destruction of 
monopoly by don'llward tarif'f' revision,. r~lentl'ess entorcement 
Of strengthened anti trust l .aHS; .and the .freeing or banks from 
dependence .on \'Tall. Stre·.et.. \-Tilson began at ·once to .rul.fill 
these steps. 
His :first move was drasti~ ta:rif'f reduqticm to de:lttoy 
the Repul:>lican syst,em, ot speoia,l privilege to industry and. 
producers o:f important ral-: .materials. The result of' his lead-
ership was the Under-.rrood Tarif'.f, the .first substanti~l reduc-
tion of tarif'.f' schedl.l~es since be.fore the Civil to.lar. 
By the time ~·lilson .signed the Und.ervrood Act, he vtas 
34Lin-lr, op • . cit., p. 21. 
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alri;ady deeply engage(l in a more a-nbitious and di1'1'icult 
und~rtaJtj.ng, the se~ond step in the llcl·T Freede>rn.' s campaign, 
to destroy monopoly and unleash the potential economic enel"-
gies of the ft.JJlerican people. This was the struggle for a 
nm..r ~u:t"rency and banking system Hhat 1·1ould bre a..l<: the old dom-
inance of' 'l.1all Street on th.e economy. Thero. wns rTidespread 
agreement about the ur~ent need :for a new banking and cur ... 
rency system but littlo cons·ensus about the right solution. 
Old Guard Republicans- 1-ra.lited a decentralized reserve system 
under _private control. Bryan Derno.crats and progressive 
Republicans called for a reserve system and currency supply 
ot·mcd and controlled by the sovermnent. After much disagree-
_ment, finally :a compro1nise uas t·rorked. out and the Federal 
.Reserve Act t-ias adopted j,n December, 1913. 
The measure created tt-relve Federal Reserve Banks 
owned and controlled by private· bankers but responsible to a 
seven-member Federal Reserve Board .ereated by the President. 
The reserve banks were authorized to issue currency frorn a 
sound, yet reasonably flexible· base and to per.for.xn numerous 
other central banking .functions. Provision was also made to 
meet the seasonal needs or agricultur~. 
Thus. the Federal Reserve Act Cl'~rated a system of 
mixed private and public po'.'rer. It tv:as r10 out-and-out vic-
tory tor the progressives, but it was a iarge s·tep in the 
direction of: establishing a workable reserve system, destroy-
in$ the concontration of. credit in Hall Street, and giving 
the count.ry an ehtstie currency suited to expanding business 
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.needs, o.ll high priority progressive goal.s. 
\vilson's next gr~at objective 1-1as revision and 
strcn:etllening of the Sherman Antitrust ..Act. This, alon~ 
95 
1-!ith the d.Ol·mHe.rd Pevision of: the tariff' and. creatj:c>n of a 
net·T banking 2nd curreney system, tvould complete the }lew F'ree-
ao:m proer$1. There would be no legislation. to give spcci~l 
benetits to labor, no rural-credits measure, no such conser-
vation progrrun as Roosevelt had envisac;ed. Chi.ld ~abo_r-, 
women's su.t.frage, 1.sorkmen•s compensation, and all the r .ept 
would have to come, if they came at all, by ac.tions of tho 
individual states. In at least one area, moreover, there Has 
positive repudiation or social justice in 191'3. vlith the 
< 
.l>resident' s aequiesce.nce, the Secretary o£ the Treasury and 
the Postmaster General sogregated some ·Negro employees, thus 
setting back the concept o:f -equality.35 
A second blow ea:me to tho socis.l justice group- ""t.zhe:n 
President \o/ilson refused to lend his support in tb13 Sena-te 
f'or a ehi1d labor bill 11hich had already pass~d the Hous.e in 
1914, claiming it '"ras unconstitutional ~or the .federal poHer 
to be extended in this area. But by 1914, the proe;ressiv~ 
movement had gathered too much momentum to be long halted by 
presigential indi:f.ference . 1·lh,ile the chilO. la"bor :forces ' ·:ere 
regrouping i'or a second assault, nev1 pressures .1·rere bearing 
so heavi1y in the lfnite House that '1ilson ha:d eithc:r to 
accommodate them or risk los.s of· his o1Tice in 1916. '1'he 
35~'lright, The Democratic Exnerience 1 op . oi t ·, p • 307 • 
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l~esult Ho..s a movement tOl·Tard tho ne1·.t Nationaliem, f-irst evi-
deneed by the pass e;ge of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
\Vilson's o:riginal measures included le~islation t<> 
outla.\ot speci!'ic unf'air tra.do practices and to creat~ a :r~d-
eral trade corl\!lli.ssi on rlith only fact-:finding pov-1ers. Pro• 
gressives in both parties did not think much or the :first 
measure and refused to support the other because the col~'lls­
sion would not have the po~-IE~r to act on its findin£}5. ~-liT~ on, 
at this poi nt, began to listen to the pttoeressive side. Con-
versations 1·1i th BI'andei.s convinced him tl1nt it l-ras impossible 
to outla-,, every conceivable trade practice. l•lilson became 
convlnced. that so1netl'l.ing like the Rooseveltian solution 11as. 
< 
the only alternative. .He lost interest in the .first rnoasur<3, 
kno'\>m as the Cl-ayton Antitrust Bill. As finally adopted. in 
1914, it vras full o:f ambiguities and qualifications. Ho.an-
while, Hilson espoused and pushed through his Attorney Gen~ 
eral' s, Louis D• Brandeis, ·measure, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. This act called t:or the creation of' a Federal 
Trade Commission empowered, in effect; to de.fine unfair· t .rade. 
practices on its own terms and to suppress· them on its own 
findings, subject to broad court review. The Federal Reserve· 
Act had siven f'irst proof' tb.at 1UJ:son might be willing to 
consider expanding f'~cleral pot-rer over economic a:t;£airs. The 
Fe.deral Trade Corn..~ssion Act 1,.ras a sure sign that he had. 
- - . .,~ 
m.o·.r.::u tv\·iar•u u.Yl'Hwzlc use of t}le federal au.tn'ori ty • ,.;)'-' 
36Ibid. 
~ -
.. I 
l 
I , 
' 
' I j 
1 I ~ 
', 
i ' 
: ·I 
! ! 
' I 
I'! 
., 
t ~ : 
' I 
[ 
-~ 
97 
Fux·the:r indiotr.tions that '-lilson 1-ra~ delibe.~.~at~ly 
emba.1•klng upo'!:l ne1·r policies aimed ~l't br:t11ging the pr6c:;r-ass.ive 
movcme:nt to .f'ruition r:orc evidenced prior to the election o1· 
1916. He beca~ne mo1•c sympathetic to the need.s or labor. ln 
J3.rma.t·:y·, 1916 > \·Tilson nominated. Br-ande.ia to the Sup1 .. eme 
Court. Olo. Guard Republicans protested. bitterly to h,is 
appoint1~ent of' such an advanced progresci v.o. Brrindeis he.d. 
upset legal tradition in 1908 by presc1iting a mass of sociol-· 
ogical data to the Supreme Court in his successful de.fense of 
the Oregon lat•J' establishi113 l1l9JCimtun ·uor}dng hours for l-rornen.. 
But tvil.s()n forced Brandeis' con:fix·mation. Next, he came out 
for a languishing rural-oredits bill that he had condemned rts 
class legislation tHo years be:t'ore. 
Then, suddenly, the legislat·i ve log jam uas broken. 
Undor ad·ministration pressure, the Kern-HcGillicuddy Bill, a 
model workmen.' s compensation measure :for federal empl.oyae3, 
dra.!"tod by the American Association £or Labor Legislation, 
was resurrected and passed by Congress on August 19, 1916, 
and quickly signed. Next, \·Tilson, through strong suppot•t 
behind. the child labor bill, 1-1on its adoption. Enacted in 
the surrtmer Of 1916, it v18.S declaz-ed U,nconstitutional two 
years l..ater in :frant:'llo.r ll· Dagenhar~. 
\-Tilson re.conciled himself' to the Rooseveltian policy 
or eo-operation botHee·n business and go~rern.>nent by urging, 
successfully, the creation of: a tarif'f com..Yl'lission. because he 
feared that Et1rope \orould du.'iip its s~rplus goods in P:.terica 
at the end or the t.;ar. 
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The .fJ.0\·1 Of pationnlistic, social justice legisla.tion 
c:orititmed right until election day. The R~venuc Act c..doptcd 
in the late s1.ur:mer of '1916 increased incc:>ne taxes sharply ~t1d 
imposed a ne:vr estate ta)t. The President,, in Septemper, pel.~­
sonally pushed throu~h Coneress the Adamson Bi"J.1 to est.ublish 
the eir;ht-hour day for railroad l'torkors .• 
:rn sum, the Hil.son Adr.dnistration had co1ne fUll cir-
cle. It was nou the ad:voca.te of positive feder~al pm;to;.• tc 
achieve s-ocial ju~t:i,ce. 1uld so l·rhen 'Hilson Has rmminr. '£o.r 
re-electit>l'l in 1916 he could claim, truthfJ.tlly, ns he didJ 
t"hat he· and his party had, in !'.ac-t, put the Proeressive . plat .. 
tor1n of 1916 on the federal statute boo!{s. By 1916 tho 
\·Tilson Adr.linistration had, indeed; pushed t~ough the most 
imposi.nG program or ref"or.m legislati.on in .American history. 37 
And when t'lilson promised more social justice, the. progrcssivo.s 
.from ali sides !"locked to his side and re .. elected him Presi-
dent. Progressivism, however, rras to die l·rith the U. s. 
entry into l-Jor:td_ Har I. It -would remain :ror another man, 
F;c~!tl~Ln Delano Roosevelt., to advance i"u~ther to1:tards the 
welfare state with his Nen·r D~a.:t, the subJect ·or. the next 
chapter. 
37Link, Uooarot-1 Hilson and. ~he Prot:;ressive Era, op. 
cit., p. 230. · 
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THE lffitf DEAL 
Sullen men lived miserably in Hoovet-vj lles, huddled 
e.cainst icy blasts, 1-mi ted in grim lines !'or bread and 
sou~, pondered a desperat.e :m.l:'.rch on l!ashlneton to col-
lect bonus payments. Fari·,iers, .fighting l.litterly again:Jt 
dispossession_, :moved tOH~d open violence. b'us·inossmcn, 
stricken t·iith panic, pleac1ed i.'or government aid. Labol-. 
1-Tas disorgtmized arid impotent. Intellectuals t-rero 
clutching at Comm.Ur.ism or. e.t Fascism. And oux- natiohal 
leadership? Clinginz t·1ith :frightened obstinacy t;o ·the 
theory that the forces 1~hich brought tho dep:ression. l·Iould 
bring the revival, Herbert Hoover resisted the demand 
th~t the lfover.nment act. It was the winter before ··the 
l-Te,1 D~al • 
Tho election of' 1932 .t.ra.de Franklin Dele.no Roosevelt 
Pres1dent o.r the United States. He had campaigned on the 
prerllise that, once elected, he 'HOUld oi.':fer a nNal-1 Deal" to 
the, American people. fihat exactly this l.<TOuld be 1-1as not mado 
clear. In the .tour months bet·ueen Roosevelt's election and 
inauguration, the depression reached. its lo't-Tost ebb. During 
this period there l'tas little constructive leadership. Presi-
dent Hoover thought that -everything justifiable had been done 
in the domestic field and was interested in s~lmulating fol .. _. 
eign trade. Roosevelt could not accept Hoover• s analysis of 
the domestic situation and 1-rus not prepared to 't.fork. for a 
1 Arthur H. Schlesi·nuer.~ Jr>., ''The Broad Accomplish-
..., .. . - -:cnt~ o"£ tha lL:n-r Deal," The !:en·r Deal! Revolution P!: i!.."V0.1U-
tion ed. Edt-dn C. RozHe~(Boston: D. C. Heath ~~ Company, 
f959i, P• 29. 
99 
' '. ! I . , 
! : ~ 
100 
! retnrn to ~.n inter-national gold standar·cl, the kcystolle or 
Hoovcr•s plans. 2 J.s the nation drifted Hi thcut 1ea<1orship; 
·si~vcr ::hirts, l-.rhi.tc shirt:-J., Jchaki shirts, and ·other or:G~n­
izations strove \L't<lsuccessi'ully ror :m~ss support. 
It vras hard. to ·u.nc:lorestimate tho:::. need fo1 .. action. 
1-l:my questioned l-lhether America could solve its probl.tM!::: cleim-
ocratically, and l'rhether eapi talism as a system Has vinblt::. 
~be national income l-tas less than half or what it had be.en 
!'our ::~hort years be.fore. Ne-arly thirteen million k ner:i..cans-.-
about one quarte:r of the la.'Por f.orce--w~r.e desperately s~~~lt­
j.ng johs.3 Th~ machinery tor shelterinB and .feeding the 
unemployed 1-ras breaking dolm every1v-here under the grorrine 
burdnn. Finally, a :fe'\·1 hours be:fore the immguration, every 
ba.n.lr in .America had locked its doors. It was no\·1 not just a 
matter or staving oft hunger. It lias seeing l'Ihether n. repl~e­
sentati ve democracy could conquer econo:rnic collapse • It .Has 
a matte-r ot: staving of£ violence, even tat least sor.1e so 
thought) revolution,.4 
Whether revolution was a real possibility or not; 
.faith in the free enterprise system was ce.rtainly waning. 
Ca:pitalism, many thought, bad spent it·s force; democracy 
coHld not rise to economic crisis. The only hope lay in gov-
ernment~! le~det-ship or a power and will t.;hich representati-ve 
2wrignt, ~Democratic J:<;xperience, op. cit., P• 374· 
3Arthur 1-1. Schle~inger., Jr., ~ pominq of' _the lh'H 
~ {.Bas to:n: Houghton liif'flin Co!r.pany, 1'959), P • 3 • 
4Ibid. 
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inst;i tutione sectno.d i:nY>o. tont ·t·. 0 _T' ...... 0 .• ~_t· , ..... c· .• s- ~:-• -.. ''"' 3c; ~-:: lo~~.~ d <;:.:vl-
ously on l!oscot-r, o.thers on ~~rlin .E:;nd l~o::~ .> Lt. \: ,i.:; i:: tb!.~ 
milieu that FzoanJ.clin D. Roosc·.;cl t 
Harch l~, 1933. 
Ro.osevel t un<lc~sco:t.•ed the ~:holo tlu·u:; t of hi :r !,:~.r\-: 
Deall::hc_n. he said -t .n h :4·s.· lnau . ~''"'. "'l ~ ,~ · .,. ..... 1 · · l~ 
... .... !:.'-"" ...._ .11:C• O!~C!>:! .: . :. a S 1: 1, . -LOn 
asks for ac·tion and action no·a • .,b Tho 1:cH D:Jnl '"~ ~a n. t•c .~;-
ponse to crisis. 
ltOrk. u7 Like the Fab;ta.n and .pro~rcnsivc f-'l'O[_i1'< ::'13. tll() r('~;­
Deal Has a . re·sponse to pres sin~ prob1c::!3, onlJ' tl\i a tir.~() t..h.., 
problems 1-rere much. :more acute, !'or it lltl.!l no lont,ct• .n r·.oro 
matter or re.f()~m or the e:r.isting SY!:i t-en. Tho VCI~'J !iUrv! vn1 
..( 
o.f the system which hac;l bt,oken dOl·m \-!as bl)in(; t·-~ ;JbH1. .n~cov .. 
ery: undar the ea:pi tEdi.stic systcr1  1nu~t bo brour.ht c.l>out or 
otheMtis.e it l-IOUld be prey to choo::inc tho J' 3.th of' vi;olcnco 
and re.volution as had oc currad in Ger:n~ ... ·1;, und¢;r Hi t1cr n.tio 
in It.a.ly under nussolini-. 
The .Nevt Dea)., "r(lich ·t-ras both e..~ idoRl end a fl"0£;1~~~. 
bat! many afi'inities and dissimiiaritie!l ~:i th both tht) F..lhl tl.!l~ 
and progressives. · th· .. · i il f! .,...i tJ.• tn" Tt.~"t ::t-~.: First·, one sees .· e :; :1 · · H .· · . • ...,. 
·· 1 ha·d n· ··e· •~-r·l1.r ident.· ice.l backr;rour.c"5 a.n the Dea ers as ·a group .-. 1 
progressives and Fabians. They ~a....,e l n,rc~l:l fro; : tho nie.-!lq 
5Ipid. 
6eterald D. 
(En~le-vrood Cliff's ~ 
1967 ).,. P• )2, 
7Ibid. 
. . .... · ...... (\··,.!" 
( - ) .. •rnn~"' Lin V~J:~no :-·J)J., · • · ~ "l~a:sh ed. _, ~· · ' ·· ~ -. -- ~-::-----~.~ . " ""'r-, 
. . . . . ,}:rr-~nt::tc!}-1:~) 1.' J..r.c .. . ~c . ~ .. _.c, Ue.,_;1 Jorseif: 
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class and l·rere mostly lat·TYers, co~1.ege pro!'cssb!"s, eccmo-
ttdsts, or soci~l 1-rorker.s. Like the. Fabim1s and proere~­
sives, ~hey loved stitnulatins conversat:ton. Tho corc..>ton bond 
which held the1n together, as Arthl.tl'" N. Schlcsi n~er, Jr. 
quotes Herman Kahn noting; 1-ras that they uer~· all at bC'!'no in 
tho uor1d of' ideas. Th~y 1-10re accustomed to ena1ysis nt.d d:i.n-
lectic; and th~Y wer.e pr.epared to use intellir;once as an 
instrument of government. They were more than, specialists. 
As Kahn he.s f'urther pointed out, they l.Jero--or considered 
themselves--generalist!:!, capaple o:f briPBin~ loaic to bo~r on 
any social problem. They delighted in tho plo.y o~ the ~-x~oc 
mnd.8 
'rl:le Nevi D~alers by no means belonged to a single 
school. Indeed, they represented diver.ecnt and o.ften clash-
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ing philosophies all the 'ltray from laia-sez-faire liberalism in 
1
. 
the tradit.ion of Grover Cleveland, dedi.cated to sound raon~y, 
:fiscal orthodoxy~ and tarifT reduction, to those vrho c.alled 
:ror a socially planned economy. and sought to coll!lt·er the 
anarchy o.f competition by government-business col.l.aboration • 9 
The pr~gressives also had. represent-ed .a lvide spectru.":l of 
thol1ght,. lihereas the Fabians had not. 
OtheP s'imilariti~s stand. out. All three: move~ents 
~1ere cha:r>acterized by t1leit' optimism and rejection or dor;na. 
'I'h.ey ~'rere uninte.rested in pure theory.. They ~eft others to 
Bsch~-es·inger, op. cit., p. 18. 
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er~gue tho finer points of capital ism or oocialism. They t·rore 
all pr'agm!ltists ·t-rho sought a 1lliddle t·my b.ott·r.sen c ·~:· .. pitalistn 
end cot1mur:.ts1~. Artnur H. Schlesinger, Jr .• lrell noted thQ 
charoctor o£ the Nel.·l Deal: 
The 1-rhcle point. or the l:lel.; Deal luy in its belief in 
ac:t·i vlsm, its faith in gradualne=3s, its '!"e.jection of 
catastrophism, its lndifff}rence to ideology, its convic-
tion that a managed o.nd modi:fied cnpi talist order• 
achieved by piece-r:1eal experiment could combine personal 
t'reedom a.nd. economic grol...-th. 'In a tlorld in l-lhich revo-
lutions just nol·T are coming easily, • said Adolf Ber.le, 
• tho Ne•·r Denl chose the more di.f.i'icul t course o!' modera-
tion and rebuiJ.din~.' 'The course that the nevr Adminis-
tration .did talt:e,' said Harold Iclces, 1·nas the hardest 
course. It con!'ormed to no th~ory, but it did fit into 
the American system--a. system or taking action step by 
step, a system of regulation only to meet concrete needs, 
e.. system of' courageous recognition or change.' 
Rexford TugHell, rejecting 1aissez-:fnire and communism, 
spoke or a • third course t '1 0 . 
Thero tvore also a number or areas in 1rrhich the }Ie\1 
Deal dii'.fered .from both Fabianism and progressivism. One 1.ras 
that both the progressives and the NeH Dealers l-Tere not com-
mitted to either collectivism or to e-stablishing socialism in 
A.Tllerica,. as the Fabians 1-rere in England. Frances Perkins, 
Roosevelt ' .s long-time friend and Secretary of Labor, Illade a 
pertinent comment on Roosevelt's thinking: 
I knel-T Roosevelt long enough and under enough circum-
stances to be quite sure he t-ras no political. or economic 
radical. I take it that the essence of economic radical-
ism is to believe that the best sys·tem is the one in 
whlch private o-vmership of the means of production is 
abolished in .favor of public Ol.·mership. But Rooseve~t 
tool{ the status quo in our economic sy.stem as much for 
granted as his f'amily • They ·t-rere part o:f his li:fe, and 
10Arthur H. Schlesinger, Jr., "Sources o£ the New 
Deal, rr Paths or l..rncrican Thoup;ht {Boston: Houghton H:ifflin 
Company, 196)T; P• 319. 
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so vras our syst.emj he l-Tas content l·Tith it. He .f'elt that 
it oue;ht to bo humane, fair und honest.; nncl that adjust-
ments ought to be rnade so that people t·!O~ld not sufrer 
:from pQverty and neglect, and so that all would share. 11 
Tho greatest single dif:ferencc betHcen the lTeH Deal 
and proeres.sive period was that under the Nc'>T Dea.:t, tho role 
of' the fedo.ral government in both the e·con0!"',Y ~md tho lives 
or its people l-tas greatly expanded. The l·tel-fare state had 
def'ini tely emerged. The progressi v:c-s ha.d consta-::ttly tnllted 
about trust busti~ arid Of devices to bring the ~OVCl .. :rtt:ient 
closer to the peopl-e. Th.e New Deal centered its interest on 
social and economic re.for1nJ rather than poli t .ica.l r-ororm. 
For the f'ir·st time in tho h1.-story of' the republic, the .fod-
. .·• 
eral government 1-ra.s assuming -<a resronsibility i'or the l-relfo.i•c 
and security of its people--for employment~· health, and gen-
eral ~1el.fare. The 'New De.al assumed the responsibility of 
guaranteeing ever-y /uner-ican a minimum standard or subsistence 
ins.tea.d of allo"t·Tinz people to starve. The goverrll'nent noH was 
a.n instru..lttent .for economic change. All this, atid much illore, 
the _progressives uould not ha.-ve conceived possible. 
So much for an overviet:r of dif·.t~rences and sinilari-
ties betr7een these thZ.ee movements.. lV'aat exactly did the lTeo;-l 
Deal stand .for.? \Vhat were its ideals and hol-t nell did it 
achieve them? These questions must be a.ns1.·:ered bef.ore an 
ass-essment of the movement can be made. 
The 11m·1 Deal was not a philosophical moveillent. The 
11 Frances Perkins, .The Roosevelt .!. KneH ( Nel·1 York : 
The Viking Press, 1946), p:)28-29. 
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mm Dc~;;.lers ,;cp~ men uho uero d3dicRtcd to solvins th~ proh·· 
lf;tns o~ a doprozdion. They ha.d. to act. IJike tho Jn•ogre!3-
sives nml FFtb5.:-.ms, th~y l-1el'C not given to \lr:lting philosophic 
ti•eat·isos.. Neverthaless, goals dld underlie the 1let·T De~l 
progr .~.m. In hiB Inaugural Address, Rooseve.l t re!'errod tc 
th€:se th1~ee objectives or the Neu Deal as "Relief, Recovery 
and Re:rorm. " 12 
Roos·Entelt • s conception of re.l:i.e£ 1-rent f'e..r be~ one. \-that 
President Hoover believed the federal go·vermn~nt should do. 
Hoover bas·ically was an advocrate of individualism anc] self-
reliance.. The individual should be responsibl,e f'ol" his ot-m 
welfare. tvhen ·the depres~ion struc.l<: in 1929, Hoover sau the 
economy la,gging aild. unet.ip1oyment grou:in&, but he ret'U.sod to 
do ·much about this ,except to say that recovery- l:;as just 
~ound the COI'ner: "Our joint unde!'taking, n he said on 
~-lay 1 , 1930., be.fore the United States Chamber o:£ Commerce,. 
"has succeeded to a remarkable d.eeree. rr The irtensi ty of the 
slump "has been gi•eatly d.iminished. rr "I EllTl convinced," 
Hoover· said, "that we have now passed the worst a..."'ld t-ti th con-
tinued unity o£ eff'ort we shall rapidly recover.n1 3 
So Hoover thought recovery 'HOUld be soon and, in nny 
case, it was not the .federal government's responsibility to 
tak(} e>ver rel:i,er·. In 1931, Hoovet' said that if .Ar.i.ori,c~ meant 
anything, it meant the principles of individual and local 
12~tr.ie;ht, op. cit., p. 376. 
1 3ArthUr J.t. Schlesil"'.ger, Jr., ~ Crisis or the .Q1S 
Or<1.er (Boston: Houghton llif'i'lin Company, 19'5~p. 16>7 
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raspons:i.b.ili.ty ru1d lnl.ttus.l sel.f-b~lp. If ue· break dot·m these 
principles, 1>1e ''have struck at the· roots of self'-eovcrn.'nont.u· 
ShotLl.d :reoet·al aid be the only alternative to starvut!on, 
~hen f'ederal aid ne nmst have; but "I have ,faith in the A-ner-
ican people that such a day shall no·t come. u14 
Heam-rhile, thousn..nd.s or American::: 1-i'Erre intrOd.llC¢d tp 
tl. neH and humiliating 1110de O:f existence-~lii'e. On the relief' 
r .oll.s. Host o:f the unemployed held qut as long as they 
e.o:uld. But l·rith savings gone, credit exhausted" and ~rwrk 
unobtainable, there seemed: no alternative except to subdue 
pride and face reality. 
The system l-Tas.1 in the main, -one of lbcnl poor 
-< 
relief, suppJ.emented by the rasourco.s of private \-reifare 
agencies. Even in 19291 public. funds paid three-quarters of 
the nationts· relief bill; by 1932, the proportion rose to 
:four !"i:fths. In larger cities, social uorkers hRd had some 
success. in improving standards or relie.f carq·" r~placing the 
old "overseers o:t the poor" by public welf'are depart.me~ts. 
Bl.lt in smaller co:mmu.-."1ities, there t-ras often no al tornntiv e to 
the poorhouse.. Arid the whole pateh,·tOr1.: sys_tem had art under-
lying :futility: it t;as addressed to the care of unempl()y-
ables--thos~ 1-1ho could. not worl<: in any eondition...,-and not at 
all to the relief of mass unemployment.1S 
By 1932, Hoover had to "give in" a litt~e to the 
popular 1-rill. He had said that helping indiv.idu9.1s by .fed-
14rbid., P· 170. 15 . - . . 169 lb~a ... , p. . • 
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er:al food or ralie.f pn;ylti_crits l·16Uld Undc.r·rrdne the ini tiati ire 
of the A.ll!et>ican people. But by 19.32, even men .of the "busi-
r.1~ss l-70rl(l, n ~irote H~.rbert. Hoover, "tht-en up their hands and 
.a.s1::e.d f'or govcrn.."llent action."16 As voltU1tary action proved 
inadaquato to counteract the deepenin~ depres-sion~ Hoover 
moved step by step toua.rd .federal regulation.. In 
December, 1931 and January, 1932, the Presidqnt co-operated 
l'iith leaders o2 the. Senate and House in creating the Recon-
struction F'inance Corporation (]u.~c) 1 a temporary pump-priminG 
agency 'Hi th substantial capital. Designed to ease the credit 
stringency, the RFC t-Jas to supply banks, insurance companies, 
and large industries -vri.th loans they \-Jere unable to g.et 
.c 
throu,gh. nor1na1 channels. Hoover hoped that such relief l·rould 
stimulate recovery througholJ.t the econo:rny.17 Hoover's strat-
egy or recovery aimed to bring prosperity baclt: by providing 
relie·.f at the ·top o:r· the economic system. Aid to the indi-
vidual might tide him over .from meal to meal; that l-Tas a task 
t'or municipal. or private philanthropy. 
RooseYelt1s view on relief' was markedly dif'ferent 
t'rom Hoover's. Part o:r the reason that Roosevelt t-tas ready 
to a.ct .force.fully on ztelie.f l-IaS that by the tir:Je Rooseve.lt 
assumed o.ft:iceA the nation as a whole -vras clamoring :for 
re.lier, and, if the .f'ede-ra.l governr::.ent did not act, the 
alternatives t-Tere ominou:s. For in 19.32, the third lrinter of' 
16t·lright, ibid., p. 372. 17tta:ndlin, ibid., p. 866. 
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dled to1-~c.rd the vanishing point. In 1-Te\·r York City:, ontire 
fenilies "·'ere getting an average of $2.39 a "'reek !'or r:clie:r. 
I "I n vast rural areas there to:-as no re.lief coverace at all. 
don •t tnmt to steal," a Pennsylvania ma:n \-;-rote Governor 
Pinchot, "but I -vro:n 1 t let my wii'e and boy c.ry .f~r somoth,ing 
to eat. • -. • Ho~r long is this going to keep :up? I cannot 
stand it any longer ••••. 0, if God \-JOUld only open a l-7o.y."18 
Clearly, tll!} unemployment problem had to be boldly 
dealt w-lth. ~oos~·velt promised throuehout the campaign tho.t, 
if elected,~ -the !'ederal government \..rould asswae responsibil-
ity !'or rolie.f uhero local aid had broken dov-m. Ho also 
called i'or greatly expanded ~eliei' payments. T"ne avorago 
• 
relief stipend in ·1932 was about fif.'ty cents a dny, and 
Roosevelt l~ould not accept this.19 Besides admitting to the 
scope or the proble!n and the. f.'edera'l government's responsi-
bility to·w-rard the relie!' of the unemployed, Roosevelt had a 
lllO!"e :fully deVeloped vierr or relief' than Hoo.ver had. 
Where Hoover had been con tent to see the unemploy3d 
go to the breadlines !'or sustenance, Roosevelt arid his advi-
sors said no, the unemployed who are ernployabl.e must he.ve 
jobs~ rather thar:l charity in the J.'orm of a relief payment. 
As Roosevelt once said to Congress, the d,91e :trras·: 
• • • a narcotic, a subtle destroy-er o:f the hu"'nan 
spirit • .• • • I run not ~rilling that the vitality of our 
people be .f'U:rther sapped by the giving o:f cash, of market 
baskets, of a fel-l hours of ·t-reekly l·Torl-: cuttinp; ~rass, 
18sehl.esinger, The Crisis £[ the Old Order, p. 174-
19schlesineer, The Cominr-; 2£. ~ l~e-vr Deal, p. 26]-. 
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rakine leaves or pickinB ~P papers in the public pa:r1{s. 
The F'cdoral Govcrn.'neht nlUst and shall quit th:i.o .business 
of rc1~er.20 · 
Instead o:f the dole, Roosevelt tho·ught that the able-
bodied une-mployed should be put to 1-1ork~ Since th.o private 
secto1 .. \-las unable to provide jobs f.or the unemployed, it 1:1ust 
become the :federal goverpm~nt's responsibility to provide 
jobs. As Rooseve.lt said in his lnau13u~al .Address: 
Our greatest primary task is to put people to rTOrlc. 
This i.s no unsolvable problem if ue face it :\-!isely and 
cou:raceously. It can be accomplished in part by direct 
recruiting by the govern.7lle)it .itself', treating the tasJr 
as ne lvould treat an etnergency o.r a uar, but nt the .snmu 
time, through this employment, accomplishing ercatly 
needed pt·o~fcts to stimulate and reorGanize the natural 
resources. . 
Roosevelt \TOuld seek.:to relieve the unempJ.oyod. th"vough 
work relief and public works projects, rather than the dole. 
H¢ recognized tho .federal government's direct responsibili·ty 
1:01* the t-IO·lf'are or individual c.Ltizens, including the une.m-
ployed. He l-fould e>f'ter .itttaginative progra.vn3 to deal l-1ith the 
problem of relie:f. How .far he ha.d gone beyond Hoover's nar-
l'ow viet-t o:r relief is seen in thi.s excerpt from his Second 
Firesioe Chat in 1934: 
To those . Hho say that our e~pend.itures fo.r public 
works and other means or recovery are a 'trras·te \~e cannot 
afi'ord, I an~n-1er that no countl"y, ho.\vever rich, can 
afford the \o-ta~te of its human. resources. Demoralization 
caused by vast imernpioyment is our greatest . extra.vagD-nce. 
Horally, it is the great.est menace to our social orde:-· 
.Sollie people try to tell me that \·le must make up our ml.nds 
20vrilliar.1 E. Leuchtenburg, Franldin D. Roosevelt and 
the Ne1-r De!t1,. The lTel·T P..merican i~ation Series (l!e"<T York: Har-
per ana ~;; 1963)' p. 124. . 
21nash;, op. cit., p. 33• 
I 
i 
I j I 
i I ,,, : 
I' , 
r 
I 
I 
110 
that 'for the future tie shall pern1anently have millions 
or unemployed just as other cOuntries have hna the~ for 
over a de·cnde • \·Jha.t may b~ necensary for those cotin-
tries is not my responsibility to clete:r>~!line. Dut as for 
this country, I stand or fall by rny rei'usnl to o.ccert as 
a nocessal:>y condition of' our futur-e a per:'l~nent nrl~iY of 
the . ur1emp~oyed. On the contrary., "He must r.tO.b) it a nat-
ural principle that l-:e 1·ril.l not · tolerate a larJ:;e army of 
une.mployed a.11d that 1·;e '\·!'ill nrrango our ne.tiorio.l f:.lcbn.omy 
to end our :present unemployment as soon o.s t-:e ca.n an(1 
then to tvJ{e tdse measures ago.inst its r~turn. I c1o not 
"''s.nt to thinl{ that it i~ the ?~st5.ny or22ny American to remain per·ma..Tlently OI:l the relJ.ef' rolls. 
A se~ond majo,r objective or the 1-Tev .Deal \·ras e.cono1nic 
recovel;'y. This ideal proved to be the most e.lusive or all, 
and also one o-£ the mo.st cruoial. The tide of' dept•ession had 
to be revet-sed. and econorirlc recovery brought about or tho 
tet-1 who questioned. the viabi.li ty or a · democratic capltnlis.tic 
< . 
syst~m could prove to be a. microcosm of those who l'Tould 
demand OVerthroH Of the capitalistic system in f'avor of 9. 
total:i. tarian one. llo one stated the challenge more exactly 
than John Haynard. Keynes, the noted British economist, in his 
letter to Roosevelt at the end of 1933: 
You have made yourself the trustee for those in ev:ery 
country l-rho seek to mend the evil s or our condition by 
reasoned exp~riment within the f'rrun~-viork ot the existing 
aocial system. . · . . 
It you t'ai-1, ration~l . choice l-rill 'be greatly pre,j~­
di.ce.d throughout the l-rorld, leaving orthodoxy and revo-
lution to :fight it out. 
. But, i:f you succeed, ne1-1 a:nd bolder metho<ls will be 
tried every-..ihere~ and we inay date the .first chapter of 
a new econO.rnic era :rroin your access·ion to of'fiee. 
It was egreed that general economic recovery must be 
~2Ibid •• pp. 42-.43· 
2.3schlesinger, -~ Politics ~ U!Jheaval, p. 656. 
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brought about. But ho\·f? ·This '"'as the question. Rooseva"lt 
indicated his over-all approach to economic probler~ts in a 
campaign speech in 1932: 
The countr:r needs, end, un).es s I r.lis take its temper., 
the country demands bold,. per-sistent ex.peri:rientttt:i.on .. 
It is comw.on sense to talce a 1·nethod. and try it. If: it 
:rails, ndr.lit it :f'r·anl~ly and try anoth0'P. Rut ~bove ~11, 
try something. The rnillion.s l·rho are in want \'till no.t . 
stt\,nd by nilently forE;rver t>rhile the things to satisfy 
their needs are within easy rea.c11.21t. 
One theory of' hol-T to get t .be economy moyin5 again 
11as to restore purchasing po\'rer to the consumer throuGh gov-
ernment spending. In the interim bett-reen .Roosevelt • s elec-
tion and inauguration, RoosGvelt and his "Brain Trust," 
RaY:mond J1oley$ Adolf Berle, and Roxf'ord 'l'uguell, worked out 
<-
this strategy !.'or economic racovory: 
As they saw it, .nothing· had happened to diminish the 
rlch .American resources. The productive industrial equip-
ment ~ras still there, even i.f idle. I .f :fear were first ovel~­
come, hovr could the machine actually be made to trork again? 
First, the Brain Trust .felt, .by providing cold and hungry 
people with the means to 'get shelter and f'ood. Solll.eho~·r~ 
cash must be put into their. hands so that they co~1ld- buy 
what they needed. Factories would have to stat•t up to 
l'epla.ce what people had bought. People 1-sorking in f'actories 
~rould ·be paid and could go on demanding- more goods. Thus i an 
up:war.d surge might I'eplace the dowm-rard drit:t of the past fetor 
----------------
24HoHard Z.inn ( ed.), lie\·1 Deal Thouc;ht (1rev-r York: The 
Bobbs-.Herrlll company, 1966),-p:" ~ 
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yeo.rs.25 
'\>l!lat ·ue_s necessary, then.; fir.st of eJ.l~ they rea-
soned, uas greo.'tJ,.y increas ed relief pa.yrt1.ents. Th;;> r;9v~rn­
ment .tr~ust furnish these either by simply handing out money 
or by setting. up public uoi·lts to t'l.irriis.b. jops. 
BesidE:s gove-rnrient spending , otho·r proposals "'rer•e 
made to secure econor.lic recovery. One wu:::: f'or tne gove!'n-
~cnt to pursue an inflationary policy.. Others, Dhcuing th-"l 
}iel·T Freedom inf'luenc:e, said basic economic dif;ficulties 
derived from failure to enforce the Sherman and. Clayton Acts. 
Roosevelt wou1d later ask that banking lat,Ts should be mad¢ 
:nore strict in some respect.s, controls over the stock 
. ~ 
exchanges and. the com;;Iodity markets should be tiehtened, and 
the abuse of tho holdin_g-coi:ipany devic.E:) should b~ corrected 
by cl.oser control or its use, especially in the field of 
public utilities.26 
One of the most cont~oversial id-etaS about hbH to 
brin$ recovery bas yet to 'be mentioned. Th:i..s 1-ras ce.ntral-
ized planning .in the f"rame"rork c;>r bus·iness-goverl"'Jrtent part-
nership. The l!e\-1 Deal called for a rejection or the old 
·laissez-taire, eompeti ti ve, unregulate.d economy. Roosevelt:, 
during the campaign or 1932, had spoken of the ill ef.tects 
ot ~ack of planning: 
25Para.nhrase of Re·:tford Tu"\-7~11' s analysis from hi.s 
book·l' F .D.R.: .. Archit.cc·! of' ~ Era0 llle\-r Yor!~: The llacmillan 
Corilpariy, 19t>"7), p. 82. · , 
26Wright, op. cit., p. 376. 
1 
I 
113 
• • • lle cn.nnot revi eH carefully tht.:! history o.r our 
industrial advance rtithout bein~ struc1{ ~d th its hap-
hazardness, the gig11ntic 1-ra:ste l.ri th l-Thich it bas been 
accomplished, the supe rfluous .s c1•apping of still use-
!'ul equirr.:ent, the trmnendous morot ::tli ty in indust;rial 
and comr:;.ercial underta1dngs, tho tho~1sands ot: dead-end 
tra:i.ls into \vhi.ch enterprise has been lured, the prof-
ligate l-lasto of natural resources. :Ymcb of this t-rasto 
is the ino·,.r£ t.able by-}::-roduet or prog r ess in a society 
l-Tbich valu':)s indivic1ua1 endeavor and 'vhich is suscen-
tible to the che.nging tastes and. customs or the people 
o:r \-:hich it is composed. But IllUCh of it, I believe, 
could have been prevented by groat~x: foresight and a 
lal:>ger measure of social planning. 1 
Roosevelt then went on t .o say: 
• • 
run 
the 
our 
• that w-!hich seems more importe.nt to me in the long 
is tha problem of controlling by adeq~ate planning 
creation and, distribution or. those products \~~bch 
vast economic machine is capable of' yielding. 
Althoush the Roosevelt Administr•ation'l-ras committed 
< 
to the idea of' centralized planning, the .Ne\'r Dealers dii'-
fere d strongly in their views on the scope and degrco of 
planninr;. Rexford Tug"ttell, ·the mos.t radical of' Roosevelt's 
advisors, argued for an all inclusive type of planning. In 
his vieto~,. planning vTould mean ab andonment of laisscz-faire 
eapita~ism and business: 
To take -away from business its .freedom of venture and 
of e-xpansion, and to limit tte pt>ofits it may o.,cquirc, is 
to destroy it as business and to make of it sonething. 
e1se. That s:omethlng eJ.se has no nan1e, we can only l-r.on-
.der ·1-rhat it may be like and t-ihether all the fearsome pre-
dictions concerning it Hill come true. The traditional 
incentives, hope .of money-ma1dng', and fear of money-loss, 
will b~ t-teakened;· and a kind of ci-vil-service loy.alty and 
rervo1• 1-1ill grol-v gradually into acceptance. Ne;-; indus-
tries will not just happen as the ~utomobile industry 
did; they l·Till have to be .foreseen,. to be argued for, to 
seem p:robably desirable features or the "Yihole econoMy 
.· . ~n 
oe.fore they can be enter.ed upon. '" 7 
27 9 Zinn, op. cit. , p. 7 28Ibid.:. p. 81 • 
29Ibid., P• 89 • 
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TuZ\·Tell :further elaborated on ~1hat centralizEld plan-
ning would b1•ing about. Besides brin~ine; recoYery, the econ-
Olny 't1ould be rational and there ·uould. no J.ongcr be gross in.e-
quities. There uould no longer be viclent contr!'l.sts o:f 't·rell- i 
b·::ling or irrational allotments or indiv-idnal liberty. Neither 
1-rould there bo unconsidered exploi tactioh of' human or il,atura.l 
resources. 
But all ~rould not .fare vmll. As Tugwe.ll said: 
But it 'Hould certainly be ()n0 o£ the ch~1ra.cteristics 
ot any ).,lanned. economy tha..:t tho f'el-I t·rho tar-e so 1-:ell as 
things are no\1, would. be required to give up noarJ.y all 
the exclusive· prerequisites thoy have · cortte to consider 
tha~rs_as right, arid that these should be in some sense 
soc:tall.zed.30 
Add to this, 'l'uBVrell•.s vision o£ planninB whe1•e: 
.... planning.f-or product:ion would, mean planning :for 
constunption too; that something more is involved than 
simple limitation to amou);lts '~hich can be sold at any 
price producers temporarily happen to find best· :for 
themse·lves; tha t pro.fi ts. must be J.imi ted and th~~r uses 
controlled; that vThat really is implied is f!Ornething not 
un1il.o;e an inteE;rated group. of enterprises r'f¥ for its 
consum9 rs rather than £or ~ t s Oi·mers .• • • • ::5 
.. ~ 
And of course the government, which was guided by 
expert plann~rs and J.o.ne;-range economic goals, should make 
the important ma..'lage:me'l''lt deci sions for the ~Thole -economy ·and 
'. j ' 
! 
:I 
I 
.i 
! not be content to act as a mere rete~ee.. Allocation o.f 
resour.ces, priorities in prod.u.ction, profits, w~~.'3es:, prices--
a11 should be de.terrnined by the government in behal.f of the 
\-thole nation,. not the more po\-rerful or persuasive interest 
g.&:•C.:fups. Like Berle, Tug't'fell felt that rnanae;ement had to be 
30 . . 
. Ibl.d. I P• 8.5. .31 8 . Ibid., p. 8 .• 
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~ " "'"t . lUS. soci2.lized and r.tora1i zed. . .._...,. .. ., tl "". - r. r. ~ _ <.:~ .. :- !:~ : . ~: ~ : . (•. ('1.. · : 0  _r, ·-~ e:··'. • t • • 
at a tremenC:ou5 cost • r.i bortv· :>..n<~ fl••· ..... (;·.1' t- •. ~·.·. •• ~ -·· •. ., J - - • -lo ~ - •,...: , ·.!- ~ ~ ~ ,, 
foreotte-n. The corporate :Jtate 1:ou1<1 b~. ~: ~ 1tL , · :• ::u c :~ "· ';t• 1 t 
nor the country l-ras \-rillins to r,o t \>at f'~t!·. 
Ro.oseve1t opted rot• n :fo\1 r;c:-; t.u.t~ t.::; t;o·.:;trd 
· •'-'~ ..1. ap; .... ro·'c" to p1 ~n= •~ : ; -~ • r.~ <'·:!-llis uas a moderate pieco-I;-"'-:->_,. • 
denced in the Agricu1 turnJ. J~,d j\t:Jtncnt ,•,c .t,. tl ,. • 1 1 · \" •. ~\ ~ o:~ r. 
Industrial Hecovcry Act., (tnd tho 'l'cnnc:r!1 •~o ··lnl 1 r: 4• ;.\~ tL·')l·! ~-;,-. 
Roosevelt 1-TS.S not areuing !'or roni t:i v-c orti.~ ·:ttn (:Jint t•c>l o!' thn 
economy. As he s ·aid: 
It is \-Iholly t-1rong to cs.l.-1 thf"! r.l,.,~!:.nl r~!'\ tktt "'"" hn\u• 
talcen Govornrn~nt control of fnr .. t1:n2:, inr1 u:~t!·:t, nn1! t:··, ! ~~-
portation. It is rather a pnrtn<>r~hl.r het>; •· ~n ""~" ''' -'' ""· ' 
and farming and indU5 try and tran~rortn t1 em, 11C•":. ; r · ~~- ! ·.nJ•-
shiP in prof~ ts ~ tor the rrofi t!J 1.·tl1l ::till r .o to tl.~ 
citizens, but rathor a p~.rtncrGhiJ in f) ~ r.~ : .l~ . ~ r.r-.<1 .!} . 
partMi>ship to sec that the p1cn5 ore e>rT"l~<l ""'_,JJ 
The .federal r;ovcrrunent u~s co:.::;ittcd to ~.: ! )r: :. t n.:.: 
-· .._~. 
tion .,ou1d embark on such different e:.rcnuen to rc-oovo!'J •• o 
tight budget, spending, or p1ann.:.n:::;• 
one coherent • c entraJ.iz ed p1a." tho. t "~ • fo 11 o·.:·: ,; • 
Crot-rell 
(
-,. ..... • . .. - .. - .... .... '1 
2 
T
. . ... . ~r _ ,....0 ~.1 ,~;·~·.·· - ·) ~ .. -· •·• · · .. 
3 Paul K. Conkin, Yg i .e_:_ !.:-
Company,_ 1967), P· 3 • 
33Nash, OP• cit., P• 38. 
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1oraa the n1ain, if' elusive, object; :foro not Ul'ltil t•{Ol'"ld Har II 
would t'ull recovery oo realized. 
Besides relie.f and recovo1 .. y, a third r,H~jor ide.al or 
the !feu Deal l-TUS refor.r.L. SQcia,l end econonic reform t-ras 
advocated fo1 ... a nUJnbe~ o.f' ro.asons. One 1-:as the hU.."llanitn.ri an 
one. Roosevelt sp()ke c;,£ Hnntine: 
• • • to do what any honest Governntent of .nny cou.nt.1 .. y 
rTould . do; try to increase the security and happiness of 
a larger number of' people in ;;tll occupations of J.i.fa and 
in all parts or the country; to give them mo1 .. e of the 
good things of life; to give them n greate1• distribution 
not only of' ~1ealth in the narr•0'\:1 tei'llls·, bu·(; of -.,iealth in 
the l'lider terms; to give them places to go in tho s'lllti- · 
mertime--recreation; to give them nssura1ice that they . 
are not eoing to starvD in their olo age; to g.ivehoncst 
bush;ess a chanc~ to go ahead and r:1.ake o. r:oasonab}e. .34 
pro:f1t, and to g1ve ~veryone· a chance to earn a l'l.V~ng .. 
" 
'l'hi.s was a long-range goal of Roosoveltt s, as it 'l.-Jas 
also of the Fabians and. progressives. They all believed it 
was possible to reform the system to bring to .fruition this 
goal or a be·tter, fuller lire for all. Roosevel·t particu-
larly vras interested in freeing the individual :from the prob-
lems of economic insecurit.y. He tianted all Americans to be 
economically secure about their homes, their jobs, their 
futures, and their old age. Roosevel.t elaborated on l-."hat he 
meant by se.curi ty when he called for a greater physical end 
mental and spiritual security .fo.~ the people of this c·oun-
try. He then Hent on to say: 
Security means a kind of :feeling vd .. thin our individ-
ua1 selves that vie have .lacked all through the course or 
history. '\-le have had to take our chc>.nce l-ri th depressions 
34schlesinger, ~ Politics of: U~·heaval~ P• 652. 
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ancl boom tir.1os. I nave bt:d5.eved for n great r.ll.'.l1" yoa.rs 
that the t .imc ho.s como in our ci vili~nt~ion \·!hen ~- e;-t-cnt 
m~y c~:r5thQse chances should. be elirr.inatad .from our ll.ves. 3 
Tho Social Security Act l-TaS an importc.nt step in tho i'ul.fill-
nient of Roosevelt 1 s dream of' eoonorOlio secto•.rity. 
But thero t·tbre other re&sons for the n.,osovclti·nn 
reforms. Roosevc~'t: himselt stateo that th€1 Social Socurity 
Act was f'r3!fl.ed not only in the intere.st o:f .the individual.., 
but also in the interest of' the economic stability and the 
l-Te11-being o.f the nation as a whole: 
This lal1', too, represents a cornerstone in a str\lo-
tur.e \-Ihich is being built but is by ho Illeans co!1tple'te. 
It is a. .str-ucture intended. to lessen the ,.force of pos-
sible future depres-sions. It l-lill act as a prot~ction 
to future Adrflinistrationi; against the necessity of going 
deeply into debt to furnish relief for the needy. '11he 
lat'-1 wi~l flatten at the peaks and valleys of: d.e.f'lntion 
B.hd inf'lation. 'It is, in shol"t, a laH that t·lill take 
care of: human needs a.nd. at the sruite time provide tha 
United Statgs an economic . structure or vastly greater 
sotmc1ness. 3 · 
Frances Perkins further elaborated on the implica-
tions or the Socia1 Security Act: 
The President's Com.idttee on Econ:om:io Security, or 
whi.eh I had the honor to be chairman. · iri drawing up the 
plan, was convinced that .its enactm.ent in,to 1au nould not 
only carry us a long vray toward the goal of economic sec-
urity £or- the individual, but also a long ~ray tb~·iard th~ 
promotion and stabilization ot: :mass pttrchas.ing po1.-rar 
wi.thout l-lhich the present economic systen1. cc:mnot ·endure. 
T'nat this intricate connection bct1r1een the mainte-
nance or mass purchasing pol.·rer through a system or pro-
tection of the individual ngainst ma.jo:r economic haz~rds 
i-s not theor-etica1 is evidenced by the f.'act that ~sfand 
has been able to vrithstand the e:r.rects o:r the worlaw:1de . 
depression! eve·n though her :pro~:Pl'l~i~ty rle:r~nns ~o 1:n•eA1y 
35:rbid., pp. 652-5J. 
36t·lilliam E. I,euc1ttertburg (eo.), The .!1£!:! De~l {Colur:l• 
bia., S. C.: University of' South Carolins. Frcss) 19bSl", P• 79. 
. i 
upon foroir;n tr2.d.a. .English economin t.s ar;rcc l·ri th 
en11)loycrs r:.nd liOr-kers th:.>..t this ability to lven.thor 
Ftdverse conditions has been due in no small PD.l"t to 
soeinl in3ut•n,.nce bcno.fi t~ and regula't- payments whi ~h 
h~ve ser\"ad to r.iaintain neces.so.ry ])urchasing poHer. 
118 
W.r nc~inl security progrrun will be a vitul forco 
1~orlt:ing ncalnst the recur.rence or severe deprcs.sions in 
the future. lle can, as the principle of sust!tineo put--
c}Jn.sing pot11cr in hard times rnal<es i tnelf' :f'.e1t in every 
shop, stoi•o and mill. e1•0H old vrithout beii)g hnuntod by 
the ~p~ctre or a poverty.-.ridoen old age or of' boi,ng a 
burden on our children.J7 
In short, reform l-:ould be r;ood both £or tho ~rell­
bail1G o:f the individual. end the nation. Hoooevelt -...ro.s d.<;\t er-
r.dncd t-h~t evei';r e.ffort must be mode to bring about recovcn~y 
v.nd to prevent .:future depressions. 
sons, the1~e wao a. political reason for the l~etr1 Deal acl';o~rtt-
ing re.rom. Ger~ld 11a.sh in his book, F'r>~n1din D. Hoos0vn]_~, 
state;s, "Perhe.ps the chie.f executive tool~ this st0J'l r.ot alto-
gether •..rillingJ.~,r, a.."'ld t·ras responding to the pressure of cis-
sident groups on the Right and Left• "38 Ex-President l!oovor 
and his f'ollot·Ier::; charged that Roo:Jevelt <.·ms d.evcloj'.:i.n:.; into 
nn u-utocrat. Disenchnnted busi.n:esomen .:for:"led grour.-1, ~uch 
sor:m e1Hbittared political !n:octeratcs, like Al Sm:i th1 ,.:t:o .si::!-
ply hated Rocsevclt. At the SCJ'lle tine, othero comrlaincd 
that PD11 uus neither doing enough to helr the mass~3 r.or to 
overcome the- depression. P.:;lrhar:s the most vocal of these 
dis·sent~ro \-rer€) Senator Huey P. Long of Louigiann, founder or 
____ .. ____ _ 
37Ibiu., p.. &5·. 38Nash, op. cit., PP• 5-6. 
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Share-the-\·;ealth movo:·ne1'lt, tL.Tid a por.·ular r .a:dio pr-iest., 
Fathe .r Charles E. Coughlin, uho frc.s u:r0in~. Roosevelt to :M~co 
drastic monetary re!'orms., l'leam·Ihile, E&rl BrowcJcr rind the 
.Amoric~m Co~til.ltiist l'a:rty ·Here conde~min3 Roosevelt 'EiJ:id the 
:Ne\·: Deal COI!lpletely~ saying Roosevelt had, ~~do the nist~.J~c or 
t.·r·.,.ing t.·o save American c·.a ... ·.Ji.::t.·  ..... l ·I··:.·s.-:-n.. ·11 lt "' lt. <~ . ... "" ... .t~~ £1. re;:;u ·. , ,-.ooseye ·. 
was under great pressure tp try s .omething n e1.·1 to br.in~ about 
reco-..rer:r• A case can be made that as the national olections 
o:r 1936 l(pproa.~h~d, the pressure .from these groups t;.f the 
Left and Right le.d Roosevelt to embnt'k on a number of ilnpor-
tarit re.forms .39 
1-!hat is most strildne about the threo basic ideals 
~ 
o.f the l'J'e1-r Deal is ho~-r much they ha.vo :in co.!l'Wlon '\>rith one 
s:not}).e:r-. The ideals of: r .elie!', recovery, and reform all vre1 .. o 
seen as means to economic recovery e.nd the r.1ean3 to a .fullCl', 
happier life. From relie.f 1 one sees the idea that a n-1an, .must 
be able ·to naintain h'-s dignity and pride by having the right 
to wqrk for his bread. 't-Jhat t-sould be given to· him l-TQuld 1"1() 
longer be charity, but t-rould come o.f right. One can: carry 
this all the t'la,y to that most importlirtt reforr-~ or the ne-w 
Deal, the Social S$~urity Act.. ln this l-l~s embodied pe:r-.ma .. 
nently the ideal of' socie.l rights t·rhich 1-T<J.S f'irst see:n in 
the re1.ief' progra!Il. There \oras· no doubt durinc the lre•·r Deal 
period that rugged individualism ~..nd laissez•t"airc had c.oma 
to an end. The govern•·ne:nt l·tas. no.1-.r actively involved ip. the 
39roid. 
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economic af.fo.iro oc£ the nati011; the r;overrunanta l ru~.ctions 
\·rere .expanding rapidly; and govern.':tent in the intel•csts or 
the _general l·rclfare had noH become realityA The Ncvr "Deal 
program shoHed the commitment of' Roosevelt to the three 
lo\)als he had enunciated Inauguration Day: Re·lie!', Recov-
e1~y l'.ncl Reform. 
Once in of'f'ice, Roosevelt \'rent to vtork irrnnediately on 
his relief program. He and his advisors £elt. relici' t.mst be 
given; but they hoped that public t-rorks l·lOUld SOOri M~Ce it 
largely unnecessary. He spoke or the eme~gency in a special 
roes sage on l"Iarch 21 , 1933: 
It is eszentia1. to our recovery prograr!l that tneasurc~ be ip.me(Jiately enacted ai.med a.t un3mp loyn1ant relief. A 
direct attack on this problem :;uggests three types of' 
legislation. 
The first is the enrollnlent or l·torkers !lOW by the 
Federal govePnr.rent .for such public empJ.o:rment as can 
quickly be started,. 
The second is grants to the Stat.es i'or relief ~rork. 
The third extends to a bro~d public -vror~s labor-
creating progz>a..."ll • • • • . 
I . shall make recommendations to the c·ongt .. ess pres~ 
ent1y.l~O 
On Harch 2t, 19331 Roosevelt sent a message to Con ... 
gress requesting the establishment or the o.f.fice o:f Federal 
Relief' Ac1~inistrator. On Hay 12, 1933, Congress a.uthor'ize~d 
a half' billion dolla.rs for direct relief, to ·be chan.rioled by 
tll.e Fede:j>il govern.."rlent throtl.t;h state and local agencies. 
Roosevelt chose Harry Hopkins to head the new Federal Emer-
gency Relief Administration (FERA)., Through the state uel-
fare departments and under the gUidance of professional 
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social \Jor·kers., Ilar·ry Hopkins; a long-time friend. ·of 
Roosevelt • s, nho 'Has called the most po1rzerfl.il man in the 
A&nini.stration by the tirne of Roosevelt r s sec(,nd tert11, began 
at once to spend l-tidely and generously the fUnds sppropriat~d 
by Congre sa • !~ 1 
Yet he still was not doing enough. As winter 
-ttppl:"oached~ Hqpl<ins reQO~nj_zeu that unless the gov.ernment 
acted quickly, nilllions faced extrem0 privation .. 42 
In June, 19.33,. a massive work relief prao·ject was 
stnrated. The Public Horks Administration (PHAl t-ras estab-
lished Hith an appropriation of $3.3 billion under Title II 
of' the 1-l'ational Industrial Recover•y Act (lURA'). 4.3 
.t 
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 1-1as made· admin-
istro.tor. 
The immediate results l'rere disappointing. For one 
thing, a g .ooO. deal of tim-a \-Tas required for' the planning and 
desiening. of' such programs as d-arns, 'Wa1Ce!'l-10I"'ks, parks, pOlier 
plants, public buildings, and ~iver and harbor improvements. 
Jobs -.rere not quickly forth.corning. 
it: 
Something else was tried. As Harry Hopkins explained 
\-Jb.en the story or this depression is f'inally vn;-itten, 
it :t-dll bo .found that it vras the social '.rorkers t-!ho, 
while struggling to get aid to the unemployed under the 
r:elief system, were denouncing its i.nadequacy. It was 
41 Leuchtenburg, ·Franklin Q:.. Roosevelt ~.:nd the lTe\'r 
Dea1,. p. ·121 • · · - -- -
!~3Tu . 11 
. gtve · , op. cit. , p. 97. 
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they who demanded that these people Hho ~re.rc ccning to 
th.eml be li:f'ted Oltt or thls system-... q. system Hhich they_, 
td th oth~rz, sarr \7'\ls rec.uoing 1nil"li.ons to the l evel or 
chronic destitution. Those a,ronil)istering. 1~elief sa:t-r 
that it vTas the. Hr.or.tg l-t<iy to get aid to the l'llillions of' 
unemplo;red and that it uas .fraught l·;i-&h grave hazards 
to all that indust.rious self-~ustaining xnen and ,.rornen 
held sacred. It i~ to their _enduring· elory that t~ey 
de1:1anded that the use of' relic:f for the ablo-boC.ie~1 be 
abolished. To me it is unthinkable that 2. :::t~te or a 
nation or a people Hould continue th:ts type of relief 
a rn<ment longer than is absolute ly necess2.ry. 
It wa s out or· a sens~ of' Hhat l-Ias ha,ppenine to thcso 
people the,t the Civil t;[Qrks program was evolved b~ the 
Pre.s~dent. T?e Civil l·lorJts Adininistrat~on. 1-ms c:reate.d. to 
prov~d.e ilnme·d~ate employment· for .four nn.llJ.on people .41!· 
Harry Hopkins \-tas authorized to set up the Civil 
Works Administrat.ion ( C\·TA} to look ror anc1 carry out projects 
that· required little preparati op and no heavy materials, so 
:< that they could be started at once. He c~lled on :toc.fll or:ri-
eials everywhere to :find. out l-:rhat needed to be done lo.cally. 
Such projects could give jobs innnediately--ropairing strec·ts, 
cleaning up parks in the cities, building small o.ams.t and 
nal~ing dirt roads in tll.e country--all to be pai.d f'or by the 
fede·ral -government. The C\-IA was supplanted pr·esently by the 
better organized liorks Progress Adndni$tration (rlPAl. 
Other 1-1ork relie.f pro.jects vrere started. A Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC) "tras set up to put unemployed younz; 
men into camps to carry out ref'orestation and erosion-control 
projects. Also, in 1935, tho Res(tttlement Adlri.nistration. ( RA} 
was created. Re.x;ford Tugl-!ell uas ma de he:e.d. or the RA. As 
the title suggeRt~ 1 Tue't-r~:n t-mrtt~o t0 res.~ttle 1rrbfi.n ~1'-~~ 
d'ttellers in autonomous garden ei ties and sub:narginal farmors 
44zinn., o-p • . cit., pp. 153-55 .. 
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in new,. _productive :fa!'ln villages, '"rith co-operation a e:ulding 
concern f·or both groi.lps. Iris greatest monuments l·rero three 
sub\.u•bun green belt cities and a. fe~i' dozen neu fn:rm comuni·-
ties. 
The RA would not cozapro,ll"..ise \'lith existing evils. 
Almost .a.lono, it fought for equal benefits fol~ l!egroes. It 
1-ra.s tho only Ue:t-r Deal agency to set up group med.ical plans.h.S 
Soon, hm..rever_. it antagoniz·ed every inte·rest. \-!i th 
restricted prerogatives, plus a tenant-purchase program at 
odds t;Tith its earlier ori¢ntation, tbe RA moved into the 
Departnient of Agriculture in 1937 3.lld be·came the Farm Secu-
rity Administration (FSA). Congress gleefully destroyed it 
.c 
during the Ha:r, repl-acing it rri th an attenuated Farmers Horne 
Administration {FHA). 
As time went on, the relief' program uas increasingly 
oriti.cizod. The ctfA and the HPA were vulnerable. to ridicule 
because ronny of the projects were not really necessary and 
also because they \'lere not carried out very efficiently .. 
Rexford Tugtrtell well.-ans.t-tered this charge: 
Unless allo-vnmces t-rePe made f'or the hali'-starved con-
dition of ths t-mrkers to begin 1-li th, it was easy to crit-
icize their poor performance., •Leaf-raJdng' became a 
byl.TOrd and a good deal of bitter hUI"aor t'ras used .on 
starved men who seemed to 1ean on their tools more often 
then they used them. 1•Ihat '·ras also ignored l'TflS a. .fact . as 
apparent to critics as to anyone else. Getting projects 
i'inished Has only a secondary purpose. The :first consid-
eration vras. to gi !e. men. ~arnings that they could ta..l<o 
home to thel.r .fa..•;ulJ..es. 1~b 
45Tug\"Tell, op. cit. , p.. 60. h.6 • 98 · Ib~d., p. . .• 
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Besidea direct relief and 'ii Ol .. k-relie.f projects, 
Roosevelt tr.ied other measures to bping about economic rcc·ov-
ery. Tb:e credit 1neasures were intended to assist those uho 
l-!Gt'C losing i"nrnts, homes, Or businesses, because, S.S things 
lrere, they could not pay their de·bts. The Farm Credit Adl1liri-
istration, a Home Ch-mers t I.oan CorporationJ and nn enlarge-
ruent o£ the Roco:nstruetion Finanee Corporation -vrere all 
quickly authorized. 
As a result o.f thes,e meas:ures, farm incoroo began to 
rlse. The government Trra.s ta...'tdng care of hundreds of thou-
sands o:C defaulted. mortgages, both tar1n and non-.farm. In 
tl-10 :initial acts creating the Federal Farm Hortgage Corpora~ 
·< 
tion and the Home Ot·mers ' Loan Corporation# tho government 
offered to rcrinance mortgages on long terms at lm-1 inter-
est. In additionJ the Federal Housing Ad.."Jl.inistr.ntion Act or 
19..34. introcl.ueed the plan o~ the guaranteed prepackaged mort-
gage--one that could be paid, principal and int.erest, by 
uni:rorm monthly paym.ents. This goverrunent guarantee of a 
high percentage of' the total cost of homes in the lo't-t-price 
range constttuted the most important change in the histc!'y of 
.Ameri.ean hor.1e Qymeroship. Now the man t-;ith a steady job could 
at.tQrc;1 to buy l-theTe he had. had to rent before.47 
Planning was another area. in l-rhich the UeH Deal 
sought to realize the goal o:f economic recovery. Three major 
experiments in planning vTere begun during the Hundred Days: 
47~lright, op. cit., P• 377 .. 
T . 
_.. ~ 
L-} I. 
~ I 
. 
' . 
I 
.! 
j 
I 
~ 
t 
! 
the Jl~ricultural Adjustrnent Adm.tnistration (AAA), the 
r:ational Recovery Adm.inist:ra.tion {liRA), and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA}. 
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The Agricultural kdjustment .Act, passed 5.n Hay, 1933~ 
was an Ont.Ylibus bill, authorizing almost any progr~ln desired 
by the Administration. As .first impl-e~ne!lted, co-operating 
farmers in the basic crops,. by voluntary, contractual agroee-
:rnent, z•educed produ·ction in return for su.f.t'icient government 
payments to provide parity prices (agricultural prices on 
par Yith, or proportionate to, over-all prices in a normal 
period). The payments came :f'rorr1 ta.xes on processing compa-
nies, and thus, in most cases, indirec-tly .from the consUl'ller. 
* The Agricultural Adjustment Administration wa:a supplanted in 
193!~ by acts setting up mandatory acreage controls on tobacco 
and cotton. The AAA r.eceived the active support of la-rge 
rarm organizations. vlith more idealism than immediate suc-
cess, the actual. operation of the program l-Jas placed in tho 
hands of local committeemen, vTho helped persuade farm'!lrs to 
"sign up", and also determined, fairly or unfairly, the 
1 allotments and the base· of the payments.. To please the advo-
J ! cates o.f land retirement (even Hoover had accepted .this), a 
i 
.1 small Land Policy Com:inittee of the AAA began .Purchasing sub-
i j marginal farm land for re!"orestation or recreational uses. 
! 
,l Although portions of the AAA t·rere invalidated by the 
Suprem.e Court early in ·i 9.36, its principles ot' acre age re duc-
tion, supported prices, and occasional stabs at land retire-
ment (soil ban..l.c l have remained at the he-at>t of govern:aent 
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aericultu}:'~l.l progra."'lls. The AAA brought bene.f.i .. ts to altnost 
all cor..Jnercinl .fnrmers. But ir1 limiting acreage and prov5.d-
ing tho stroneest possible incentive .for rnoro etficifmt lo.nd 
use, and thus :Cor better techrlology, it forced sharecroppers 
ot::i the land &.ncl vTOrsened the plieht ot: farm 1 ~borers. It. 
also bypassed barnssed .farmers in several roinOl' crops, e.nd, 
basing payments on production instea d of need, inevitably 
aided most cener-ously th~ already laree an.d proap~rous 
f'erl!lers. Even the grass-roots princi·ple invited all types 
of' local chicanery, and too of'ten reintorecd clnss and racial 
injustice, nhile the idea of enforced scarcity horrified tna..ny 
urban liberals.48 
..( 
A second enduring agricultura1. progra.-n invo.lved 
direct government price controls and, in principle, direc·t 
subsidies paid fr.om the federa~ treasury. In a minor way, 
this began in the fall o.f ·1933 by mea..ns or an executive ordet'-
and in line with a permitted alternative in the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. The RFC established a .fnrzn subsidl,ary, the 
ColJlrllodity Credit Corporation (one o£ tvJO NeH Deal C.CC 1 s )_, 
which lo~ned money directly to fartner-s on the secur-ity o.f 
their cr.ops. By authori.zing loans that exceeded existlng 
prices, and assuzning all risks involved; Roosev-elt used the 
CCC to place supports under f:arlll prices. Remini S·Cent of: the 
old wa~ehouse receipt plan of' the Farmer's Alliance, this 
be gar& the support, s tol•a.g&, and l!Aa:r·ke t.ing !:to v e:u i,.ure of the 
48conkin, op. c i t .. , p. l!-2. 
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As a :res:ult o£ th~s<:t developmcilts agricultu1•a1 
ir.cone, j_nc1uding govel'•nment payments, stood up better in 
the depression or 1936-37 than did. the incor:t~ or other sec-
tors, althouth }:'ecoV'et'Y was still a far-ott: goal. 
As sto.tcd earlie-1~, the .first AliA 'Has dclC).n.red unc:on-
stitutional by the Supreme Court irl 1936. In 1938, the t-r.e+:t-
orgro'rlzed farmers t-:on subst-antial na':•r support ili the Agri-
cultural Adjustment l..ct ot: 1938. The s$cond AM PI'OVided 
price supports and continued conservation. payt.'lents, condi~ 
tiohed qn the acoept~ce of acreage or- ·marketing conti•ola 
for crops with a surplus.. By re.ferendUitt, all tho :.farme-rs 
< 
gro~·ring a :major staple crop could v·ote for or aeninst con-
trois. By this, and a restored. local coll:Lnittee system·, the 
gr~ss-roots approach continued. The price supports were 
still ad'1linist-ered through CCC non-recourse loans. Sur-
pluses soon necessitated export $al(!ls a.t. govern1nent los·s or 
else vast stor.age expenses. Some surpluses could be justi-
1'ie-d by the Secretary .o£ Agricultt1r.e, Henry A. t·!allaee is 
ever-normal granary, based on Josephts experiences in Egypt. 
Berore there \rsa.s an ever-pormal, permanently glutted mark('}t, 
tlorld t-1~~ li c~e to the rescue • 
The second AAA permanently established the main :r~a--­
tures or the Neu Deal Agricultii~al policy ahd added a mn·!" 
crop insurance progra.trt• No significant alternatives have 
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yot been adopted. Hany i'nrmers, as a result of' the Nei...r De-nl, 
:t-Iere on their HD.:y to recovel"Y• The ir•1balance bet\oicen indus-
try and agriculture uas beins corrected by raisinc farm 
Pl1ices. J.1any ucra able to keep their homes and nere more 
aecnre in their income. But not all farmers "tlere o11 the road 
t ·o re-covery. As stated earlier, these p?ogrruns '!:!ere p!•i11la-
rily aimed at the larger-, mot•e prosperous farmer. 
Uost dra:cna.tieally, most f'ar.zr..ers a.cceptod the .fact 
that the .federal goV'e:t>nrrlel1t could limit tbeir :rroduction, in 
return .fox- price supports. This \.roulcl not have he,pperied 
thirty years b_e.fore. Farmers v1ere beginning to realiz_e that 
the f'ree,. g~utted market 1-ras not the best ans1·1~r, and many 
" accepted price supports i'rom the .federal governnent. 
Industrial recovery in 1933 seemed to dopend on liq_-
uidation o:r the surpluses that halted ,manu.fac.turing. The 
experience o:r Uorld 1·la r I and the propose.ls of various trade 
associations .for suspension o:f th~ antitrust la.tvs sugg~sted 
to the Presid~nt the idea of providing industry with the 
machinery :for self>·regula.tion, pri.ce fixing, and planned pro-
duction. To ot'.fset that conce~rsion, Roosevelt asked ·ror- pt-o-
tection of la,bor and :for a ptibl,ic ~rorks pz:>ogt-~ to raise pur• 
chasing potver. 
The National Industrial Rocovery Act {laRA) actually 
provided tt-ro main mechanisms for recover-j". The first, public 
works, was placed in the Department o.f the Inte:r-ior under 
Harold Ickes. A much more imaginative man than is usually 
conceded, Ickes requi:red earerul planni·ng or project s, zeal-
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c•tlsly guarded against 't·raste and political influence, and 
eventually secured the maximu."'ll benefits frmn always too lim-
ited funds. His successful 1\lblic ~·iork3 Ad.-ninistration (THA) 
spon allocated over three billion. d.ollnrs, but the actual 
evn3truction proceeded too slm·rly to have SJ.~Y drastic e:fi'oct 
on :recovery... l!ere.t the New Deal. simply cxpand~rl the even 
more cautious public works program oi' the Hoove!~ /l.dministra-
tion.50 
The National. Recovery Administration (NRA), on the 
other hand, represented a vast po·tentio.l, either for the 
illlposition or central economic plans upon private organizo.-
tions, for a govermnent-prot~cted business c0~7110n-t·Tealth, o~ 
fo1-- a ·better ... regulated atmosphere for open and. rair competi--
tion. The planners, such as Tugl-rell, never really had. a 
chance, and lost all their oa.ttles-. The NRA never really 
tried, in any extensive or cohere-:tt· "t·ray _. to :force _public 
goals upon an unlr1i1ling business eommunity .. 51 
The purpose or the bill, tho :President said on 
June 16., 1933, l·Tas to put people bac1( to l-IOrk. It l-Tas to 
raise the purchasing po·H·er or labor by lird ting hours anc5 
inoreasing :trtages. It vras to elevate labor standards by r.lttk-
ing sure that no employer would suf:fei> competitive disadvs.n-
tages as a result of' paying decent \-rages, or establishing 
decent working conditions. Above all, it rspresented an his--
toric experiment in govern.-rnent partnersh:ip uith business •. 
5°conkin, op.. cit .. , P• 35 .. 51 Ibid. 
T' 
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Rooscv.elt emphasized: 
It is a ehallcnzo to industry vrhich hn~ lons inni.ntod 
that, given the rieht to act in unison, it cot,1.ld cio z:1uch 
I'ol• the r;encral goo~ \~hioh }la.s hitherto beon tmla..,.rful. 
From today it ha.s that right. 
History probably 1-1ill record the Nat:tonal Jndustrinl 
Recovery Ac-t as the most important end f'ar rcacbin-:,. lor•-
i.slv..tion over enacted by the American Concro~s • .52 ..;> u 
Tbe resu1ts t-rere not t-Ihat Roos.eve1t had anticipated. 
To establish and maintain fair ·labor standards, the lliRA pro-
posed that eo.ch industry, through its trad.c asso.cio.tio.n, 
agree to a code of "i"ai:r competition" def"ininr; t..,razos, hours, 
and Tt:r,inirnUl:n pl .. ices. Labor would be represented in tho maklnc 
of' such industry agreements by representatives o.r its m·m 
choosing •Iithout any pres.sure i'ront the employer. Tho public 
i( . 
would a1so be represented so that the interests oi' the con-
stim.ers of the indu·stry 1 s products were not lost sic;ht of'. 
The :national Recovery Administ·ration {l1RA} \·Ias s~t up to 
administer this section fJf the law. 
\fuen the bill hecame law in June, 193.3, the pr·esidont 
appointed retired General Hugh s. Johnson head of' the llRA. 
A spreading blue eagle was adopted as the symbol of coorerat-
ing :firms; those who si~11ed :f'air competition codes l-rerc to be 
allOHed to display the bltte eagle sy:rnbol on their store:J, 
plant.s 7 or merchandise, and the publ:ic l-Ias strongly -ureed not 
to patronize non-signers.. Hot-rever, the negotiation of codes 
proved difficult a..Tld time consuming. In .July, 1933, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, to speed matters, announced a blanket 
1.31 
lla.tionnl Reemployment Ae~eroent, and U!lder this plan; mil .. 
li-ons or ./l.ncrieans l-rere uorldng und0r the noari.ng blue eagles 
'l-rithin a f'c:n·t months. The orieinal idea of cooperative ttt;ree -
ments bett-reen tho employer, ot•gauizcd labor, and consumor 
representatives \·Jere all but lost in the haste. Furl;hol"more, 
consum.ers w0re unorganize-d ru1d unable to pro~~ct their inter-
eats as lilanagclllcnt and goverrunent drol·l up a .flood .o~ codes. 
As time pas·scd, thousands of c.as.es of' ·non-compli:mce t-tith the 
codas '\--rere r~ported. ~ab9r l-tas extrcroe.ly r>est·ive because 
industry often opposed labor's right; to organize as author-
i2:ed by the iliRA, and the country was plagued by strikes. 
F.,.';Jlployers began to .fear that they hnd inn.de a mistake in 
< . 
. agreeing to negotiate with labor .in draHing up the codes. 
The public a1so began to fee-l that it was being fleeced by 
prices that l-te.re rising :faster than income. 
Criti-cism o:r ·the NRA gret-t. It had not bt~ought eco ... 
. nomic recovery. For a season in 1933, the NRA had actually 
helped generate empl oyment. The shortening of hours ~.nd tho 
c.onsequent spreading o:f l-Tork under the Presid6-nt1 s Reemploy-
ment Ag:roecment gave jobs to something J.iko two million \-rork-
ers, and a general lift to demand. Beyond this·t ho"t-rever, the 
NRA•s stl~ictly ecpnondc contributions to recovery l-Tere lim-
ited. It represented a holding action, no.t a positive stim-
ulus-. A11 did n.ot -t-tork together for the general uelfare. 
Indeed, inso.far as it eventually h e ld up prices and held down 
p-:-oduction, the liRA constituted a hindram~e to recovery,. As 
\1illia.~ S~.royan said., :hea:ring a radio announcer say that 
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aspit'in was a member of th(\ llRA: 
.. • .. 1-'Iaybo the UP~ is a mer11ber 0£ aspirin.. l!J.r-yt.:c.y • 
tozether they r!li1.ke a p:r-etty slic]t tea..-n. They o.re dcad-
e~ng n lot of'_pain_, bl1t they aren't _ pr0v~nting any 
pe.J.n. Everythl.ng i~ tho s arae overyl.rhere. !:> 3 
Roosevelt l-:as sec.rctly ralievcd vlhen tho URA \-las 
declo:red uncon~ti t:utional by the Suprnme Court in 1935, on 
the grolmd~ that it trans:rorred legislative fun~tions to the 
president end that it mado improper us.e of the f'edel .. al pm-1ers 
over interstate connne~co. >L~ 
Be.for-e leaving tho !lilA, lt. rnlst be stated ·that the 
more enduri...~e; aehieVelnent-~ o:f the. NRA lay not in the ceo· 
norldc, but in the social .field.. Het'e., the ~ffiA tt.ccomplished 
a number• or reforms. It established tho principle of mc.>:imtu:t 
hours m1d hlriimum ~rages on a national basis. It abolished 
child labor. It dealt a 1'atal blol·r to s1-rentshops. It made 
collective bargaining a national policy and thereby t:rans-
:forncd the position of organized labo·r" It gave ne1-1 status 
to the consume:r. It stamped out a n1.nnber of unfair trad.o 
pract·ices. It set new standards or economic decency in Amer-
ican life--standards that oould not be :z-olled back, ~1hatever 
happoned to the NRA.-- Bu:t it did not achieve its basic .reason 
for existenee: recovery.S!> 
In the hope that federally· sponsored, regional pot-1er 
development _programs would stimulate re-covery_, Roosevelt 
enthuidastically approved the creation of' the Tenness-ee Val-
54Handlin, op. cit.; p. B8t. 
55schlesingor, !,h~ Cowin~ o1: the lTet-1 Deal, P• 174· 
. ; 
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1ey Authority~ 0£ all the ec..rl..y Ue\'t D~.al meo.su1•es, thG 'l.'\'!1. 
was the 1nost :L'lr~.1;;ins.tiv¢ in qoncoption t-~'ld 011o o:f the mot.t 
succ(!S$ful in Ol)ora,tion.. This r:as t:he one grc!'.t slicces::: in 
pl~nrd.ngi alth<:mgh it did not bring ~ecovery, either•56 
Two govortmrent plants f'or the niannfnctt\l'C · of' nl.t1•o.tes, 
bu11.t during_ Horld l!ar· I at Huscle Shoals,. on the Tennes!Jee 
RivoJ:l, hO.d long baen a sottt>ce of controversy. Senator 
Georeo 'He Norris had hoped the governraent uou:la 1•etain an,l 
oper.a .te them along with \·Tilson Da:rn, :from l·7hich they dr(n·t 
pot.:et-. But Coolidge and Hoover had vetoed bills to that 
ef.f'ect, prefe1•ring to s~ll out to. private O'l·mers. In 
l:la:y, 1933, the Tennessee Val:f:ey Author! ty Dev.elopmertt Act put 
the pl~.nt end. ds.m in the hands of' a public atithol"'ity l-!hicl+ 
was to use them :for flood control, f:or the generation of 
pot..ror-,. and tor the eeon<;mi~o develciPiilertt o.f the ~;hole region. 
'l;he SUCCeSS Of. this ll1E!tl.SUI"O i .n salvaging both the natvral and 
htu.n.~n resources of the area encourage-d t.he construction f.•f 
tha Hoover (1936}_, Bonneville (19 .37), nnd Grand Coul:E3e ( 19h4) 
Dams. But Roosevelt's suggestion in 19)7 ot six regional 
developill.ents ln o·ther parts .of. the. country bore no .fruit. 
By' then, planning had lost its attractiveness and the empha-
sis in Congress ha.d shifted to contpetition. 
other r~eove.ry measures were tried. The President. 
pursued an inflationary policy in devaluing the d.ollar in 
J"une, 19JJ, }loping to restore the pPic.e· lev~l Of 1926. 
S6conlcin, op. elt., p. 49 • 
·;·' 
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Prices rose s1ightly, but not n(}a.rly so r.1i.te:b: as the Ad\i.t.i .. nis-
trat;ion ha.c expected; both ~he P;.~esid+:)t1t 1 s .fi:,cal ~~nd ri~one­
tary program had no si~nif:te:.ant e.fi'oct. 57 
Roosevelt ins.ti:tut~d a. .nt!lilber of finanei.~l refot,;ns 
in the hope o.r bringine about general econornic stability so 
that r:tecover;-y could be realized. 'l"hcse· innluded vo.ri:Ol.l3 
ban)dng r.estricti·ons and the establish.nmnt of'. the Secu'tlitieo 
sn(l E.--:change Conmrl.ssion.. The Securities Exchnnc;o Act of 1CJ3!r 
set up the Securities and Exchenge Com>"!lission (SEC) to r~­
ulate trading practices, to .force .full disclgsure o£ inf"ox·nm-
tio.ri, arid to regulate margin requirements on stock purchase.::r. 
Stockbroke!'s and investment bank~.ra compl a.ined bitterly li.'bcut 
. < . 
the :rest·rictions this legi.slation 1-rould place on th~t.l. &.t 
despite bitter ·d.e:Pate in Consross, the bill t.ta.s passed in 
June, 19.34, and the die-hard opponents or all goverr_rne·ntal 
reg-ulation o1' the finaJ'!cial eoinmuni'l;y \-lel'e decisively 
defeated. 
Therea:f'ter, the goverr.ment increasingly moved a\1ay 
from !~~a:rining to regulation o'£ the business community as a 
means to ensure .fair competition anti., hopefully, recove17. 
The An-titrust Division o-:r the Departnent of' Justice, under 
Thurmond Arnold, put teeth under the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts.58 Other regulation measures included the Public Uti:l-
ity Holding Act o£ 1935, 1-rhich ga-:re the Fed.eral 'PoHer Gem-
mission the right ~o set rates., prohibit most pyramiding, 
,......_-~ ... ..----..... 
56rbid., p. 881. 
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~nd SUbjected securities Of' SUCh ontcrpPiSOS tO the CCint.r ol 
of SEC. 
lfuile the ne~;T Deo.l h a d gro.:ltly ir.lprove d stability 
and security in the no..tionnl ecort:Ol'ly, it h.~d not broucht 
satit.;:f~ctory r~covery, nor did it end the Ore3o.t D!:pression. 
In. 1939, the:re l·lnS still no ~ssurcmco th~t the defects or 
1929 bad haon rectified. 'l'he ·eo.ono::~1y had follm-rcd e l-:aver-
i ·ng course. The level o:r. business activity end of riat.ion~l 
income had l~isen unsteadily ·hetl'recn 193.3 mid 1937, alt}iqUzh 
construction :lagged s~:riously.. Than followed a scriou-o 
recess·ion in 1937, \-Jhich lasted into tho sunmtcr or 1938, "lith 
. 
m3llu:faoturing;, exports, and r.ri.oes slm11plng once rr.orc• Tho 
.. 
re.covery of 1939, 1r1h:ile welcome., was not .firm cnouch to 
aosure Americans that; their trouble.s 'Here ove~. 
The long-term econoinlc :fai1uro or tho decade rev·oc.l r)c:l 
the f'ull impact of' th~ G:t>~fl,t Depresoicm. In the ten year-s 
aft()~ 1929:, thE> re.al national Ot1tput C>f all goocs in t}l~ 
United. States rose by only six p.¢rcent ~ and that lt~s entire.l:r 
due to an increase in the labo.r i;orce .. 59 
The :most visible .t"orm ot tho failure \r~s une~:p1oy­
ment.o Throughout the decade, the nu.tnber of Jobless ne.ver 
san.lC belot·r one sixth or the potential labor :force, wi.th a 
result that a large pa rt of' th~ rop.llation ,.,.~s unable to con-
a ·. d o40 it was literally ciestitute ' 60 ~ume, an some .L 
Almost as important E4"'1 indic~.tion o.f tho detects tn 
59Ibid., P• 871. 
i· 
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the economy l'ITas the persistence ot: the far·m. proble;-:1. The 
depression in agricultuN~ 1-ras alrcndy ten ye£trs old in 1929. 
I .t deepened. in the next four years; and p't'olonecd drouzht 
and_ dust stor.~s in 1934 and 1935 intensii'ie(l the misery. 
~tHeen 193.3 ancl 1937, there t-tas a rise in farm pricen and 
incomes, but only enough to get back to tho 1930 level. In 
1938 nnd ·1939, there Has anothcn~ slip and another recovery, 
but no escape f'Pom. the dittieul ties that had burdened e.gri-
c.ultur·e since 1920--excess production, lo't·! prices, inadequate 
income. For the :farmer-$, as ror the unemploye-d, the Great 
Depression er.Ldured tor the whole dEicade .. 
The l-Ieu Deal pumped money into its relief and recov-
". 
ery progralllS, but its e·fforts were too small and intermittent 
to be e:f'fecti ve. 'i'h.e Hell Deal !'ailed to genel"ate cnour,h 
demand to COW1ter the tendencies or the productive system to 
contraction. Recovery wpuld remain an elusive .goal until 
World \-lar II ca..me and the economy t..ras expflndine; once aeo.in. 
But it must also be eaid that when rec·overy did come, it l-Tas 
.much more soundly based. The United State.s had a stronger, 
t bl . . d . .1 ~ _, t.t 61 more s a e econom~c an soc~a .~.. .ounua ... on .• 
Iri 19.35, .Roosevelt latLl'lehcd a second ne-..; Deal l'thich 
emphasized re.d·orm, rather than :relie.f or reeove:::-y measures. 
The Second l1e.H Daal embraced a t-Jide range of reform. legisla-
tion as a consequence o:r t-1idespread political discussion. In 
the president's :znind, the most important legislation of hie 
61Ibid., p. ,386 and Handlin .. , op. cit., PP• 870-73. 
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administration uns the Socinl Security· Act.62· 
The Sociel Security Act created a ns.tional syst~m or 
old-a~c insurance in l·ihich roost employees l·rere compelled to 
participate. At ti1-e age or sixty-five, wor!rers Hould receive 
retiro'•~ont a.J.intJities f"inanced by taxon on their 1.-lages and 
their employer•s· p ayroll; the bene.fits uo'Ul.d va1:•y in p1~opo1~ ... 
tion to hm..r l11Uch they earned. In addition, thl) .federal gov-
erl1lnent offered to share- equally vri th the s to. tcs the c.a.ra of 
de.sti tu.te persons over sixty-five t-1ho uottld not be able to 
take p art in the old-age insurance system. The act also set 
up a t'edaral-stnte system of ·un.employ:ment insurance, and pro-
vided national aid to tho st~tes, on a Matching basis, foro 
' 
cat'e o£ depend~·nt roo.thers and -children, the crippled, the 
blind, a,nd for public health serYicea. 
This· act l'TaS a: breakthrough in the de•J-elopment Of the 
modern -welfare state and. a nevr landJ11ar1c ir~ Jl.meriean h i st()ry. 
Roosevelt said, in s·igliin,g the e.ct: 
The pas.so.ge of thi.s ac-t lrith so .fet-r dissenting votes 
and ~Tith so much intelligent public support· is deeply 
s·ignificant or tha progress which the t..merican _people 
have made in thought in the social field and auareness 
or znethod.s of using cooperation to overcome social hg_z-
ards against which the individunl alone is inadequate. . 
Dul'ine · the fifteen year.s I hB.ve been . advocatil1g such 
l~gislation as this I have learned that the Aille:rican peo-
ple t·ri.""it such security as the lav! provides. It t-rill make 
this great Republic a better end a h~.ppie.r place to live--
£..or us, our children and our children's child::r-en. It :is 
.a profound and. sacred SA:tisf'action to have had some part 6 in securing th1s great boon to the people of our country. 3 
62~/:r>ight, op .• cit., p .. 380. 
63Leucht.enblirg, ~ NeH Deal ,. pp. 8,5-86. 
r 
,,, 
Roos.ovclt 1ate.r. sE~.id of' the Social Security J.ct: 
It ·doo~r 11ot reprooent a complete solUtion of the 
pl:"oblerlls or econmnic ~ecurity,. but it does ropres.ent n 
S\l.b$tantia.l, r1ecessnr:r begil'lnin:c:. • •• Thin is truly1 lezisletion in the interest oi: the natiopal velfar~. {) .. ~ 
U{)t-r the pouel"' or Congro~g to legislate .for the generAl l·lcl-
fal:"'e h~d a nou mec:n1ing. It 'Vtas est~blished thnt; the indi-
viduo.l had olerir-cut social righta.65 
A succession of reforn1 raeasure~ in 19 35 f'olloued the 
passage or tl16 Social Security Act. In tho regulatory ricld 
the. Iublic UtilJ. ty l!oldine Act was passed. A Banking Act and 
Revenue Act (Health Tax Act) 1-mre pansed, also. The aim of 
the Revenue Act wa:s to redistribute tho tax burdon from the 
·. 
poor to the rich, but the fil'iished bill -.r~.s considerably 
'5-tatcred. do1m. Not until the liar years 1-1as there a 'SUbstan-
tial ehang·e in the distribution of' income. 66 
As a result o~ the Supreme Court declarinr; the lURA 
unconstitutional on Nay 21, 1935, the Roosevelt Adr.rlnis·trn .. 
tion put its support behind the llagno·r .Act {National Labor 
Relations Act). This act 'trou1d replace the l:abor provisions 
o£ the outlaHed NIRA. The t'lagner Act created a .ile-;.; Hational 
Labo~ Relations BOard ( NLRB) for administrative purposet~ and 
upheld the rights of employees to join labor organizations 
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
64Ibid. 
65t-rri(Pht, op. c:i,t., P• 381; Con':{in:. op .. eit., p. 60; 
Leuchtenburg, <.:.>Franklin ~ R.oosevelt and the l!£l!. Deal, pp. 
1~-D· . 
66Ibid. 
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o~.;ll choosing. Tho H~..ener Act 1 like the HI:u.~ t:ms a bold st.op 
fcn•uar·d. in breaking do.,_m the inequali.ty Of p a r(';aining pOHC.r 
bet-..rcen employees and employers. lt t·1E',s ono of: the r.tost 
drastic legislettive innovc-~tiops or the decade. Big labor, in 
or1e S\ve~p, almot;t gained c.qua.lity Hith businesr..,. It thl .. <:.n·t 
the t-!oie;ht of" governncnt behind th3 right of' lribor to b~rrr.ain 
co11cctiv$ly, and compelled employers to accede peacefully to 
the unionizati on of plants. 6-7 
The retorrns continued until.1939,. J.'Tom 1937-1939., 
Roos-evel.t and Conc;ress embarked on another round of legisln-
tion to pull the country out of' ec011omic c:r-:tslfJ. Th.ts 
1nc1.udod. the Bo.nkhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act 1 the t·TP.gnci•-
"' Steagall Housing Act.J the administrative :reorganization of' 
certain o:epartments, and the creation o£· the s·econd AAA. 1J.•h.e 
.final major Uet-1 Deal rnea.sure , the Fair La.bo1• Standards l.ct of 
1938, consolidated soms of the early gains of the :NRA and, in 
the :main, completed Roosevelt t s \tel!" are program. The nit~ 
codes !'orbade child labor and often set minimum 1-t:iGes and 
mrudmum hours. The :N'el-1 Deal aimed at th.ese ~~me goa.l5 on a 
permanent basis. The bill pass9d in June, 1938. Under the 
act, th~ labor of ali childl"en under sixteen vsas prohibited, 
the minim.Uill 'trace 1-ms set a.t tt-Ienty-i'i ve cents an hour, anu 
beyond .forty-f·our hours a vreek, overtime 1-ras to be paid. 
Like other t-Tel.fare measuz'es, many ·t-rorlcers (e.o;ricultural and 
small retail, .for e:r;emple) 1-rere exempt .froJit the provisions 
67Leuchtenburg' Franklin D. R-:>osevelt and ~ llm-t 
Deal., p. 151. . 
,,-· 
of thia e.ct;, but :it t-7:ts a beginnint~· 
In 19;30:, a much :rnore revolutionary ·reor5aniznPion bill Has. 
rejected by Ccmz~ass. Other far-rso.cl;lil1S r.e.for·~ns, such ~.s 
sev~n tleH TV:A 1 si vrere ~pnlY(}d by Conc;~~ess. tn 1939, the 
House rejected, oven. Jlrl;ld housing and spend5.n~ measur0s. Th.e 
.Ne11 D-3$.1.1 which had. bec;un in a burst of' energyt $i1ni'1Y 
p;3tered. out .in 1938 and. 1939. At'·i;er. 1939.-: J{oosev~lt incrcr:~s­
inr;ly co.:ncentrated his e:C.forts c>n foreign poliy~es. 
.· . 
Chapter 5 
COHCLUSIOH 
ACL."'llittedly, the gqoq society Has not achieved. &~ a 
t-esult of Fabianism or the progre.ssive or ne.-r Deal r;tove-
rnento. l'To society has yet a.chieve·d this J.onc;-sts:riding id_aal. 
But as a result of movements such ns these, a beginning has 
been made. A better li!'Q for o.ll is no;·1 seen as a d1st.i.nct 
pos~~ibility instead e>-f a.s a remot.e utopian droam. The abun-
dant sbuie~.Y .c.an be realized :Cor all. Groups such as tho 
Fabilll'l SociaJ.is ts ;av.ed the 1-tay to11rards the devolol)rnent of' 
·the modern wel.fare stat~e, one route to.uards the good socisty. 
ThroushoUtthis thesis, the author has sousht to 
point out that the ideals and progr.a..'!ls of tho Fabien Social-
ists l-rere first implemented in Eneland and then in America. 
The author bas contended that those ideas ru1d progrroits or 
the Fabian Socialist~ are cornpa:rable to a developing move·-
titent in the United States tot.;ard the 1-relf'are s.tate. A final 
aur.rua.t,ion o.t the major ideals and pt•ograms or the Fabim1s 
trill onee again sho>·I the validity' o;f tb.is the:;i:J. 
Tne ov~rarching gonl of t}).e F'abians, a .s it was a.l~o 
of the progressives and Ne1-r Dealers, l>ms to aszure a .fuller, 
happier lire JJ.or all men. Six s'll.bgoals uerc · $e¢n ~s · ne ce~,.. 
sary to a~hiev-e thl.s ideal. First,. the FabiP..ns called for 
the elimination of' poverty. This l-tas a basic tenet or the 
I 
., 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
i 
! 
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14.2 
Fabia::ts. 'fh~y felt thnt therA coulc1 b<.: no gene r al har,pi nc.3 s 
and woll-being u11ti l poverty \·tan era dicate-d f.ro:m this e ur• th. 
T'ney rough·!; stronr;ly £or its eliminaJ;ion. Tho Fubian :S :felt 
that the most ei'fective Hs.y to stril<:e out at the .roots o-r 
poverty HO'Ulfl be through tho esta.blishmen1.; of a national rntn-
inn.tm income. They Here ronong tho first to e.dvocate this. 
~:ith a nD.tional lllinimtUn income, eech mn:n HOUld bo in. a po~!.~ 
tion to move out or that slur11 and into a job he ltaa more 
sui ted tor. Each man HOulcl then h~we ~Oll.~.o: dtgni ty and not be 
subject to degredation fJlld/o.r desti'tution. 
Because the Fabians ner•e pz~E·.r_; Illati3t.3, they did not 
leave the !ilatter thero. l·ni-en they sal>~ tlw.t a national m:tn-
< 
imum income W~R uri.lilcely tp pass in rarlironent"- in th~ U3~I' 
f'uture 1 they d.id not bury their ha-a:ds in th~ s~nd and l-ra:it 
tor- the propi tioue moment. lnstea.d., the Fabians .fought• foro 
the elimination of poverty step by step. As a result or 
Fabian propaganda, the Fabians cha.ng~d the clim.a.te o:r opinic·n. 
in E.'ngland to the belief that poverty could, in!'}eed, be oli"rrt-
inated. Al.so, the Fabians shovred that it t-.ras f'easiblCI to 
eJ.iminate poverty, and that the moans to its elin1ination 
would ba through specific action--through a. system of social 
security above all, but also th~ough such lesser measures as 
ttncr.1ployment legislation, ho'llsing legislation, prmrisions for 
he-alth care, reduction ·oi: hours_, o.nd. m.ini:mu.'il \-rages. .And so 
th~,y ;ought sLrongly fo·r these. A crowning achievement or 
the Fabians crone in 1946, t-rhen several acts of Par~:ianent 
extet1d.ed and r .eo1•genized the t-Thole sy-ste!tl ot social :t.nsur-
i ... 
ance. No-..r ev~ryone had tb.~ ri.g:ht to :r:ree medical care. 
\;Jorlcittrr)Tlen, )lottld pe eonmenaated for inju~i¢s. Fa.rn:ilies were 
given alloH'P.nces tor children. The a~ed bad ~<>Jne r.1eans to 
1 live on. · 
The progressives did not really nreua f'o~ tho elim-
ination of poverty. They vrarited to ~elieve social dis.tross 
but they 1-rer.e less intere.sted in z-e::tlly grappling with the 
'Nhole problem. Instead, they often deYotec1 thoir ener'3ies to 
by 1912 ., 
of child 
a child~ ·labo:r bill ua.s enacted riri<J the Ao:-..:;•won Bi 11 ·H 2:s 
pn~sed, YThich established an e igh:t-hou-::- c::..y fer r-~i1rc~J.d 
l·!.O!'~ not lookin~ that; far> ance.o. 
The Hcu Dea l is somewh~. t .clifforcn t. I'::ot.:~ nut:·t')t' con-
D-:itroit,. Nichir;nn, October 2 , 1032: 
lio,..r, my :triends, th~ philo::;or:hy of' soci-al justiqe 
1seo p. 57; ~upra. 
. ..,... · 
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th~t I ron g:oing to to.lk about this Sabbath dny, the .rhi-
lorrorh:V <>f social justico through nocial action. calls 
de:f'initely, plainly, 1'or the reduction of poverty.. And 
Whnt do We m.a~n l-ihen v;o talk about the redl.\ction of r.ov-
orty? }!e moan the reduction or the causes o.f poverty. 
\1b.en 11e havo on epidenii.c of' di.sc ~oe in these modern drt:rs, 
t-!hat de we do? t\"e turn in the first instance t.o find 
out th9 sources i'rom '\·thich the disease htts come , and t-Ihon 
't-re he.ve found those sources, thosQ. c auses, l~e turn tho 
encn->gy of our attack upon them. 
l!e have ~ot -'beyond the point in xnod~rn civilization 
o£ merely tcying to .f'icht an epidmnic ot d;i.scn.9e by . t::tk-
ing care ot th.e victir.ts n.fter they are stricl~cn. t-Ic do 
tJtt\t; but l·t0 do more. 'de seek to nrevent i .t; and the 
nttack on poverty is not very unlihe tlw nt.tn.cJ:: on ditl-
en3e. He are sa ekinG the cause~ n.na 1-:ho~ t·re h~.v.e found 
ther'!l, vle must turn our Qtta.c1-:: upon them. 
The Soc:tal Security Act of 193~) is the best exr-:.:11ple 
oi' Hoosev·eJ. t t s preventn.ti vc t·.tar on poverty. Innt0ad of hav-
ing the e.p:;d go on relief, there \mr~ .old :J.g c rcnsions thnt 
uoulcJ come to thell1 o.f right. It uas n:ot ch arity; the uorkel"' 
had contributed . The act also provided for the unemployed , 
.and dependent mothers s.nd children• These people Hould no 
longer be foit~ot·ten. They had rights. Rooscv~l t smt this as 
the Fahia.-l'ls di<.:l, too. 
A second Fabian r;on.l uas equality of orportu <1i ty. 1-..s 
one Fabian so uptly described this ·idcr:.l :: 
It involves , accordingly, thn.t the Hqolc fund <'f ri?~t­
ural ability that ex·i sts :i.n n pCt?.!)10 sh:;..11 be ;.; i Vrin th~~ 
cb.cnce ot provin~ its car-~city , nnd tha:t t-:c shrill n:o 
lol..., ..,.e"l'Y stl.· ~·1"' ~ l ,. r --e _;..· ... ~ o· .~ t ' ,,: ....... h~, l.',t • .,. b ··.,. '' c ·~.~. · ·i ·· - .;. t 
-e• .... J.. v a. ~ e) ..!:- ' -.A..t. "' ..... "-- _.,j ......_..., ..~........ _ ""' _ " • """' . ... ,'1 · .~ ~-!.,;, _ -... 
the opportunity of .knot·:lccise and of traini~""lG for lcnd~: r-­
zhip. It rao!'.ns that. the 1-rholc 3oci~t:r :;~1~11 be or::;~1.zed 
r.o~ ~lent:y, ~'1n th!'l.t T!.O u~nh1 o P8~our~>?~ o.f r.i~mno~;r~~ c.r 
of' c apital s:u~ll be allo~red to r un to Hns te. Le~1<h:~r.1 
yes--men pn~1 ~·rome:>"'l c~o:ieli f'or ~:rccial t..hii:.i. t~.,. i n social 
e.d:;linistrntion. n.nd control, bu~ t.o co!:JI3 frm~ ~he t-;hol~ 
poople on the bn.3i!:!· o f the -.duest r;OS5ib lc diffu.::;ion of 
opTortuni ty f'.ron childi1ood years ri ght :into adul t life:. 3 
2 Rozw:~nc, op;. cit . , P• 47. 3see p. 31, supra. 
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['his goal has not been f1.1.ll:y a:ttaine<J either in 
ltmc1 or l:.raeriea. Recent D:dvances in ecru~atio11 in l~'neland 
h.~ve gone:: far in 1u~.king this gc.al pos~ible. In 191~"{, e.ll 
.childr~n in I!.'ngltmd t-Tere Xicquirc<l to s.ttepd scll.ool unt~l age 
go. 
i:'rogrensive proz_1 .. cuns sought equality o-r opporturd ty. 
Theod.ore Roosevelt sm.·; the gcver11n1ep.t P. .. s a moder•o:toi• bct\.fl1eh 
businc::Js ancl labor. He ~fai(l: 
Let us . strive . ~t~adily .to secu:re justice as bctueen 
man,. .an<l 1nap ltith<:>ut regard. to a .mun' s posi ti.on.t social or 
.oth(;}rvrise. Let us remember justi.ce. e·an nevc:tt be jus-t:te~ 
unless it is equal. Do justice to the rich man and oxa.ct 
justice rrom hlm•-justice to the capitalist and justice 
to the ~otage~uorker.4 -< · 
· \;loodrotrr l.filson ~;as also a bqlieve r in equal i ty ot 
opportunity. He l-1anted to ~eesta.blish the fair ru.l.es of the 
ga."lle· so that tho competitive free enterpr>ifle s:ys.t em could be 
in balance ~gain. This \.ras the "llel·7 Fre ecl.om." 
Frariklin Roosevolt also strongly believed in equalit:r 
o:f opportunity.. Because of this belief'; Roosevelt felt t;hat 
labor should no longer have an unequal bargaining position in 
A..?flerican li.fe. So he encouraged the p assage or the \-lagner 
Act, which tnrel-r the lleie;nt o;f gover1m:ient ba~1incl the r~~eht of 
labor to 'bargain collectively. 
It seems that both the progressives and 1je1-r Dealers 
saw the st:ruggle :rcn: equality of opportunity largely in 
r 
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tcr·~nc o-r business n_. labor~ becawre that l·ras a p:r$ssing 
issue o£ the day. They seem not to have ~oncerned themselves 
m.uch wit.h th~s issue in its broadest sense as :rrc::mi ng the 
oppor.::turrl. ty tor all t ,o have the chance to achieve their- t'Ull-
est potentialities in a society organized ror plenty. 
Neither fugland not' America has yot .fully achieved 
thls :ideal. Part or the :re~.::;on may be th!J.t both nations nave 
not yet totally re.jected the ~ompetitive economics o.f scar-
clt;:y ideology. +'Jle idea that you cannvt J;>eally 2.llouyour 
neighbor to get ahead of: you still :Pemains. The economy of 
abundance, thou8h possible, is not yet acceptable to the· 
individual.. 
A third Fabian ideal rras that of gradualisr.h Like 
th,e Fabians~ both the progressives and the Nel'T Dealers sought 
evolutionary char1ge· l·rithin the democra tic system.. The·.se 11e~e 
no.t revolutionaries. Part of:" the reason the Fabi~.ns sought 
evolutionary eh~ge l-ms because that t-Tas the only way they 
·• Qould see their program being enacted. Plus, they all ha.d a 
stake in the exis.ting society. Like the Fabians, the Pl'":O-
gre.ssives and Uel-t Dealet-s 1-rere pragmatic gradualists. 
Theo(:lore Roosev~lt called for a Securities .and Exchange Com-
mission, so.cial insurance, ~a.'1.d acceptance or big unio.nism, 
but ~-ra~ t-dl:ti'ng to -ac:eept lesser gains because that ~ms tho 
only .realistic thing to do. From the start, FDR 't-tanted a 
social security act, but in the Fir.st One Hundred Days, 
Roosevelt concentrated on emergency measures be·cause he had 
to. 
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Hot·rever, there t:as one major· difference here. Tho 
FabiDJlS beJ.ieved that, as o. result of.' gl"adualism, Britnin 
l-tOp.ld become a aociaJ.i.st state, their utopia. The fun::rric£tns 
never llent that fal". They \-ranted to chart a middle course 
betueen laissez-f.aire capitalism a1td ~ocial:tmn. They uould 
buttress or modify oapit?.J.ism and :make it wo1~l~nble, but they 
uould not reject it and individualisl:t. 
A :fourth Fabian ideal l-Ta.s that of a :moro equitable 
distribution or the uealth. As a result· of this, more could 
live a fUller life. Both Britain a.nd the 1Ynit·ed Stat~s have 
had di.f.ficulty in att~ning this gqal, largely due tO the 
fa.ct that those in pot-rer al""e reluctant to tax themselves out 
of existence,.. The g~aduated income tax· bas been the 'basic 
means to attain this· goal. During Ta'ft • s administration, the 
Sixteenth, or Income. Tax, Amep<i.'n.ent was passed, l·Thich pro-
vided £or a .federal inoo:me ta:lt.. This t·ras a major stop tol'-
ward in allo1-ring a redistribution of tho wealth.. In 1935; 
the vlea1th Tax Act l-TaS passed unde:r Rooseve.lt, a bill w-Thich 
sought to reverse the tax burden !'rom the poor to the rich. 
The result, however, was a wate~ed-do\m bil.l. So in America, 
as in England, there has been some redistribution of' the 
wealth, but nothing nearly as extensive -as that envisaeed by 
the: Fabian Socl.alists. 
Also, during FDR's presidency, an .attempt l<Tas ma(le to 
redistribute the nation 1 s l-real.th away, predorninently f"·rom 
business to other ailing sectors or the econo:;.ny. So the AAA, 
TVA, and RA were established. It has helped .. 
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A ri.fth Fabian ideal l-19Jl their bclier in .f~eedozn and 
democracy. The Fabians s~w no incompatibility bet1-1een 
socialism and .tre~dom and demo~raey. As Harold 'Vfilson said: 
.There a.re those, particularly in the u.s., ltho 
believe that the a.ssertian of public responnibil:ity fo·r 
thG means Of full errtploymcnt, social ~dV.n.YlCO, mate~nnl 
or s:piri tun.l, is a. fatal s te.p in tho direction of C.Ol:J.-
inimism. It is our belief" that o.. ~ocialist approach to 
Britain's problems, so 1:tir from be in& a l-urch in the 
di·rection of' conimunisnt, mel'.ns the fullest floHeri,n~; o.r 
democracy·. For wb.il.e we yield to none in our deteeni ... 
nation to f:ight fot• the basic poli tic:nl frcotl.oms--:Lx•eo-
dotn. or: sy)eech, of relif.';icn, or public f;lectinr,, o:t~ the 
ballot--\-:~ believe thnt no man in tr1l1¥r fr~c l·:ho i!:: in 
cconor..t.ic th.r>a.llc1o.,, v:ho is u :dD;vc to U'16!ny-,ln~·;-: .'..ent, or> 
economic in::;0:ctr:c•it:y, or the crirr'lins; co~t of. ~8d:i.c}ll 
t .... e..;t~"'l1. ;... , •1.,... , ""' .- .... -.... -'~l --'\ · ,.,. .. - ~"·\.'"'""' 1· - ~ .. ~i- .. - ~ ~""' · .;. . ·.· ..,. · .:-·~ .• _. · ,..._ . < •!~· v .J •••.• , ). ..!. "~C o\..) v.1C 0}. 1 ... ()l. v ..... t · !...~ ....:..:. 1 .; . .• 1 L·.·.•. ·- wo ~. ~ 
mnte.rnal and the r:ricole:·:~: i ll'.:nn.ter:l.P.l nons 0 t.o :"l. fall !.•t • 
li!'o n.nd tto fullest .rouliz<"tt.lon ot hi~1 i.:nJ r::; ':;;:-~ ;.m<1 
n.hili.ti es • .7 
It 1l.lmost goes Hi thout saying that both the r.rof~t't?.S-
si·ves nnd lk\-T Dealers believed in freedo:11 and t!:::•·;.mcracy. r~~ 
there was one significant di.fforence. l•n1oro the progrcs:;i· . .rc 3 
stressed the extension o£ political dor.iocrrtcy--thc direct 
electi·on of' SentJ.:tors, the primary, the re.coll .. nnd rofol~(}.;luU!'1··-
the .n<n-; Dez.lers, liJ:e their Fabian countcrTC~.!'t~, cone entre. ted 
on economic dcnqcxoacy. 'i'hey vere cocr.i~tmt of the fact that 
poli ticai democracy rrn::; dependent upon the existence of' ec~O'!'t-
o1ni.c democracy 1 bectuse they sn:H a man Has not truly free i.f 
he had no hrend to eat. noosevelt 1.:ould see that relief \O:;:tn 
~ive11 instBArl of tn.J.kil"lP; cl)out n di'[iect nrimnry. 
Lastly,. a sixth Fabi2.n idenl ·Has a belie.f in rositi ve 
governr.tent. GoveM1.."'3"!nt is seen as a positive good. Th~J ~ov-
5see p •. 63, supra. 
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ern..rnont acti voly intervenes in the intet~ests of tho gcnet~nl 
l:el.farc. It nr:sumes a rcsponsibil:i. ty .for tho.se Hho are Clos-
titute • The fl'OV.ern.'l!cnt acts • The HC]f'~.re state cr:torgos. 
In A"'nerica, th:ts positive vieH or tho stute \ ·7Zs just ermrr;:i.ns 
in the progressive period. 'J..lj,"le movement auay tron1 la.issoz-
faira tl.nd individ\talis:m hn.d begun 1-rith Tneodoro Roosevelt 1 s 
Square Deal regulatory measu~es in the interests ot: the gen-
eral t..rolfaro. Front then on, no loneer t>fas a man solel.y reg-
ponsible to hinrself'. But neither Has the scope of' r;overn-
mental action that ~ride. For in the progressive perj_od, a. 
total l:>r·e$2<: !'rom a Olimi ted) nega,tivistic concept of gov·ern-
ment had not been made. There 111ere too many people who 
objected to these proogressive programs as out~ioe the sphere 
of acceptable governmental action, and so r.ru.c.h of the pro .. 
gressive program was not enacted until the lre1>! Deal period. 
Attitudes had to change be:rore Theodore Roosevelt 1 s social 
insurance program could be enacted. 
Under Roosevelt, the welfare state emlle into its om1.. 
There was no longer any doubt ·t-rhether the United States had 
a. pos.itive government. The Ne1-t Deal assumed the responsi-
bility for· gua.ra...~teeing every American a m.ininnlm standard. of 
subsistance, a long ... tirne Fabian goal. Roosevelt said that he 
@.ee~pt~o the r~sponsibili ty for the people's t-rell-being. 
The government of the United States l·ras making sure that no 
one ... rould eo hungry or cold, and that everyone l-TOuld have n 
decent place to live. This undertaking ga;ve "ord:!.naryn peo-
ple a se!lse of security they had never had before; a formerly 
hostile world bccruno more frier'!dly. This tn.::::k t·Ht3 not cor1-
pleted at once; time Has nocclod. But beginnings l!Ol'e nade, 
and th~re t·tere sharp changes from ·olde!."", carele3s ·Hays. 
Only the wealthy had been fre-e .fro:n the fear of l·m.nt 1.Uitil 
then. This one endeavor l·Tas the .furthest advance to~·mrd 
equality ever mnoo in this country.6 
By 1938, t-!hen the NeH Deal ended, there ~ms no doubt 
that Roosevel.t had made signi fie ant progresn touard.s making 
the United States a lr'telr·a:t•e state. In three arcas·--socinl 
security, labor protection, and housing, significant a.dvancos 
had been made. Also agriculture, through subsidi.zed produc-
tion and price control programs, no''~ ha.d a. :more just distri-
bution of the wealth ot: the country. So, too, did organ:i.zed 
labor. Roos.evelt did make significant progre·ss in fulfilling 
his goal: 
• ... • to do what any honest Government of any countr·y 
would do; try to increase the security and happiness o:r 
a larger nwnber or people in all occupations o:f li:(e and 
in all. parts .or the country; to give them more or the 
good things of life; to give tham a greater cl.istraibuti.on 
not only or tiealth in the na.rroH terms,. but of t·malth in 
the wider terms; to give them places to go in .the sum.'ner-
time--recreation; to give them assurance tht:'.t they are 
not going to. starve in their old age; to give hon'3~t 
busil_less a c~~nc: to go ahead and make a reasonah~e . 7 profl.t, anCI to g1.ve .everyone a chance to earn a l1.ving. 
T'ais statement clearly shOHS the Fabia.."'l in.fluenc·e. 
Roosevt::"lt ha.d tried to rna.ke lif~ better for more or the .Amer-
ican people through his relief, recovery7 and. re.fot"ln p1•ogrrons. 
6Tugvrell, op. cit. 1 p. vii. 
7Schlesinger, .!llil Politics of" Unhea"~ral, p. 652. 
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A s.t-a!'t ·on eliminating poverty and brine;ing abcmt necurity 
vas made 1-rith Eoosev.elt • s Social Sec\u:•j.ty progrfu-ll.. Thrm.xzh 
the Health Tax Act, Roosevelt had tried to have a mDl'e cql.ti-
table distribution of the t-realth. Finally, Roosevelt h~i.d 
tried to baln..l'l¢0 Ol:" equallze opportunities in this co:1nt:::>y 
so that business, labor, and s.gricnlture could comrete f'airly 
and equally ror the distribution of the l:ealth. He uas ever 
against privilt?.ge, again as the Fabians '\·:ere. I!' the Fab:tan 
Socialists are considered the architects of' the Hclfare state 
in Britain, Roosevelt, too, is considered the architect of 
the wol:fare state in the United States. 
In the interim, the Roosevel.tian r>eforms have bcon 
expanded and enlarged upon. A national mininn.tln income is now 
being talked about seriot1.sly. This, too, has been advocated. 
by the Fabians £rom the beginning, both ·because it keeps up 
demand .and purchasing pol·ret• and because it is the just, 
decent thing to d.o. There is no doubt that the prog~C\.nt and 
ideals of the Fabian Socialis·ts hnve had, a.."'ld continue to 
have an impact on the 4-'Tlerican experience in this century. 
-~-
· ... .;....:· . . 
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